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Education is generally seen as one of the most important investments in a person’s life. 
Education raises earnings, improves health, adds to a person’s positive habits, and improves 
overall life satisfaction (Becker 1993). The benefits of education are not restricted to the 
individual, but spill over to firms and the economy as a whole (Blundell et al. 1999). A more 
educated workforce improves a firm’s productivity and profitability and thus enhances national 
economic growth.  
Human capital theory, as pioneered by Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962), views the 
decision to invest in education as analogous to investments in tangible forms of capital. 
However, while investments in physical capital are strictly the firm’s own decision, investments 
in human capital involve interactions between firms and their workers. Firms invest in their 
workers’ human capital to improve efficiency and increase overall firm output, at the cost of 
the foregone value of the workers’ time not spent on productive activities. Workers invest in 
human capital to improve their labor market opportunities and to maximize earnings, at the cost 
of the foregone value of time spent in education and training.  
Despite the wealth of literature on human capital investments, some fundamental empirical 
questions remain unsolved. In particular, researchers have paid little attention to the question 
of how changing market environments might affect returns on investment. To sustain their 
profitability and employability, both firms and individuals might need to adapt their investment 
strategies to respond to market changes. Only few studies investigate the role of changing 
market environments in determining returns to educational investment. Yet, this type of 
evidence is crucial for choosing an optimal investment strategy both for the firm and the 
individual. This doctoral thesis aims at providing an elaborate analysis of the factors influencing 
the realized returns to educational investments.  
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Throughout the analyses, I focus on dual vocational education and training (VET), as in this 
type of education both firms and individuals are involved in the investment decision 
(Muehlemann et al. 2007). VET combines formal education at vocational schools with on-the-
job training at a training firm. My empirical analyses are based on data from Germany and 
Switzerland, two countries with a strong VET tradition. Unlike other sectors of the educational 
system, VET is market-driven, i.e., individuals have no guarantee of receiving a training place, 
nor are firms obligated to provide training.  
The first project of this doctoral thesis analyzes how firms that provide and pay for training 
secure their return on human capital investment. For these firms, the outcome of interest is a 
better-educated and thus more productive workforce. To realize this outcome, firms must be 
able to retain at least some of their trained workers. The new training literature highlights the 
importance of labor market frictions for a firm’s ability to retain their training graduates. In this 
project, I investigate how firms retain their graduates if they are embedded in markets without 
these favorable market frictions.  
The second project analyzes individual investment decisions and focuses on the skill set 
that individuals acquire during their education. For individuals, the outcomes of interest are 
employability and earnings. To realize these outcomes, individuals must acquire skill sets that 
are valued on the labor market. I investigate the value of different types of skill sets and how 
these skill sets determine individuals’ labor market outcomes.  
The third project combines the firm and the individual perspectives and analyzes 
educational outcomes in a dynamic setting. Of course, firms and individuals want to maximize 
both their short-term and their long-term returns on investment. In the long run, market 
dynamics might fundamentally alter the working environment and might lead firms to demand 
different types of skills. Workers, in turn, have to respond to changed skill demands. In this 
project, I investigate how skill requirements have changed over time and how these changes are 
related to changes in wages.  
The existence of firm-financed training is not easily explained by standard human capital 
theory. According to this theory, profit-maximizing firms should be unwilling to offer and pay 
for the general training of workers who are likely to leave the firm after training. Instead, firms 
would simply free-ride on the investment of other firms by hiring fully trained workers. Starting 
with Harhoff and Kane (1997), researchers have investigated this apparent paradox, and most 
explanations focus on some type of market imperfection that allows training firms to recoup 
the training costs by extracting rents from graduates who stay with them at the end of the 
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training period (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Katz and Ziderman 1999; Booth 
and Bryan 2007; Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner 2010). Indeed, researchers argue that the 
absence of strict labor market regulations explains a firm’s reluctance to invest in the general 
skills of their apprentices (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999b; Bassanini and Brunello 2008).  
Thus far, little discussion exists on whether and, if so, how a large-scale VET system might 
function well in a different market environment. In this regard the Swiss case is highly 
insightful. Although the Swiss labor market is weakly regulated by international standards, it 
has a highly successful VET system (Muehlemann and Wolter 2011; Ryan, Backes-Gellner, 
Teuber, and Wagner 2013). To explain why firms invest in training if they are embedded in 
weakly regulated labor markets, I argue that firms use pay-for-performance plans to incentivize 
their graduates to stay. Personnel economic theory predicts that the most productive workers 
self-select into performance-pay jobs because of higher expected returns (Lazear 1986, 2000). 
I empirically test whether this prediction also applies to graduates from vocational education 
and training programs.  
My analysis uses representative data from a large employer-employee panel, which contains 
unique data on the base and bonus payments of individual employees. With this information, I 
construct two performance pay measures, one reflecting the amount of performance pay in 
relation to the total pay in a firm and the other the performance pay coverage, the share of 
workers receiving performance pay.  
To account for unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity and potential endogeneity, I 
run instrumental variable regressions. I instrument the performance pay measures with a 
variable on the occupational position, which provides information on the hierarchical position 
of employees. The idea of this IV strategy is that the occupational position should be positively 
correlated both with the amount of performance pay and the likelihood of receiving it. The 
higher the occupational position, the higher the amount of performance pay, and the higher the 
likelihood of receiving it. However, given that young training graduates all start in the same 
occupational position, this variable should not have any effect on the retention of training 
graduates. 
The empirical analysis shows that the occupational position is indeed a valid and strong 
instrument for the performance pay measures. I find that both the amount of performance pay 
and the likelihood of receiving it have a highly significant positive effect on the retention of 
training graduates. Given their higher retention success, performance-pay firms thus should 
also be more inclined to invest in general training than firms with fixed salaries. Market frictions 
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might thus not be a necessary prerequisite for firms to offer general training. Instead, even in 
competitive markets firms can offer and pay for general training if they adjust their payment 
strategy to incentivize their graduates to stay. Pay-for-performance plans are a successful means 
for training firms to secure their returns on educational investments.  
Even if firms offer and pay for training, individuals must take the offer and be willing to 
participate in training. This will only be the case if they benefit from their training effort. In the 
second project, I shift the focus to the individual perspective and investigate how training 
graduates secure their returns to educational investment. For the analysis, I draw on recent 
literature that suggests that the Mincer earnings equation—using the number of years of formal 
education as a measure of skill—cannot account for the considerable heterogeneity that exists 
within the same education group (Ingram and Neumann 2006; Poletaev and Robinson 2008; 
Kambourov and Manovskii 2009a, 2009b). This literature argues that different colleges and 
training institutions deliver different types of skill sets to their students, and therefore graduates 
achieve uneven levels of preparedness upon graduation.  
Lazear’s (2009) skill-weights approach formalizes this idea in a tractable and testable 
model. He assumes that all skills are general in their nature, but that the combination of single 
skills varies across firms. Because firms demand different combinations and different weights 
of skills, skill combinations become firm-specific. Lazear thus introduces a new concept of 
human capital specificity. The advantage of his view of human capital is that it provides a more 
differentiated explanation for employability and earnings opportunities.  
I transfer Lazear’s idea to the case of VET occupations and characterize these occupations 
in terms of their skill bundles. While Lazear defines human capital specificity on the firm level, 
I thus define it on the occupational level, assuming that skill weights are constant on the 
occupational level. I compare the skill bundles of VET occupations with the market weight to 
determine the degree of specificity of occupational skill bundles. The market weight comprises 
the market demand for different skill bundles. If the market demand is high, i.e., many 
occupations use a certain skill bundle, then the degree of specificity of that skill bundle is low 
and vice versa. This approach allows me to define and rank VET occupations in terms of their 
degree of specificity.  
I then investigate the effect of occupational specificity on individual employment 
opportunities and earnings. In addition, I compare VET occupations with each other to 
determine how similar they are in terms of their skill bundles and how the skill similarity 
between the original occupation and the new occupation affects changes in wages. Instead of 
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leaving the training firm voluntarily for another firm that offers better opportunities, training 
graduates might of course be laid off by their firm. The analysis of how well VET prepares 
workers for coping with layoffs is particularly valuable, because it provides information on the 
riskiness of a worker’s educational investment. Therefore, I decide to focus my analysis on laid-
off individuals and investigate whether occupational specificity determines how quickly 
individuals find reemployment, what type of reemployment they find, and how occupational 
specificity affects wages.  
My empirical analyses show that individuals trained in more specific occupations are less 
likely to find reemployment in a different occupation and are more likely to suffer prolonged 
periods of unemployment than individuals trained in more general occupations. In addition, I 
find that occupational specificity has a significantly positive effect on wages. Individuals 
trained in more specific occupations receive a wage premium compared to individuals trained 
in more general occupations. Finally, I show that workers, who move to new occupations that 
are similar to their old occupation in terms of the underlying skill bundles, suffer smaller wage 
losses than workers who move between more occupations that are more dissimilar. This finding 
provides evidence that skills are indeed transferable across occupations. 
My second contribution in this doctoral thesis is to show that occupational specificity 
crucially determines workers’ labor market success. I show that a trade-off exists between more 
specific skill bundles that pay higher wages and more general skill bundles that increase 
worker’s mobility. Because more specific skill bundles hamper individuals’ mobility, firms 
might have a stronger interest in providing training in these skill bundles. Because more specific 
skill bundles provide individuals with fewer outside options, they are more likely to stay with 
their training firm. However, more specific skill bundles also imply that individuals are less 
adaptable to changing skill demands. In the long run, therefore, firms are probably better 
advised to provide training in more general skill bundles to build up a workforce that is able to 
cope with technological change.  
In the third project, I explicitly focus on long-term returns to educational investments and 
investigate how labor market dynamics affect these returns. Structural change and technological 
shifts are related to an organizational restructuring that affects the overall demand for certain 
skills, ultimately changing the market value of the individual’s human capital. That 
technological change fundamentally alters the skill requirements has long been recognized 
(Katz and Murphy 1992; Card and DiNardo 2002; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Autor, 
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Katz, and Kearny 2006, 2008; Lemieux 2006a; Goos and Manning 2007; Goos, Manning, and 
Salomons 2009, 2014; Altonji, Kahn, and Speer 2014).  
Previous research finds that technological change is associated with a polarization of wages, 
where moderately skilled workers experience a decline in relative wages, while low-skilled and 
high-skilled workers experience an increase. The common explanation for this development is 
that middle-skilled workers perform mostly routine tasks that are easily substitutable by 
computers. However, research in this field suffers two major shortcomings. First, since most of 
these studies are investigating the United States and the United Kingdom, their results are not 
easily transferable to countries with fundamentally different educational systems. While 
middle-skilled workers have a high-school degree or some college in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in countries such as Germany and Switzerland, middle-skilled workers have a VET 
degree (Autor 2013).  
These countries have institutionalized processes of regularly updating VET curricula to 
include latest technological developments and highly innovative firms participate in this 
updating process. In addition, most training firms lay particular emphasis on further training 
their incumbent workers. Because of these measures, middle-skilled workers in Germany and 
Switzerland are potentially less affected by technological change than middle-skilled workers 
in Anglo-Saxon countries. Second, most previous studies in the field use information on skill 
requirements that are measured at only one point in time. However, the theoretical argument 
emphasizes that the introduction of new technologies fundamentally changes skill 
requirements. To adequately measure these effects, empirical analyses ought to use panel data 
on skill requirements to track changes in skill requirements in different occupations. 
In the third project, I address both of these shortcomings. Again, I draw on Lazear’s skill 
weights approach and characterize occupations by skill bundles. In the empirical analysis, I 
combine German administrative records from 1975 through 2008 with detailed data on 
occupational skills from different waves of the BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys. These surveys 
allow me to identify how skill bundles in occupations changed over time. I distinguish between 
cognitive, interactive, and manual skills and investigate how the share of these skills changes 
within occupations and relate these changes to changes in the wage structure.  
In the descriptive analysis, I show that skill bundles underwent substantial changes. Over 
all occupations, the share of cognitive skills increased, while the share of manual skills 
decreased. This finding suggests that any longitudinal analysis relating skills to wages might 
be potentially biased if it does not account for the fact that skill requirements change over time. 
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I also show that Germany experienced an increase in top-end wage inequality from the late 
1970s through the mid-1980s. Wages then remained largely stable until the early 1990s. From 
then on, wage inequality increased both at the top and the bottom ends of the wage distribution.  
To explicitly quantify the contribution of changing skills to changes in the wage structure, 
I use a recently developed decomposition method for unconditional quantile regression models 
(Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux 2007). This method has the advantages of being flexible enough to 
allow for changes in different parts of the wage distribution. It allows me to directly estimate 
how differences in one characteristic (e.g., cognitive skills) affect wages at different parts of 
the distribution.  
My decomposition analyses show that changes in skill requirements affect workers 
differently because of their differing skill bundles: some experience sharp decreases in wages, 
while others experience sharp increases. Specifically, at the upper part of the distribution, I find 
that changes in skill requirements have benefitted workers with large shares of cognitive skills, 
but harmed workers with large shares of manual skills. In the middle of the distribution, changes 
in skill requirements have benefitted workers with large shares of cognitive and manual skills, 
but harmed workers with large shares of interactive skills. The reason why changes in skill 
requirements affect upper- and lower-tail inequality differently is that differently skilled 
workers are not uniformly distributed along the wage distribution.  
Beyond their analytical relevance, my analyses are also valuable from a policy point of 
view, because I can clearly reject the widespread concern that wages in Germany have become 
polarized. I show that wages of middle-skilled workers behaved similarly to the ones of the 
overall population: Wages fell rather sharply at the bottom end; they increased rather sharply 
at the top end, and increased modestly in the middle.  
Combining the research findings of the three projects reveals several important insights into 
what firms and individuals can do to secure returns to their educational investments and into 
how changing market environments might affect the realization of their returns. First, I show 
that firms in less regulated labor markets are well able to realize a return on their investment. 
By offering performance pay, they incentivize their most productive training graduates to stay, 
thereby recouping their training costs. Second, I show that a trade-off exists between general 
and specific skill bundles. While general skill bundles provide individuals with more flexibility, 
specific skill bundles pay a wage premium.  
Third, I find that long-term returns to educational investments are crucially influenced by 
market dynamics. In the long run, firms want to have a workforce that is flexible and adaptive 
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to technological changes. Similarly, individuals want to acquire skills that allow them to react 
to these changes. This entails regular updating of educational curricula—to ensure that 
graduates acquire knowledge that is at the technological frontier—as well as further training 
for incumbent workers to update their skill bundles.  
My analyses suggest that educational curricula that are up-to-date like it is the case for 
Germany and Switzerland, should improve both the productivity of firms and the labor market 
opportunities of graduates. Indeed, while technological and structural changes have led middle-
skilled workers in Anglo-Saxon countries to experience wage losses and decreases in their 
employment shares, middle-skilled workers in Germany were better able to react to these 
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Investment in General Training 
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This chapter is our first contribution in investigating the determinants of realized returns on 
educational investment from the firm’s perspective. Specifically, we analyze how training firms 
that are embedded in unregulated labor markets are able to retain at least some of their trained 
workers to realize a return on their investment.  
In the traditional human capital model (Becker 1962), firms do not invest in general training, 
because the associated returns accrue fully to the workers. However, a particular feature of the 
dual vocational education and training (VET) system is that training firms offer and pay for the 
general training of their apprentices. The latest cost-benefit analyses show that about 70 percent 
of German training firms and more than 40 percent of Swiss training firms incur net costs of 
training (Wolter and Strupler Leiser 2012; Jansen et al. 2015). 
Harhoff and Kane (1997) started the discussion on this empirical puzzle and explained a 
firm’s incentive to offer general training through the existence of imperfect labor markets. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) formalized a model of this idea. The main assumption of this 
model is that frictions in the labor market provide training firms with a certain market power 
that prevents the firms’ graduates from switching employers without losing income. In recent 
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years, a large number of studies has identified different sources of labor market frictions and 
tested their impact on a firm’s willingness to offer and finance training1 (Acemoglu and Pischke 
1998, 1999a, 1999b; Katz and Ziderman 1999; Booth and Bryan 2007; Dustmann and 
Schoenberg 2007, 2009; Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner 2010).  
To date, surprisingly little discussion exists on whether factors other than imperfect markets 
might exist that enable training firms to retain their graduates. In this chapter, we fill this gap 
by exploring a potential solution that firms create internally and that does not rely on external 
market conditions. We use findings from personnel economics and hypothesize that firms use 
performance pay to incentivize their most productive graduates to stay.  
We argue that for the most productive graduates the reasons to stay with their training firms 
are twofold: First, they expect a higher compensation because performance pay rewards their 
individual productivity. However, since this would also be the case for non-training firms that 
offer performance pay, there has to be another productivity advantage that incentivizes 
graduates to stay. The second reason is that they expect to gain from positive externalities from 
training, which do not exist in non-training firms. Recent studies show that training firms are 
on average more productive than non-training firms. The higher productivity can be explained 
through training firms’ success of attracting and retaining a more productive workforce through 
better signaling and screening mechanisms (Autor 2001; Cappelli 2004; Backes-Gellner and 
Tuor 2010).  
If training firms offer performance pay and the most productive graduates have an incentive 
to stay, then the overall productivity level is boosted even more, i.e., high quality training 
creates a self-reinforcing productivity advantage. Therefore, the most productive graduates 
should reach their highest productivity level with the current training firm, implying that 
expected earnings are also highest with the current training firm. In turn, training firms that use 
performance pay should be more successful in retaining training graduates than training firms 
not using it.  
Going further, one could argue that these performance pay firms should also be more likely 
to invest in training, because they have better chances of realizing a return on their investment. 
Switzerland provides the most suitable setting to test our hypothesis for two main reasons. First, 
                                                 
1 Training firms follow either a substitution strategy or an investment strategy. Substitution firms use apprentices 
as cheap substitutes for unskilled or semi-skilled workers and have no incentive in retaining them at the end of the 
training period (Harhoff and Kane 1997; Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner 2010). Investment firms invest in their 
apprentices, incur higher training costs and want to retain at least some of their graduates. Our analysis focuses on 
the latter firms.  
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Switzerland has a large institutionalized VET system, where training is mostly in general skills, 
and largely financed by training firms. Second, in contrast to other countries with a strong VET 
tradition like Germany, the Swiss labor market is much less regulated (Muehlemann and 
Wolter 2011; Ryan et al. 2013). Therefore, Swiss firms may be less able to rely on market 
frictions and instead need to find another way of retaining their graduates.  
For the empirical analysis, we use the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, a representative 
employer-employee survey. Although the survey is designed as a cross-section, we are able to 
identify most firms in subsequent points in time and construct a firm panel for the years 1998 
through 2004. The main advantage of this data is that it contains separate information about the 
base and the bonus payments of individual workers, enabling us to investigate the effect of both 
the incidence and the magnitude of performance pay. We develop two measures for the use of 
performance pay in a firm, one reflecting the intensity, i.e., the amount of performance pay in 
relation to the total pay in a firm, and the other reflecting the coverage rate, i.e., the share of 
workers receiving performance pay.  
To establish a causal link between a firm’s use of performance pay and its ability to retain 
VET graduates, we run IV estimations. We instrument the performance pay measures with a 
variable measuring the occupational position of single workers, arguing that the position should 
be correlated with performance pay but should not have any effect on the retention of graduates. 
We find that training firms with pay-for-performance plans have a significantly higher retention 
of VET graduates than training firms with fixed salaries. Both the performance pay intensity 
and the coverage rate have a significantly positive effect on the retention of VET graduates.  
This chapter contributes to the new training literature by providing an additional answer to 
the question of why firms would provide and pay for investment in general training. We argue 
and provide evidence that imperfect labor markets might not be the sole condition for the 
existence of firm-provided general training. Instead, our findings show that training firms in 
weakly regulated labor markets might resort to different payment strategies to incentivize their 
graduates to stay. This finding should be of high interest to policy makers who are considering 
the introduction of a Germanic-style dual VET system as a means to tackle youth 
unemployment.2 Policy discussions should not exclusively focus on market regulations, but 
also account for the firm itself and potentially successful firm strategies. 
                                                 
2 Empirical evidence suggests that a dual VET system smoothens youths’ entry into the labor market (Bell and 
Blanchflower 2010; Scarpetta, Sonnet, and Manfredi 2010).  
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2.2 Theoretical Background 
In this section, we first give a short overview of the new training literature and the performance 
pay literature. We then introduce a simple two-period retention model similar in spirit to 
Lazear (1986). Because this model does not make any assumptions concerning markets and 
institutions, its validity is not limited to the Swiss case. Rather, similar to Lazear’s performance 
pay model, our retention model has general appeal.  
2.2.1 Related Literature 
The standard theory of training draws a crucial distinction between general and specific 
training (Becker 1962). While general training increases workers’ productivity in many firms, 
specific training increases their productivity only in the firm providing training. Under the 
assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets, general training is solely beneficial to the 
worker, because it directly translates into higher wages. Therefore, Becker (1962) predicts that 
firms will never pay for general training.  
The empirical evidence is, however, difficult to reconcile with this model. In many countries 
with a dual VET system, firms provide and pay for training that is largely general (von 
Bardeleben, Beicht, and Fehér 1995; Schweri et al. 2003; Beicht, Walden, and Herget 2004). 
The new training literature relaxes the assumption of perfect markets and argues that market 
imperfections provide training firms with a certain market power that prevents their graduates 
from switching employers without losing income.  
A large number of studies has identified different sources of market frictions: Some 
contributions point out that regulations such as employment protection and institutions such as 
unions increase a firm’s ability to retain a sufficiently high number of graduates (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1999b; Dustmann and Schoenberg 2007, 2009; Jansen et al. 2012). Other studies focus 
on mobility costs and low labor turnover rates caused by residential inertia (Stevens 1994; 
Harhoff and Kane 1997), on information asymmetries (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Katz and 
Ziderman 1999; Mohrenweiser, Wydra-Sommaggio, and Zwick 2015), on reputation aspects 
and social expectations (Sadowski 1980; Harhoff and Kane 1997), and on complementarities 
between general and firm-specific training (Franz and Soskice 1994; Kessler and 
Luelfelsmann 2006).  
Although they may well affect investment in human capital, the new training literature does 
generally not discuss the role of payment methods. Contrarily, personnel economics has 
traditionally focused on a firm’s compensation structure as a means to hire and retain workers. 
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Starting with Lazear (1986), a growing body of evidence has shown that performance pay, 
defined as pay tied to worker output, has two effects. First, the incentive effect causes 
performance pay workers to work harder. Second, the sorting effect causes more able workers 
to select and stay with performance pay firms, while less able workers leave performance pay 
firms.  
In equilibrium, workers have reallocated according to their ability so that productivity and 
wages in performance pay firms are higher than in fixed salary firms (Lazear 1986, 2000, 2004; 
Gielen, Kerkhofs, and van Ours 2009; Dohmen and Falk 2011). Thus, one stylized fact that 
emerges from these studies is that performance pay induces workers’ selection into the right 
jobs. In the next section, we sketch a simple model on how this selection process might work 
for workers graduating from vocational education and training.  
2.2.2 Retention Model  
The following two-period model applies the same basic assumptions as in Lazear (1986): Firms 
and workers are risk-neutral and form a principal-agent relationship. Firms maximize expected 
profit and workers maximize expected utility. Firms can choose between two compensation 
strategies. They either pay a salary 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆, where 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 equals the wage the worker receives in 
period t and is a fixed amount, or they pay 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡), where 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 is the output the individual 
worker produces in period t. There is no discounting between periods. For simplicity, in our 
model, we assume that firms do not incur monitoring costs.3 
The structure of the model is as follows. In period one, the firm hires apprentices and starts 
training them. We assume that apprentices are randomly assigned to training firms such that 
each firm has a group of apprentices that are similar in their ability distribution. This is a 
reasonable assumption given that we know from previous research that apprentices’ initial 
choice of training firm is random (Oswald and Backes-Gellner 2014). We also assume that 
firms train more apprentices than they have vacancies to fill.4  
In period two, firms offer employment contracts to their graduates and the graduates have 
to decide whether to stay with their training firm or to choose a different employer. Graduates 
accept the employment offer if the expected compensation at their training firm is larger than 
their outside options. To sketch these options, we have to take into account two firm 
                                                 
3 In practice, most jobs fit somewhere in between these two extremes, meaning that many employees receive a 
large proportion of their compensation as a fixed amount and some bonus payment depending on their output. This 
does not harm our model. The most important distinction between the two payment types is indeed whether or not 
there is some kind of variable component. 
4 Indeed, the average retention rate is 36 percent in Switzerland (Schweri et al. 2003). 
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characteristics, training firms and non-training firms as well as salary firms and performance 
pay firms. Figure 2.1 illustrates the types of firms we are considering.  
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First, we discuss the differences in expected compensation at training firms and non-training 
firms. As we have pointed out previously, training firms are on average more productive than 
non-training firms (Autor 2001; Cappelli 2004; Backes-Gellner and Tuor 2010). Since more 
productive firms pay higher wages (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999), accepting the 
employment offer will always lead to a higher utility level than renouncing it and starting to 
work at a non-training firm. Thus, graduates should always prefer working at a training firm to 
working at a non-training firm. Indeed, in line with our prediction, Mohrenweiser (2013) shows 
that almost all inter-firm movement of training graduates in Germany takes place between 
training firms. Non-training firms hardly participate in the post-graduation recruitment market. 
It is thus plausible to assume that graduates switch mainly between training firms.  
Second, we discuss the differences in expected compensation at training firms with 
performance pay and at training firms with fixed salaries. In this case, we assume that the 
graduates react in the same way as the incumbent workers in Lazear’s (1986) model and derive 
the following sorting result: Graduates with 𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) > 𝑆𝑆 choose to work at a performance pay 
firm, while those with 𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) < 𝑆𝑆 choose firms with the fixed salary 𝑆𝑆. Therefore, for the most 
productive graduates, accepting the offer from a training firm with performance pay will always 
yield a higher utility than leaving and starting to work at a training firm with fixed salaries.  
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In our model, the only option yielding the same utility is an offer from a training firm with 
performance pay. However, because each firm trains more apprentices than it wishes to recruit, 
these firms already have a sufficiently high number of graduates they want to retain and do not 
have any incentives to hire graduates from external firms, engaging in potentially costly 
poaching activities.5 
In equilibrium, these training firms with performance pay should be able to retain the most 
productive graduates. Given that all training firms’ interests are to hire the most productive 
graduates only, we should observe that training firms with performance pay have a higher share 
of retained graduates than training firms with fixed salaries, because they offer the most 
attractive compensation for these graduates.  
In the empirical investigation of our hypothesis we will thus compare training firms with 
performance pay and training firms with fixed salaries and expect to find that performance pay 
firms have a higher share of retained graduates than fixed salary firms. Before proceeding to 
the empirical analysis, we introduce the data and provide a short overview of the Swiss dual 
vocational education and training system. Understanding the main features of this system is 
crucial for interpreting the empirical results of this chapter.  
2.3 Institutional Background and Data 
In this section we first overview our main data, the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey. Second, 
we explain how we construct our dependent and the independent variables. To better understand 
our measurements, we also provide some key information about the Swiss VET system. Third, 
we present our sample and descriptive statistics.  
2.3.1 The Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 
For our empirical analysis, we use the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (SESS), an employer-
employee survey that is conducted every two years by the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office (SFSO). The SFSO ensures representativeness of the sample by randomly drawing firms 
from the Swiss central register of firms within groups based on size, geographical location, and 
industry. Participation in the survey is compulsory. Firms with fewer than 20 employees must 
report on their entire workforce, firms with fewer than 50 employees on at least half of their 
workforce, and firms with more than 50 employees, on at least one third of their workforce. 
                                                 
5 As Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) show, an additional explanation for why outside firms might not engage in 
poaching activities is the winner’s curse. 
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Firms not reporting their entire workforce randomly select the employees for whom they 
provide data.6 While we are able to identify firms that are being surveyed over several waves, 
we cannot identify single individuals that are being surveyed multiple times precisely because 
most firms do not report on all of their employees. Therefore, we cannot conduct any duration 
analyses on the individual level, but have to conduct firm-level analyses.  
The SESS is particularly suitable for our analysis for three main reasons. First, the SESS is 
the only Swiss dataset that contains separate information about the base and the bonus pay of 
individual workers, enabling us to investigate the effect of both the incidence and the magnitude 
of performance pay.7 Second, the SESS is an establishment survey, i.e., personnel officers fill 
out the questionnaire. Since the data come from establishment records they are not subject to 
recall error and clustering at round figures typically observed in earnings data 
(Zweimueller 1992). Third, the sampling has two levels, firms and individual workers. We have 
firm-level information such as firm size, industry8 and location, as well as detailed information 
about individual worker characteristics.  
To conduct the panel study on the firm level, we aggregate the individual worker data to the 
firm level and generate a firm panel that allows controlling for time-specific and firm-specific 
effects. In the analysis, we use the waves from 1998 through 2004. Even though later waves of 
the SESS are available, we can only use the data until 2004. Unfortunately, from 2006 onwards 
the firm identifier has changed so that we cannot match firms over time anymore.  
2.3.2 Measurements 
VET Graduates 
Our dependent variable is the rate of internal VET graduates, relating the number of graduates 
that received their training with their current firm to the total number of workers with a 
VET degree in that firm. The graduates in our sample have taken part in a dual vocational 
education and training program. Apprentices who attend such training spend between one to 
two days per week in a public vocational school and three to four days at the training firm where 
they receive on-the-job training and take actively part in the firm’s production process. 
                                                 
6 The survey guidelines instruct firms that report data on part of their employees to sort them by family name or 
social security number and to report data on every second or every third employee in the sorted list. 
7 The SFSO combines information on earnings and working time to compute a standardized monthly wage 
corresponding to the earnings of an employee working 4.3 work weeks per month at 40 hours per week 
(Graf 2006). Since the SESS reports the four components included in the standardized monthly wage separately, 
simple computations allow decomposing it into a standardized base pay and a standardized bonus component. 
8 The sectors are defined according to NOGA 2002, the official general classification of economic activities used 
in Switzerland. 
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Apprentices typically start their training after compulsory schooling, when they are on average 
17 years old.9   
The two main types of training last either three or four years. Therefore, graduates are 
between 20 and 21 years old at the end of their training. The apprentices graduate after passing 
both a practical and a theoretical examination. They receive a federal certificate that is 
recognized throughout Switzerland. Because their skills are externally assessed, graduates have 
a qualification that is portable and the opportunity to move to different employers. The 
employment relationship ends automatically upon the completion of training and any extension 
must be negotiated in a new contract.  
To identify those workers who have recently graduated at the firm where they are currently 
employed, we use three pieces of information, namely a worker’s education, age and tenure. 
The SESS records tenure in a firm starting from the very first day of the VET program. 
Therefore, any worker (i) with a VET degree, (ii) who is not older than 21 and (iii) who has 
been working at the same firm for at least three years, has probably received his training with 
his current firm. Formally, we apply the following equation for each person i with a VET 
degree:  
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  ≤ 17 𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ≤ 21 (2.1) 
We construct a dummy with the value one for those workers who fulfill these criteria and 
call it the “internal VET graduates dummy.” Because this dummy does not capture the 
30 percent of workers who were 18 years and older when they started their VET training, we 
argue that it is a conservative measure, capturing the lower bound of internal VET graduates.10 
For the sake of inference we decide to use this lower bound.11  
In the next step, to construct the within-firm rate, we sum up the internal VET graduates 
dummy and divide it by the number of workers with a VET degree (“VETworkers”) in that 
firm. Because the SESS contains only information on core workers but not on apprentices, we 
cannot relate the number of graduates who stay to the overall number of former apprentices 
within a firm, which would give us the more commonly used retention rate. We use the number 
                                                 
9 The SFSO has provided us with representative data on the starting age of apprentices. In 2012, around nine 
percent of first-year apprentices were 15 years old, 23 percent were 16 years old, 38 percent were 17 years old, 
and 30 percent were 18 years old and older. 
10 We cannot enlarge our inequality to 18 or more because then we might erroneously categorize those individuals 
as internal graduates who graduate from the VET program at 18 years of age and switch firms right after 
graduation. 
11 In the empirical analysis, we run robustness checks where we modify the above equation and use a different 
bound. This modification does not change our main findings. 
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of VET workers instead, which should be a good indicator for the number of apprentices i.e., 
graduates within a firm. While this ratio is not a “true” retention rate, it approximates it in the 
best possible way. We call this ratio the rate of internal VET graduates. A thorough inspection 
of the data shows that throughout the observation period the fluctuations in firm size and 
number of VET workers are very low and, more importantly, they move in parallel.  
Performance Pay  
The SESS has the unique feature that it provides separate information on the base and bonus 
components of workers’ earnings.12 This characteristic enables us to investigate the effect of 
both the incidence and the magnitude of performance pay. Since we are interested in firm level 
outcomes, we aggregate the individual information to the firm level.  
To measure the magnitude, we add up the individual performance pay amounts that 
VET workers receive within a firm. To generate a performance pay rate, we relate this 
aggregated amount of performance pay to the aggregated monthly wage of VET workers. We 
call this measure “performance pay intensity,” because it shows the percentage of total pay that 
is based on performance. Formally, we define the performance pay intensity of a firm j as: 




For a second measure, we construct a dummy variable indicating whether a VET worker 
has received performance payments. Again, because we are interested in firm level outcomes, 
we add up the dummy variable to see how many VET workers receive performance pay within 
a firm. We divide this number by the total number of workers to construct a measure for the 
share of workers receiving performance pay within each firm. Thereby, we use the number of 
workers for which we have valid wage data in the denominator. We call this measure 
“performance pay coverage,” because it reflects the percentage of workers within a firm 
receiving performance pay. Formally, we define performance pay coverage of a firm j as:  




                                                 
12 The SESS breaks earnings down into the following parts: gross earnings, social security contributions, extra 
payments (including payments made for shift work, night work, weekend work, and overtime), and bonus 
payments, the amount of performance pay. 




In addition to the above earnings data, the SESS contains a rich set of worker-level control 
variables. For each firm and year we use the following control variables: monthly gross wages 
of VET workers (fixed salary without bonus payments), age and age squared (in years), tenure 
and tenure squared (in years), occupational tasks (categorical), job requirements (categorical), 
gender (dummy), and nationality (dummy). We aggregate these individual-level variables to 
the firm level and compute the mean of these variables at the firm level. Importantly, we do not 
exclude workers by educational degree when aggregating our control variables. We also control 
for firm size (continuous), industry, geographical location, and year (all dummies). 
2.3.3 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
We restrict our sample as follows: We exclude firms in the public sector, because they usually 
do not behave in a profit-maximizing way, which can have consequences for their training and 
retention decision (Muehlemann et al. 2007). We also exclude some firms that appear to be 
switching industries due to inconsistencies in the data. In addition, we drop firms in the 
agricultural sector because the observations in our sample are not representative (Janssen et 
al. 2016).  
In line with previous literature, we exclude firms with fewer than five employees, because 
their expansion potential through hiring new graduates is very limited (Muehlemann et 
al. 2007). We also exclude part-time workers. Finally, since we want to explore the effect of 
performance pay on the retention of graduates, we compare training firms offering performance 
pay with training firms offering fixed salaries. In line with Mohrenweiser and Backes-
Gellner (2010), we define a training firm following an investment strategy as a firm that has 
retained at least one graduate during the observation period.  
After creating the panel and removing missing variables, we are left with a sample of 
16,718 observations. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the aggregated variables, i.e., 
all variables are firm-level averages. The dependent variable, the rate of internal VET graduates 
is 0.4 percent, a clear indication that our measure is a lower bound of the real rate. Out of 
1,000 VET workers in a firm, four are young internal VET graduates. Concerning our main 
explanatory variables, about 10 percent of monthly gross wages (about 630 Swiss francs) are 
performance pay earnings. The amount of performance pay varies greatly within and between 
firms with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 94 percent. On average, 10 percent of VET 
workers receive performance pay.  
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The variable “occupational tasks” describes 24 different tasks that workers perform on the job. 
Examples are administrative tasks, accounting, or logistics. The variable “job requirements” 
has four categories and describes how demanding a job is. Category 1 comprises repetitive 
tasks, category 2 comprises tasks that require some expert knowledge, category 3 comprises 
autonomous tasks, and category 4 describes tasks with the highest level of expert knowledge. 
The variable “occupational position” has five categories, ranking from 1 (positions without any 
management function) to 5 (the highest management position). Given that we use firm-level 
averages for our calculations, we include these categorical variables as continuous variables in 
our regression. 
The average worker earns a monthly gross wage of 6,270 Swiss francs, is 41 years old and 
has 10 years of tenure. Average wages for VET workers figure so low in the descriptives, 
because all non-VET workers are assigned a wage of zero (to prevent missing values), which 
pushes down the mean. Sixty percent of the workforce is Swiss and 75 percent is male. The 
very high percentage of male workers is due to the exclusion of part-time workers.  
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Internal VET graduates 16,718 0.004 0.019 0.0008 0.3333 
Performance pay intensity 16,718 0.097 0.165 0 0.9358 
Performance pay coverage 16,718 0.102 0.189 0 1 
Wage 16,718 6,270 2,242 1,735 52,526 
VET Wage  16,718 1,048 2,453 0 23,095 
Occupational tasks 16,718 20.89 7.742 10 40 
Occupational position 16,718 3.855 1.023 1 5 
Job requirements 16,718 2.233 0.725 1 4 
Tenure 16,718 10.18 5.459 0 48 
Age 16,718 41.08 5.851 18 64 
Male 16,718 0.752 0.270 0 1 
Swiss 16,718 0.602 0.322 0 1 
Firm size 16,718 180.9 691.2 5 32,000 
Industry 16,718 7.081 3.286 3 15 
Region 16,718 3.631 1.858 1 7 
  Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, 1998-2004. Based on authors’ calculations.  
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2.4 Empirical approach 
In this section, we first explain how we identify the causal effect of performance pay on the 
retention of internal VET graduates. Because of a potential endogeneity bias, we instrument 
our performance pay measures with a variable measuring a worker’s occupational position.  
The rationale of the IV strategy is that the occupational position should be correlated with 
both the amount of performance pay and the likelihood of receiving it. It should, however, be 
uncorrelated with the retention of internal VET graduates. Second, we present our estimation 
approach, moving from pooled OLS to firm fixed effects and finally to panel IV estimations.  
2.4.1 Identification Strategy 
Our model predicts that performance pay has a positive impact on a firm’s ability to retain its 
most productive graduates. A convincing analysis of the causal link between performance pay 
and the retention rate requires an exogenous source of variation in performance payments. It is 
conceivable that exogenous demand shocks might influence both a firm’s payment and 
retention strategies. Positive demand shocks induce an upward bias if they cause firms to 
increase their recruitment and retention of apprentices to cope with increased needs for skilled 
labor and, simultaneously, cause firms to increase their performance payments due to increased 
profits. In contrast, low performance payments might be a signal for labor costs problems that 
the firm might try to solve by a hiring stop.  
A consistent estimate of the true effect can be obtained if there is a component of the vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 that affects performance payments but not directly the retention of internal training 
graduates. We need to identify a causal determinant of performance pay that can be legitimately 
excluded from the regression equations. The occupational position might be such a variable. In 
our dataset, occupational position is a categorical variable with five categories.  
Workers belong to either one of the following categories: (5) upper management, (4) middle 
management, (3) lower management, (2) lowest management, and (1) no management function. 
Simple correlational analysis reveals that the higher the occupational position, the more likely 
it is that workers receive performance pay. The occupational position should thus affect the 
amount and incidence of performance pay. However, the instrument can be excluded from the 
outcome equation given that these young graduates are mostly in category (1) as they are at the 
beginning of their career. We thus assume that the occupational position can be omitted from 
our regression equations, since the direct role of occupations is adequately captured by the 
regressors “job requirements” and “occupational tasks.” 




The function that has to be estimated can be specified as follows:  
yjt = αj + β ∗ PPjt + xjt′ ∗ γ + 𝜑𝜑𝑟𝑟 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡 + εjt, (2.4) 
where t is a time indicator and j is a firm indicator, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   is the share of internal VET graduates, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the main explanatory variable, performance pay intensity in model I and performance 
pay coverage in model II. 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′  is a vector of control variables, and 𝜑𝜑𝑟𝑟 , 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 , 𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡 are controls for 
region, industry, and year. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the error term, which is assumed to be mean zero and normally 
distributed. We call this function the “graduates equation.”  
The control vector 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′  includes wages, age and tenure and their squared terms, a job 
requirements measure, an occupational tasks measure, gender and nationality dummies, and 
firm size. We include wages of VET workers (measuring the base payments without 
performance pay) as control variable to ensure that our PP-variables are not simply capturing 
wage effects, i.e., it is not only the higher wage that induces graduates to stay. Because our 
dependent variable is bound between 0 and 1, we winsorize our data, replacing the highest and 
lowest values with 0.001 and 0.999 respectively (Cox 2006).   
To begin the investigation of the effect of performance pay on the retention success, we run 
pooled OLS regressions. However, with pooled OLS we consider observations of the same firm 
in different years as independent and we do not take unobserved firm heterogeneity into 
account. Therefore, this regression is potentially biased. Most firms have unobserved 
characteristics that influence both a firm’s payment strategy and the rate of internal training 
graduates. One example is a firm’s productivity level, because a higher productivity leads to 
higher performance pay rates, and at the same time to higher training endeavors.  
To overcome time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we use the panel structure of our 
data and estimate firm fixed effects regressions. Equation (2.5) shows our second specification. 
The firm fixed effect, 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖, captures the impact of time-invariant differences among firms in 
observed and unobserved characteristics.  
yjt = αj + β ∗ PPjt + xjt′ ∗ γ +φj + φt + εjt (2.5) 
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However, as argued previously, endogeneity might bias our fixed effects regressions. 
Therefore, in the third step, we apply an IV approach and use the occupational positions as an 
instrument for performance pay. We estimate the following two-equation system with 2SLS: 
First stage: PPjt =  αj + β ∗ OPjt + xjt′ ∗ γ +φj +φt + εjt (2.6) 
Second stage: yjt = αj + β ∗ PPȷt� + xjt′ ∗ γ + φj + φt + εjt (2.7) 
2.5 Results 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the results of the pooled OLS with clustered standard errors for 
model I and model II respectively. In specification (1), we regress the retention variable on our 
performance pay measures without including any controls. In specification (2), we estimate the 
full model with all controls. The results show that both the performance pay intensity (PP-
intensity) and the performance pay coverage (PP-coverage) have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the rate of internal VET graduates.  
To interpret the effect size, we need to keep in mind that our dependent variable and our 
main explanatory variables are proportions. The coefficients of these variables can be 
interpreted in terms of a percentage change in the rate of internal VET graduates. In the full 
model, a ten percent increase in PP-intensity increases the rate of internal VET graduates by 
0.12 percent. Similarly, a ten percent increase in PP-coverage increases the rate of internal VET 
graduates by 0.072 percent. At first glance, this effect may seem economically unimportant. 
However, recall that in our sample with conservative measurements the mean rate of internal 
VET graduates is 0.44 percent. A ten percent increase in our PP-measures thus increases the 
rate of internal VET graduates from 0.44 percent to about 0.4405 percent. With a ten percent 
increase in PP-intensity or PP-coverage, the number of internal VET graduates thus increases 
from 4.4 to 4.5 workers per 1000 VET workers. Since the true rate is potentially larger, so is 
the true effect size. Indeed, in our robustness checks, where we include all internal VET 
graduates and not only the young ones, the effect sizes are three times larger (see Appendix 
Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2).  
The control variables comprise individual and firm characteristics aggregated at the firm 
level. Size and direction of the coefficients are similar in both models. Average wages of VET 
workers have a small, but significantly positive effect on the rate of internal VET graduates. 
The variable age is U-shaped and tenure is inverted U-shaped and both are highly statistically 
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significant. Both effects are in line with our expectations and result from our definition of 
internal VET graduates. Since we impose the restriction that the graduates cannot be older than 
21 years, age has a negative effect on the rate of internal VET graduates with a minimum at 
around 46 years. Similarly, increasing tenure has a positive effect on the rate of internal VET 
graduates with a maximum at 16 years of tenure.  
As expected, the variable “job requirements” has a significantly positive effect of the rate 
of internal VET graduates. With increasingly demanding tasks, the rate of internal VET 
graduates increases. This makes sense both from the firm’s and the graduates’ perspectives. 
Firms are eager to retain graduates who fulfill tasks that are not easily replaceable and graduates 
will be more inclined to stay if they have meaningful job tasks. Surprisingly, the percentage of 
males has a significantly negative effect of the rate of internal VET graduates. It appears that 
the higher the percentage of male workers, the lower the probability that graduates stay with 
their firm. One could derive from this result that firms should make sure to have a gender-
balanced workforce to retain their graduates.  
  
CHAPTER 2. FIRMS’ METHOD OF PAY & INVESTMENT IN GENERAL TRAINING  
 
 25 
Table 2.2: Model I: Pooled OLS regression 
 Rate of internal VET graduates 
 (1) (2) 
PP-intensity 0.0372*** 0.0120*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) 
VET Wage  0.000002*** 
  (0.0000001) 
Age  -0.0031*** 
  (0.0003) 
Age squared  0.00003*** 
  (0.000003) 
Tenure  0.0006*** 
  (0.0001) 
Tenure squared  -0.00002*** 
  (0.000003) 
Male  -0.0014** 
  (0.0007) 
Swiss  0.0003 
  (0.0004) 
Occupational tasks  -0.000003 
  (0.00002) 
Job requirements  0.0007*** 
  (0.0002) 
Firm size No Yes 
Industry No Yes 
Region No Yes 
Year No Yes 
R-squared 0.1067 0.1728 
Observations 16,718 16,718 
  Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
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Table 2.3: Model II: Pooled OLS regression 
 Rate of internal VET graduates 
 (1) (2) 
PP-coverage 0.0286*** 0.0072*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) 
VET Wage  0.000002*** 
  (0.0000001) 
Age  -0.0032*** 
  (0.0003) 
Age squared  0.00003*** 
  (0.000003) 
Tenure  0.0006*** 
  (0.0001) 
Tenure squared  -0.00002*** 
  (0.000003) 
Male  -0.0017*** 
  (0.0007) 
Swiss  0.0005 
  (0.0004) 
Occupational tasks  0.000002 
  (0.00002) 
Job requirements  0.0007*** 
  (0.0002) 
Firm size No Yes 
Industry No Yes 
Region No Yes 
Year No Yes 
R-squared 0.0831 0.1705 
Observations 16,718 16,718 
  Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
  Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
  
CHAPTER 2. FIRMS’ METHOD OF PAY & INVESTMENT IN GENERAL TRAINING  
 
 27 
As discussed earlier, pooled OLS regressions are potentially biased and might lead us to draw 
wrong conclusions. Exploiting the panel structure of the data, in the next step, we estimate firm-
fixed effects to overcome this bias and improve our estimation results. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report 
the results for the firm fixed-effects regressions with cluster-robust standard errors for model I 
and model II respectively. Again, we first regress our dependent variable on the performance 
pay measures alone and then include the control variables.  
Overall, we confirm the results obtained in the pooled OLS regressions. Again, we find that 
both performance pay measures are highly significantly positively correlated with the share of 
internal VET graduates. In the full model in specification (2), a ten percent increase in PP-
intensity or PP-coverage increases the rate of internal VET graduates by about 0.1 percent 
(0.145 and 0.111 percent respectively). This effect size is largely in line with the effect sizes 
from the pooled OLS regressions.  
Again, average VET wages have a small but highly statistically significant positive effect 
on the rate of internal graduates. Age and tenure effects are similar to the OLS estimates in 
terms of significance and magnitude. In the fixed effects estimates, gender and job requirements 
do not have a significant effect anymore. Given that the results from both the pooled OLS and 
the fixed-effects regressions might be biased, we present a detailed discussion and interpretation 
of the effect sizes in our instrumental variables regressions in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. 
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Table 2.4: Model I: Fixed effects regression 
 Rate of internal VET graduates 
 (1) (2) 
PP-intensity 0.0357*** 0.0145*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0026) 
VET Wage  0.000002*** 
  (0.0000001) 
Age  -0.0029*** 
  (0.0004) 
Age squared  0.00003*** 
  (0.00001) 
Tenure  0.0004** 
  (0.0002) 
Tenure squared  -0.00001*** 
  (0.00001) 
Male  0.0008 
  (0.0014) 
Swiss  -0.0002 
  (0.0009) 
Job requirements  0.00003 
  (0.00004) 
Occupational tasks  -0.0004 
  (0.0004) 
Firm size No Yes 
Industry No Yes 
Region No Yes 
Year No Yes 
R-squared 0.0565 0.1105 
Observations 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 
  Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 2.5: Model II: Fixed effects regression 
 Rate of internal VET graduates 
 (1) (2) 
PP-coverage 0.0279*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0023) 
VET Wage  0.000002*** 
  (0.0000001) 
Age  -0.0028*** 
  (0.0004) 
Age squared  0.00003*** 
  (0.00001) 
Tenure  0.0005*** 
  (0.0002) 
Tenure squared  -0.00001*** 
  (0.00001) 
Male  0.0007 
  (0.0014) 
Swiss  -0.0001 
  (0.0009) 
Occupational tasks  0.00004 
  (0.00004) 
Job requirements  -0.0003 
  (0.0004) 
Firm size No Yes 
Industry No Yes 
Region No Yes 
Year No Yes 
R-squared 0.0462 0.1096 
Observations 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 
  Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Despite their stability across specifications, the estimated performance pay coefficients in 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 may give a biased estimate of the true economic effect because of potential 
endogeneity. It is conceivable that firms alter their qualification structure simultaneously with 
their profit or that both are influenced by demand shocks. A convincing analysis of the causal 
effect of performance pay on the rate of internal VET graduates requires an exogenous source 
of variation in the performance pay measures. We need to identify a causal determinant of 
performance pay that can be excluded from our graduates function.  
We use the occupational position (OP) as an exogenous determinant of performance pay. 
Workers who hold managerial positions are both more likely to receive performance pay and a 
higher share of performance pay than workers who hold no managerial positions. Given that 
young VET graduates who are just starting their career do generally not hold managerial 
positions, one can expect OP to have no influence on the rate of internal VET graduates.  
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the results from our IV regressions, using OP as an instrument. 
To investigate the relation between the instrument and the dependent variable, we first run 
reduced form regressions. The reduced form coefficients show that the instrument is highly 
statistically significant and positively correlated with the dependent variable. The coefficient is 
rather small; however, it is similar in size to the coefficients of the control variables. These 
results support the credibility of our instrument.  
In the 2SLS regression, the first stage regression has high explanatory power and the OP 
coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant. Because we have one instrument for 
one endogenous variable, we cannot test for instrument validity. However, the first stage tests 
for instrument relevance. The value of the F-statistic of the first stage is well above 10 in both 
models (105.40 in model I and 213.55 in model II), so that we can confidently assume that our 
instrument is strong (Staiger and Stock 1997). As an additional test for weak instruments, Stock 
and Yogo (2005) propose a test for the just-identified case. If we are willing to tolerate 
distortion for a 5% Wald test based on the 2SLS estimator so that the true size can be at most 
10 percent, then we reject the null hypothesis if the test statistic exceeds 16.38. The F-statistic 
greatly exceeds this value so that we feel comfortable in rejecting the null of weak instruments. 
The second stage results show a highly statistically significant positive effect of 
performance pay on the retention of VET graduates. Using occupational position as an 
exogenous determinant of performance pay yields IV estimates of the performance pay effect 
of 3.86 percent for PP-intensity and 2.34 percent for PP-coverage. The 2SLS estimates are about 
two times larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. The standard errors of the IV estimates 
CHAPTER 2. FIRMS’ METHOD OF PAY & INVESTMENT IN GENERAL TRAINING  
 
 31 
are obviously larger than the OLS estimates, but overall not inflated to a worrisome size. The 
effect of PP-intensity is almost two times larger than the effect of PP-coverage. This makes 
sense assuming that the decision-making would be driven more by the extra amount of money 
that an individual receives rather than by the likelihood that a person receives an extra amount 
of money.  
Among the control variables, again, wages, age and tenure are significant in the second 
stage for both models. Aside from the likelihood of receiving performance pay, also the base 
pay received matters to VET graduates. As we have pointed out previously, this is in line with 
expectations. The most productive VET graduates decide to stay with their firm not only if they 
have a high chance of receiving performance pay, but, of course, also only if the base pay is 
attractive enough.  
Overall, the results support our hypothesis. In terms of effect size, a 10 percent increase in 
PP-intensity causes an increase of 0.38 percent in the rate of internal VET graduates. A 
10 percent increase in PP-coverage causes an increase of 0.23 percent in the rate of internal 
VET graduates. These effects are sizable given that our rate of internal VET graduates is 
0.04 percent only. Because we are able to take into account both unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity, the panel IV regression is our preferred estimation specification. Our results show 
a causal relationship between performance pay and the internal rate of VET graduates, thus that 
a performance pay effect exists that influences a firm’s ability to retain graduates.  
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Table 2.6: Model I: IV regression, instrument: occupational position 
 Reduced Form  First Stage Second Stage  
 
Dep. Var. intern Dep. Var. PP-int Dep. Var. intern 
PP-intensity   0.0386*** 
   (0.0139) 
VET Wage 0.000002*** 0.000027*** 0.000001*** 
 (0.0000001) (0.0000008) (0.0000004) 
Age -0.0030*** -0.0105*** -0.0025*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0004) 
Age squared 0.00003*** 0.00010*** 0.00003*** 
 (0.000005) (0.000027) (0.000004) 
Tenure 0.0005*** 0.0051*** 0.0003* 
 (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0002) 
Tenure squared -0.00001*** -0.00007** -0.00001** 
 (0.000005) (0.000031) (0.000005) 
Male 0.0008 -0.0176* 0.0014 
 (0.0015) (0.0091) (0.0015) 
Swiss 0.0014 0.0900*** -0.0021 
 (0.0009) (0.0079) (0.0014) 
Occupational tasks 0.00004 0.00003 0.00004 
 (0.00004) (0.00033) (0.00004) 
Job requirements 0.00025 0.0086*** -0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0032) (0.0004) 
Occupational position 0.0010*** 0.0250***  
 (0.0004) (0.0025)  
Firm size  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,718 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 6,897 
(Centered) R squared 0.1049 0.3230 0.0927 
F-Statistic first stage 105.4 105.4 105.4 
Stock-Yogo critical value 16.38 16.38 16.38 
  Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 2.7: Model II: IV regression, instrument: occupational position 
 Reduced Form  First Stage Second Stage  
 
Dep. Var. intern Dep. Var. PP-cov Dep. Var. intern 
PP-coverage   0.0234*** 
   (0.0083) 
VET Wage 0.000002*** 0.000026*** 0.000002*** 
 (0.0000001) (0.0000009) (0.0000002) 
Age -0.0030*** -0.0155*** -0.0026*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0004) 
Age squared 0.00003*** 0.00015*** 0.00003*** 
 (0.000005) (0.000029) (0.000004) 
Tenure 0.0005*** 0.0026** 0.0004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0002) 
Tenure squared -0.00001*** -0.00003 -0.00001*** 
 (0.000005) (0.000031) (0.000005) 
Male 0.0008 -0.0099 0.0010 
 (0.0015) (0.0093) (0.0014) 
Swiss 0.0014 0.1209*** -0.0014 
 (0.0009) (0.0087) (0.0012) 
Occupational tasks 0.00004 -0.00071* 0.00005 
 (0.00004) (0.00037) (0.00004) 
Job requirements 0.00025 0.01202*** -0.00003 
 (0.0005) (0.0038) (0.0004) 
Occupational position 0.0010*** 0.0413***  
 (0.0004) (0.0029)  
Firm size  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,718 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 6,897 
(Centered) R squared 0.1049 0.2644 0.1028 
F-Statistic first stage 213.6 213.6 213.6 
Stock-Yogo critical value 16.38 16.38 16.38 
  Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




This chapter examines the effect of performance pay on the retention of internal VET graduates. 
Being able to retain these graduates is crucial for a firm’s willingness to offer and pay for 
general training, because it allows firms to realize a return on their educational investments. 
Previous studies explain a firm’s training incentive with the existence of imperfect labor 
markets, identifying different market frictions and institutions that induce a training investment. 
Our explanation does not rely on labor market conditions. Instead, we explore what firms 
themselves might do. Applying findings from personnel economics to the theory of training, 
we hypothesize that training firms use performance pay to incentivize their most productive 
graduates to stay. Drawing on a theoretical model by Lazear (1986), we develop a simple 
contracting framework to provide a rationale for this firm behavior.  
In the empirical analysis, we use data from a representative employer-employee survey that 
contains register data on the base pay and performance pay (PP) of individual workers. We 
construct two different PP-measures, one reflecting the share of performance pay relative to the 
base pay and the other one the share of workers receiving performance pay. To establish a 
credible causal link between performance pay and a firm’s ability to retain graduates we use 
instrumental variable regression. As instrument, we use a variable measuring the occupational 
position of workers, arguing that the position should be correlated with performance pay but 
should not have any effect on the retention of graduates.  
We find that training firms with performance pay have a significantly higher retention of 
internal VET graduates than training firms with fixed salaries. We are able to consistently show 
a causal relationship between the use of PP and the internal rate of VET graduates and thus 
argue that there exists a performance pay effect that influences a firm’s ability to retain 
graduates. We contribute to the theory of training by providing an additional answer to the 
question of why firms provide and pay for training even if that training is general and easily 
marketable. . This chapter thus provides additional insights into the question of why firms offer 
and pay for general training. Ultimately, because retaining the most productive graduates helps 
covering a firm’s training costs, an increased retention rate should in turn lead to a higher 
likelihood of offering training.  
As pointed out previously, the investment decision involves two parties. Firms that offer 
training must of course also find workers who are willing to take the offer. Individuals decide 
on whether or not to participate in training depending on their expected return on investment. 
In the next chapter, we will focus on the returns to the individual.  




Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2 show the results of a specification where we reduce our lower bound 
from 17 to 16 years of age and include all internal VET graduates, regardless of their age. The 
formula is the following: 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  ≤ 16. Results are in line with our preferred estimation, 
reported in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. As expected, given our less restrictive definition of internal VET 
graduates, the effect sizes for both measures of performance pay are much larger than for the 
specifications in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. 
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Table A.2.1: Model I: IV regression, instrument: occupational position 
 Reduced Form  First Stage Second Stage  
 
Dep. Var. intern Dep. Var. PP-int Dep. Var. intern 
PP-intensity   0.0897*** 
   (0.0322) 
VET Wage 0.000007*** 0.000027*** 0.000004*** 
 (0.0000003) (0.0000008) (0.0000009) 
Age -0.0030*** -0.0105*** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0023) (0.0007) 
Age squared 0.00003*** 0.00010*** 0.00002** 
 (0.000009) (0.000027) (0.000009) 
Tenure 0.0009** 0.0051*** 0.0005 
 (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0004) 
Tenure squared -0.000007 -0.000068** -0.000001 
 (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00001) 
Male 0.0003 -0.0176* 0.0018 
 (0.0030) (0.0091) (0.0031) 
Swiss 0.0033* 0.0900*** -0.0048 
 (0.0017) (0.0079) (0.0033) 
Occupational tasks -0.00003 0.00003 -0.00003 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Job requirements 0.00073 0.00856*** -0.00003 
 (0.0010) (0.0032) (0.0009) 
Occupational position 0.0022*** 0.0250***  
 (0.0008) (0.0025)  
Firm size  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,718 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 6,897 
(Centered) R squared 0.1848 0.3230 0.1576 
F-Statistic first stage 105.40 105.40 105.40 
Stock-Yogo critical value 16.38 16.38 16.38 
  Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table A.2.2: Model II: IV regression, instrument: occupational position 
 Reduced Form  First Stage Second Stage  
 
Dep. Var. intern Dep. Var. PP-cov Dep. Var. intern 
PP-coverage   0.0543*** 
   (0.0191) 
VET Wage 0.000007*** 0.000026*** 0.000005*** 
 (0.0000003) (0.0000009) (0.0000006) 
Age -0.0030*** -0.0155*** -0.0021*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0007) 
Age squared 0.00003*** 0.00015*** 0.00002** 
 (0.000009) (0.000029) (0.000009) 
Tenure 0.0009** 0.0026** 0.0008* 
 (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0004) 
Tenure squared -0.000007 -0.000033 -0.000005 
 (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002) 
Male 0.0003 -0.0099 0.0008 
 (0.0030) (0.0093) (0.0029) 
Swiss 0.0033* 0.1209*** -0.0033 
 (0.0017) (0.0087) (0.0028) 
Occupational tasks -0.00003 -0.00071* 0.00001 
 (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
Job requirements 0.0007 0.0120*** 0.0001 
 (0.0010) (0.0038) (0.0008) 
Occupational position 0.0022*** 0.0413***  
 (0.0008) (0.0029)  
Firm size  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,718 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 6,897 
(Centered) R squared 0.1848 0.2644 0.1849 
F-Statistic first stage 213.6 213.6 213.6 
Stock-Yogo critical value 16.38 16.38 16.38 
  Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 








The Returns to Skill:                                 
Occupational Mobility and Wages 
Part of this chapter is a revised version of early parts of the working paper “Labor Market Transitions 





In this chapter, we investigate the returns to educational investments from the individual 
perspective. Specifically, we investigate earnings and employment opportunities of individuals 
with a dual vocational education and training degree (VET), putting special emphasis on the 
heterogeneity of skills that exists among different VET programs.  
A commonly held belief in labor economics is that vocational education provides students 
with specific occupational skills that prepare them to work in one particular occupation. 
Although researchers acknowledge that the close link between teaching content and on-the-job 
skill requirements improves school-to-work transitions, many are concerned that these 
occupational skills are too narrowly defined and deprive workers of any flexibility and mobility 
(Krueger and Kumar 2004a, 2004b; Kambourov and Manovskii 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Hanushek 
et al. 2017).  
These concerns make sense against the background of the early human capital theory 
introduced by Becker (1962), which distinguishes between skills that are either specific to a 
given firm or completely general. In this framework, firm-sponsored training cannot be general, 
because firms would never provide training in skills that are transferable. Therefore, the skills 
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acquired during vocational education must be specific to the firm and workers are tied to their 
initial firm.  
However, the traditional human capital model has been extended over the last three decades, 
mostly in response to empirical findings that cannot be easily reconciled with Becker’s early 
predictions. It has been shown that general skills are an important component of the dual VET 
programs that exist in German-speaking countries (von Bardeleben, Beicht, and Fehér 1995; 
Schweri et al. 2003; Beicht, Walden, and Herget 2004). More precisely, these VET countries 
are characterized by occupational labor markets, which are structured along corresponding 
tracks of vocational qualifications and bound by vocational qualifications (Maurice, Sellier, and 
Silvestre 1982; Eyraud, Marsden, and Silvestre 1990; Marsden 1999). The skills acquired 
during VET are indeed specific to a certain vocational occupation, but can still be of use outside 
that occupation. Therefore, to make any predictions about the mobility of VET graduates it is 
imperative to first conceptualize how to define the specificity of their training.  
In this chapter, we draw on the “skill-weights approach” introduced by Lazear (2009). He 
assumes that all skills are general in nature but firms use skills in different combinations with 
different weights. His skill weights approach provides an ideal foundation to operationalize the 
specificity of dual vocational education and training programs (Mure 2007). Adopting his idea, 
we characterize VET occupations by bundles of single skills and build occupation-specific skill 
weights to measure their degree of specificity. We distinguish workers according to the degree 
of specificity of the occupation they were trained in. Throughout this chapter, we will refer to 
workers who received training in more specific occupations as “workers in more specific 
occupations” and we do the same for workers who received training in more general 
occupations.  
We investigate whether, and if so, how the degree of specificity determines worker mobility. 
We define mobility as the ease with which workers switch their occupation. We thus investigate 
which groups of workers are more likely to switch occupations and how these switches affect 
their wages. For this type of analysis, distinguishing between layoffs and quits is crucial 
(Lazear 2009). While layoffs are initiated by the firm and are supposed to reflect the choice of 
the firm, quits are an outcome of worker’s choice. Whereas quitting is a deliberate decision, 
being laid off is not and it often happens unexpectedly. Workers can always decide against 
quitting and instead staying with their old employer, but they cannot decide against being laid 
off. The analysis of how well VET prepares workers for coping with layoffs is particularly 
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valuable, because it provides information about the riskiness of a worker’s educational 
investment. Therefore, we decide to focus our analysis on laid-off individuals.  
These individuals have four different options to react to the layoff: They may find 
reemployment in the original occupation, find reemployment in a different occupation, remain 
unemployed, or quit the labor force. We summarize these four options with the term “labor 
market transitions.” We estimate the probability of these labor market transitions as a function 
of a worker’s degree of specificity. With this approach, we do not only investigate whether or 
not workers in more specific occupations switch less frequently, but we also analyze whether 
these workers have to wait longer for a suitable match. We expect that workers in more specific 
occupations are less mobile, meaning that they are less likely to switch occupations and more 
likely to stay unemployed for a longer time than workers in more general occupations. 
Relating specificity to wages, Lazear (2009) argues that workers have higher wages and 
suffer larger wage losses in firms that require specific skill combinations. In our model, this 
implies that workers in more specific occupation have higher wages and suffer larger wage 
losses than workers in more general occupations. To test these hypotheses, we proceed in two 
steps. First, we estimate an earnings equation with occupational specificity as the main 
explanatory variable and wages in the original occupation as the dependent variable. We expect 
to find a positive relationship between specificity and wages. Second, we repeat the exercise 
using the smaller sample of reemployed individuals. Now, our dependent variable is the change 
in wages between the original and the new occupation. We expect to find a negative relationship 
between specificity and wage changes.  
Finally, we investigate the transferability of skills in more detail. Lazear’s model posits that, 
the more idiosyncratic a firm is in its skill requirements, the higher are the expected wage losses 
its workers suffer upon layoff. Put differently, the extent of the expected wage loss depends on 
the proportion of skills workers can transfer from one firm to the other. Transferring Lazear’s 
model to the level of occupations, wage losses depend on the proportion of skills workers can 
transfer from one occupation to the other.  
Recent contributions investigating the transferability of skills introduce the concept of  
“skill distance” to measure the proportion of skills that is transferred during an occupational 
change (Poletaev and Robinson 2008; Gathmann and Schoenberg 2010; Robinson 2011). They 
provide an empirical measure for comparing two occupations in terms of their underlying skill 
bundles. This measure is a useful empirical tool to estimate wage changes resulting from 
occupational changes. However, the skill distance literature does not provide a theoretical 
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explanation for why certain workers change their occupation and others do not; it does not 
account for the number of job offers workers have.  
We use Lazear’s comprehensive skill-weights approach to derive our hypotheses and use 
the skill distance measure to test one of these hypotheses empirically, namely that the extent of 
wage loss depends on the proportion of skills that is transferred. If we combine Lazear’s model 
with the skill distance measure, we can thus provide a thorough explanation for the observed 
patterns of both occupational mobility and wage changes.  
Empirically, we focus on short-term effects and investigate labor market transitions one 
year after the layoff. We combine data from the Berufsinformationszentrum with the Social 
Protection and Labour Market (SESAM) survey. The first data set provides a detailed list of 
skill requirements for all vocational occupations in Switzerland. The second data set is a 
representative worker survey conducted by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. We use the 
SESAM for two main reasons. First, its panel structure allows following workers over time to 
track their labor market transitions. Second, the survey is linked with register data on wages 
and unemployment benefits. The administrative nature of this data minimizes measurement 
error in wages and occupational coding.  
Our empirical analyses confirm our hypotheses. We find that occupational specificity 
crucially determines worker mobility. The more specific the occupation, the less likely the 
worker finds reemployment in a different occupation after being laid off. Moreover, the more 
specific the occupation, the more likely the worker stays unemployed for a prolonged time. 
Regarding wages, our results show that a higher occupational specificity is indeed associated 
with higher wages. In addition, we find that the higher the occupational specificity, the larger 
the drop in wages. Finally, we show that the larger the skill distance between two occupations, 
the higher the wage loss for workers who change between these occupations. Taken together, 
these findings suggest a risk-return trade-off for investments in more specific skill bundles. 
While workers in more specific occupations are less mobile than workers in more general 
occupations, they are compensated for their lower mobility with higher wages.  
Our analyses show that single skills and the bundling of these skills crucially determine 
workers’ mobility and wages. The advantage of this new skill-weights view is that it provides 
a convincing explanation for the mobility differences we observe in the data. In addition, this 
new approach helps to better understand the observed patterns in wage changes after an 
occupational change. They are consistent with the idea that single skills are transferable across 
occupations and that the transferability of skill bundles depends on the skill weights.  
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3.2 Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we first present the skill weights approach proposed by Lazear (2009) and derive 
empirically testable hypotheses regarding workers’ mobility and wages. Then, we introduce a 
relatively new concept in the mobility literature, the “skill distance.” This concept allows an 
empirical assessment of how similar two occupations are in terms of their underlying skill 
bundles. We distinguish occupational changes according to how different the skill bundles are 
between the original occupation and the new occupation and relate the resulting changes in 
wages to the skill distance. 
3.2.1  Skill Weights Approach 
Lazear (2009) proposes a new theory of human capital that puts emphasis on the individual 
composition of skills. While standard human capital theory strictly distinguishes between 
general and specific human capital, Lazear’s skill-weights approach assumes that all skills are 
general in nature. However, firms vary in their weighting of different skills. In his basic model 
only two skills (A and B) and two periods exist. Firms use the general skills A and B in different 
combinations, with firm-specific weights attached to them. Specificity, therefore, occurs 
because firms demand different combinations and different weights of skills. 
The investment problem for the worker in this set-up is to choose a strategy that maximizes 
net expected earnings while taking into account that different firms demand different types of 
skill combinations. In the first period, a worker decides on a particular skill bundle composed 
of the skills A and B. Workers acquire skills at cost 𝐶𝐶(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) with 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 ≥  0  and 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 <  0. 
In the second period, the worker’s pay-off at firm i is determined by the simple earnings 
function 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖)𝐵𝐵, where 0≤ λ ≤1 is the relative weight of skill A in firm i. The 
weight 𝜆𝜆 is particular to each firm and has density 𝐹𝐹(𝜆𝜆). 
A novel empirical implication of Lazear’s model is that occupational mobility and wage 
changes depend on the market weight, 𝐹𝐹(𝜆𝜆). The market weight determines by how much the 
investment will depreciate. If the difference between the weight of the initial firm and the 
market weight, (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝜆), is small, then the worker is more likely to find a firm that uses a skill 
combination similar to his own. In this case, his skill combination is rather general. If the 
difference, (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝜆), is large, then the skill combination is rather specific.  
If a worker were certain to remain with his initial firm indefinitely, he would invest in the 
particular skill bundle that maximizes the payoff in that firm. Lazear’s model, however, allows 
for separations. Because other firms might demand a different weighting of skills A and B, the 
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worker’s initial skill bundle might not be optimal in another firm, making part of his initial 
investment worthless. In case of a layoff, the worker might thus face a wage loss.1  
Translating Lazear’s idea of firm-specific human capital to the level of occupations, we 
argue that each occupation j requires a different combination of single skills with occupation-
specific weights, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖, thereby further developing an idea first applied by Geel, Mure, and Backes-
Gellner (2011).2 We characterize occupations by skill bundles and determine their specificity 
by comparing them to the market weight, ?̅?𝜆. We then explore how occupational specificity 
determines mobility and wage changes of laid-off workers.  
When workers are laid off, they have four options: finding reemployment in the original 
occupation, finding reemployment in a different occupation, remaining unemployed or leaving 
the labor force (Blanchard et al. 1990). In his model, Lazear assumes that the value the worker 
gets from a new job is always greater than the value of unemployment or being out of the labor 
force Therefore, if the worker receives a job offer, he always accepts it. In our study, we relax 
this assumption and allow workers to choose to remain unemployed or to quit the labor force.  
Workers decide against the job offer if the value of non-participation in the labor market is 
higher than the value of participation (Mortensen 1986). Empirically, we measure the value of 
non-participation with unemployment benefits. The idea is that the higher the benefits, the 
higher the value of unemployment. Indeed, empirical findings show that a reduction of 
unemployment benefit durations leads to shorter periods of unemployment (Card and 
Levine 2000; Lalive and Zweimueller 2004; van Ours and Vodopivec 2006; Card, Chetty, and 
Weber 2007; Lalive 2007).  
The cut-off, where the value of non-participation equals the value of participation, is the 
reservation wage. Empirically, we measure the reservation wage with the wage from the 
previous job. Indeed, the majority of unemployed individuals report reservation wages that are 
at least as high as the wage they were paid on their last job (Feldstein and Poterba 1984; 
Neal 1995; Krueger and Mueller 2009, 2016).  
                                                 
1 At the extreme, if the probability that the worker is going to remain with his initial firm is very low, he will adopt 
an investment strategy that is closer to the market weight ?̅?𝜆  than to the firm-specific bundle 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 . Under these 
circumstances, being laid off is actually good news for the worker. Because he invested in skills that match more 
closely with the market bundle, switching jobs will allow him to make better use of his skill bundle. The worker 
might actually realize a wage gain. Similarly, if the market becomes thicker and the number of offers converges 
to infinity, laid-off workers are certain to find a job that suits their skill bundle. In this case, the wage loss from 
layoffs is zero. However, these are more theoretical possibilities and not borne out in our data.  
2 The study by Geel, Mure, and Backes-Gellner (2011) focuses on firm-financed training. Using data from the 
German BIBB/IAB Qualification and Employment Surveys, they construct an index of the skill specificity of 
different vocational occupations and find support for Lazear’s theory.  
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We apply Lazear’s framework to derive the following empirically testable hypotheses: First, 
the more specific a worker’s original occupation, the less likely he will switch occupations. 
Workers in more specific occupations are less likely to find another occupation that uses a skill 
combination similar to their own. Second, allowing workers to choose to remain unemployed 
or to quit the labor force, we derive an additional hypothesis that we can test in Lazear’s 
framework. We expect that the more specific a worker’s original occupation, the longer his 
unemployment spell. This prediction derives from Lazear’s modeling of market thickness. 
Because of the idiosyncratic skill bundles, workers in more specific occupations face a thin 
market, with a small number of offers. Because they receive only a small number of offers with 
each draw, these workers are likely to decide to keep searching for a longer period than their 
counterparts in more general occupations with many draws. Therefore, these workers in more 
specific occupations should be more likely to remain unemployed for a longer time. 
Note that we analyze short-term effects in the sense that we observe labor market outcomes 
one year after the layoff. While the emphasis in the displacement research has shifted from 
short-term wage losses to longer-term wage dynamics before and after displacement 
(Podgursky and Swaim 1987; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993; Burda and Mertens 2001; 
Farber 2004; Couch and Placzek 2010), enlarging our analysis of occupational specificity to 
long-term effects is not feasible for one main reason: Our skills data stems from the year 2004 
and we assume that occupational skill requirements do not change over the considered time 
period, i.e., from 2004 through 2009. However, if we investigate individuals for longer periods 
of time, this assumption becomes unrealistic. Due to technological and structural changes, skill 
requirements within occupations might fundamentally change. Moreover, some occupations 
might become obsolete while other occupations are newly created. Any analysis investigating 
long-term labor market outcomes has to account for these structural changes. In Switzerland, 
unfortunately, such skill data is not available.  
Moreover, Lazear (2009) predicts that workers at firms with more specific skill 
combinations have higher wages. He argues that these firms have a lower probability of laying 
off their workers, because they have more difficulties in replacing them. Consequently, workers 
are more secure in their current position and they invest more idiosyncratically in the skills that 
suit their initial firm. However, because of their idiosyncratic investment, these workers also 
lose more when they are laid off. Translating Lazear’s predictions to the level of occupations 
leads us to our fourth and fifth hypotheses: Workers in more specific occupations earn more 
but also incur greater wage losses after layoffs than workers in more general occupations.  
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3.2.2 Skill Distance 
Lazear (2009) points out that one motivation for his new view of human capital stems from the 
empirical fact that the wage losses workers face after layoffs are very heterogeneous. Lazear’s 
model posits the heterogeneity in wage losses is due to firm-specific human capital. Workers 
in more idiosyncratic firms suffer greater wage losses than workers in more general firms. 
Therefore, the extent of the wage loss ultimately depends on the proportion of skills that a 
worker can transfer from one firm to the other.  
Transferring Lazear’s analysis to the level of occupations, wage losses depend on the 
proportion of skills that a worker can transfer from one occupation to the other. Recent 
contributions investigating the transferability of skills introduce the concept of “skill distance” 
to empirically measure the proportion of skills that are transferable during an occupational 
change (Poletaev and Robinson 2008; Gathmann and Schoenberg 2010; Robinson 2011). In 
line with Lazear’s model, the underlying hypothesis is that wage changes should be smaller if 
the original occupation and the new occupation are similar in term of their skills.  
These new studies have evolved from the discussions on the source of human capital 
specificity. While many early studies have estimated the contribution of firm-specific human 
capital to individual wage growth (Abraham and Farber 1987; Altonji and Shakotko 1987; 
Kletzer 1989; Topel 1991), more recent evidence suggests that specific human capital might be 
more tied to an industry (Neal 1995; Parent 2000) or an occupation (Gibbons et al. 2005; 
Kambourov and Manovskii 2009b) rather than to a particular firm. These studies thus assume 
that workers lose their human capital if they switch their firm, industry, or occupation. On the 
contrary, studies calculating the skill distance show that specific human capital is not fully lost 
if an individual leaves an occupation and therefore argue that specificity is tied to a combination 
of single skills (Poletaev and Robinson 2008; Gathmann and Schoenberg 2010; 
Robinson 2011).  
These skill distance studies share the same intuition as Lazear (2009) in the sense that they 
hypothesize that human capital specificity should be measured at the level of skills. However, 
the skill distance approaches and Lazear’s model differ in one crucial point: The skill distance 
studies assume that all skill bundles are equally general. This assumption means that, 
empirically, this literature looks at realized occupation-to-occupation transitions, compares the 
underlying skill bundles, and estimates the resulting wage losses.  
Lazear’s model goes a step further and allows for skill bundles with different degrees of 
specificity. His model allows accounting for both realized and potential occupation-to-
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occupation transitions. Depending on their skill bundles, some workers can choose from a large 
number of job offers while others have a very limited number of offers. The number of job 
offers, in turn, explains workers’ transition patterns. The number of job offers is explicitly 
modelled in Lazear (2009), while it is absent in the skill distance literature. Lazear explains 
which workers are more likely to change their occupation, while the skill distance allows 
estimating the extent of wage change induced by an occupational change. If we combine 
Lazear’s model with the skill distance measure, we can thus provide a thorough explanation for 
the observed patterns of both occupational mobility and wage changes.  
To measure the skill distance between two occupations, we use the Euclidean distance 
measure. This measure has been used extensively in the network literature to characterize the 
proximity of race and ethnicity (Conley and Topa 2002), in the innovation literature to 
characterize the proximity of firms’ technologies (Kaiser 2002; Benner and Waldfogel 2008) 
and recently also in the literature on occupational mobility (Poletaev and Robinson 2008; 
Robinson 2011). The Euclidean distance between two points in Euclidean space with the 
coordinates (x, y) and (a, b) is simply the length of the line segment connecting them. It is given 
by the formula  dist�(x, y)(a, b)� = �(x − a)2 + (y − b)2.  
In our application, this distance measure is particularly valuable for two main reasons. First, 
it is a straightforward measure and a concept used in many applications.3 Second, unlike other 
distance measures, the Euclidean distance is sensitive to the length of the vector, i.e., it takes 
the number of skills required in the occupation into account (D’Agostino and Dardanoni 2009). 
We describe two occupations X and Y by their skill bundles X and Y. Then we define the 
Euclidean distance between occupations X and Y as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 = ��𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖)2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  
 
where the sub-index 𝑖𝑖 = 1 …𝑁𝑁 indicates the number of skills in the skill bundles and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is a 
weighting factor, which reflects how intensively skills are used in an occupation. In our 
                                                 
3 For instance, the linear regression model, which is without doubt the workhorse of applied econometrics, relies 
on the Euclidean distance. Given an n-sized vector y and k n-sized vectors 𝑥𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘  , which are collected into an 
n×k design matrix X, the linear regression model deals with how to find the point in the linear space spanned by 
the columns of X which is closest to y. Thus, the problem is to find a k-sized vector β, which minimizes the distance 
between y and 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋. The most common method for solving this problem is OLS, which implies that Euclidean 
distance is the chosen distance concept. 
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application, this weighting factor accounts for the fact that some occupations use up to 12 
different skills, while others only use three different skills.  
The Euclidean distance measure varies between zero and one. It is zero for occupations that 
use identical skill sets and one if two occupations use completely different skills sets. In the 
empirical analysis, we follow previous contributions (Poletaev and Robinson 2008; 
Robinson 2011) and regress wages in the new occupation on this distance measure. We expect 
that the larger the skill distance, the larger the wage change.  
3.3 Data and Measurements 
We use data from Switzerland, a country with a long tradition of dual vocational education and 
training (VET), where more than half of the workforce holds a VET degree. We use three types 
of data for our empirical analysis. First, our core data is the Social Protection and Labour Market 
(SESAM) survey. The SESAM is a survey data set linked with administrative data on 
employment and unemployment spells. Second, to control for regional and time-specific 
employment opportunities, we use data on the monthly unemployment rates from the Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office and match them to the SESAM sample. Third, to construct 
occupation-specific skill bundles, we use data on skills used in an occupation from the Swiss 
career-counseling center Berufsinformationszentrum (BIZ).  
3.3.1 The Social Protection and Labour Market Survey  
The Social Protection and Labour Market survey (SESAM) is a matched panel data set linking 
the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) with data from different social insurance registers. The 
SLFS is a representative household panel based on a sample of about 100,000 interviews 
provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. It provides a rich set of information on 
employment patterns, socio-demographic, educational, and occupational characteristics. The 
social insurance registers provide the exact daily duration of individual employment and 
unemployment spells, as well as monthly earnings and the exact amount of unemployment 
benefits received. The panel structure allows following individuals over time so that we can 
observe them before, during, and after the layoff.  
The SESAM has at least four advantages over regular household surveys commonly used 
in the literature studying labor market transitions. First, its administrative nature ensures that 
we observe the wages associated with each occupation and the exact date of an occupational 
change. Second, measurement error in wages and occupational titles is much less of a problem 
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than in typical survey data. We are thus able to reduce the bias in our estimates. Third, because 
the SESAM reports education histories as well as the highest education, we can single out 
measurement errors in the education variable.4  Fourth, the SESAM contains a question on the 
reason of the last job loss, which allows separating those workers who were laid off from those 
who separated for other reasons. Although one might be concerned that self-reported data on 
layoffs contains response bias (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), previous research has shown 
that this concern does not apply for our data (Balestra and Backes-Gellner 2017).  
We restrict our sample to individuals with a VET degree who are between 18 and 65 years 
old. To be included in the sample, these individuals have to be laid off at least once during the 
observation period, and we have to observe them for at least one year after the layoff. Our 
sample includes both male and female workers. We also include part-time workers since the 
share of part-time workers in Switzerland is very large. We exclude some individuals who show 
inconsistencies in their education variable. We also drop all observations with missing values 
in the dependent or independent variables.  
After creating the panel, we are left with a sample of 4,511 observations. The large drop in 
observations is because unemployment is generally low in Switzerland. Over the observation 
period, the average unemployment rate is 3.29 percent, varying between 0.7 and 7.6 percent. In 
addition, only about 13 percent of the unemployed workers have been laid off, whereas the rest 
are unemployed for reasons such as injuries, quits, retirements, and other.5   
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics. About 60 percent of the sample is male, 48 percent 
of the individuals are married and about 40 percent are Swiss nationals. Individuals are on 
average 42 years old and have three years of tenure. Since all these individuals are laid off at 
some point, average tenure is rather low. Sixty-two percent of the sample is working or has 
worked fulltime. The average wage is 3,386 Swiss francs and the average unemployment 
benefits are 917 Swiss francs. Average wages are below the Swiss average (about 5,000 Swiss 
francs for workers with a VET degree), because all of these individuals experience a layoff 
during the observation period with zero wages and positive unemployment benefits.  
                                                 
4 Comparing the individual education histories with the variable “highest educational attainment” reveals some 
misclassification in the data. We drop all observations where individuals report VET as their highest educational 
attainment, but where the individuals’ education histories reveal that they achieved a university degree after the 
VET degree. Similarly, we keep those observations where individuals report compulsory schooling VET as their 
highest educational attainment, but where the individuals’ education histories reveal that they have received a VET 
degree, they work in VET occupations, and have earnings similar to other VET workers in that occupation.   
5 The possible response categories are (in descending order of occurrence in our data): layoff, retirement, 
sickness/accident, end of fixed-term contract, quit due to bad working conditions, early retirement, end of first job, 
quit due to being fed up with the job, personal reasons, other reasons, care service, starting education, wish to 
change job, ceding own business, and mandatory retirement.  
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Similarly, average unemployment benefits are below the Swiss average, because all of these 
individuals are in employment at some point during the observation period with positive wages 
and zero unemployment benefits.6 We have included an overview of the Swiss unemployment 
insurance system in Section 3.7 in the Appendix. Applicants who are eligible for unemployment 
benefits receive 70 percent of their insured wages during an unemployment spell for up to two 
years. For the average worker with a VET degree, unemployment benefits thus amount to 3,500 
Swiss francs per month.  
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics  
Variables Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Male 4,511 0.584 0.493 0 1 
Married 4,511 0.480 0.500 0 1 
Swiss 4,511 0.393 0.488 0 1 
Age 4,511 42.28 12.04 17 65 
Tenure 4,511 2.900 5.499 0 44 
Full-time 4,511 0.591 0.492 0 1 
Wage 4,511 3,386 3,822 0 64,200 
Unemployment benefits 4,511 917.5 1,912 0 11,050 
Firm size 4,511 10.25 4.007 1 14 
Industry 4,511 57.23 27.84 0 96 
Region 4,511 13.08 8.889 1 26 
Local unemployment rate (%) 4,511 3.290 1.316 0.7 7.6 
Occupational specificity 4,511 0.275 0.083 0.0353 0.4505 
Labor market thickness 4,511 0.064 0.079 0.0001 0.2200 
Skill distance 4,511 0.202 0.328 0 1.4142 
  Notes: SESAM data linked with BIZ data, authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3.2 gives a brief overview of our main outcome variable, the labor market transitions 
we observe in the SESAM sample. One year after layoff, about 55 percent of all laid-off 
individuals are reemployed, 18 percent remain unemployed, and 20 percent have left the labor 
force. Among the reemployed, about 33 percent have changed their occupation. In the analyses 
of labor market transitions, we use the full sample with 4,511 observations for our investigation. 
In the analyses of the relationship of specificity and wages, we use the sample of reemployed 
                                                 
6 The SESAM provides register data on yearly wages and unemployment benefits as well as on the daily 
employment and unemployment duration. We use this information to compute monthly wages and unemployment 
benefits. In this way, individuals who were fully employed during a year, will have positive wages and zero 
unemployment benefits. Viceversa, fully unemployed indivudals will have zero wages and positive unemployment 
benefits. Because we include these zeros, wages and unemployment benefits in our sample are below the Swiss 
average.   
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workers only. Finally, in the analysis of the skill distance, we use the smaller sample of 
reemployed workers that have switched their occupation. 
 
Table 3.2: Decomposition of labor market transitions 
                  % of all separations  
Total          100 
unemployment-to-employment 55.17 
         of which  
         same occupation 67.20 
         different occupation 32.80 
unemployment-to-unemployment 17.68 
unemployment-to-out of the labor force 20.36 
  Notes: SESAM data linked with BIZ data, authors’ calculations. 
 
3.3.2 Skill Bundles, Specificity, and Distance 
We use data from the career-counseling center Berufsinformationszentrum (BIZ) to construct 
the skill bundles, the specificity measure, and to calculate the skill distance between 
occupations. The BIZ provides a detailed list of skills that are used in VET occupations. The 
list comprises 26 different skills and distinguishes between intellectual, personal, and physical 
skills. Table 3.3 gives an overview of the skills.7  
Occupational experts, who advise youth on their occupational choice, compile this skill list. 
Because it is not the workers themselves who report on their skill requirements, the BIZ data 
might suffer from measurement error. While workers should be very precise in describing their 
everyday work, it is conceivable that occupational experts over- or underestimate certain skill 
requirements. This concern is frequently voiced for the O*NET data, the most commonly used 
data in skill research, which also relies on occupational experts.  
While the vast majority of the early job search literature estimates this model structurally, 
advances in the discrete choice literature have generated much of the econometric methodology 
needed to estimate the model parametrically (McFadden 1974). In our application, we can thus 
use the empirical framework of the job search literature and enrich it with Lazear’s model. 
Applying a discrete choice model, we can describe worker’s labor market transitions to depend 
on occupational specificity.  
                                                 
7 Note that these data are a snapshot. We assume that skill requirements do not change over the considered time 
period, i.e., from 2004 through 2009.  
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Although our data does not provide workers’ self-assessments, we are confident that 
measurement error in the BIZ is less of an issue than for the O*NET data. In contrast to O*NET, 
the state-funded BIZ is the primary source of information for youths’ occupational choice. The 
BIZ cooperates closely with both schools and firms. If the BIZ list were to largely diverge from 
the actual on-the-job requirements, youths, teachers, and firms would ultimately refrain from 
using it. Contrarily, the main audience of O*NET are policy makers, who are less closely 
attached to the actual labor market. Misclassification in the O*NET is therefore less likely to 
be uncovered. We believe that while workers’ self-assessment is the preferable data to work 
with, due to their constant feedback loop, the BIZ data appear to be very accurate as well.  
 








mental flexibility, abstract-logical thinking, practical understanding, 
spatial perception, technical understanding, language skills, creativity, 





sense of responsibility, ability to work in a team, openness, 
communication skills, service mindedness, reliability, psychological 
stability, patience, perseverance, empathy. 
Physical Skills 
 
strong constitution, robust health, manual dexterity, physical mobility, 
fine motor skills, sense of taste, no fear of heights. 
Notes: List provided in German by the Berufsinformationszentrum in Zihlmann et al. (2011); translated by the    
authors. 
 
In the first step, we construct occupational skill bundles by listing the skills used in an 
occupation and assigning a weight to each skill depending on the total number of skills used in 
that occupation. Some occupations such as sales persons use up to 12 different skills, while 
others such as road builders use only four skills. On average, occupations use seven different 
skills. To account for this heterogeneity in skill usage, we weight each skill with the number of 
skills used in an occupation. For example, if an occupation uses four different skills, we attach 
a weight of 0.25 to each skill, while in an occupation with eight different skills each skill 
receives a weight of 0.125. Essentially, we describe each occupation by a weighted sum of 
skills.  
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In the second step, we construct the market weight as a benchmark for the specificity of the 
occupational skill bundles. We use the SESAM to construct the market weight, ?̅?𝜆.8 Since the 
SESAM is a representative survey, it contains the distribution of occupations of the Swiss 
workforce.9 For each wave, we know the distribution of the workforce across occupations, and, 
for each occupation, we know the respective skill bundle. Using both types of information, we 
rank each of the 26 single skills in the labor market according to their distribution in the labor 
market. The most general skill occupies the first rank and the most specific skill occupies the 
twenty-sixth rank. In essence, this ranking constitutes the market weight,  ?̅?𝜆.10  
In the third step, we adapt the approach of Geel, Mure, and Backes-Gellner (2011) and 
determine the degree of occupational specificity by comparing occupational skill bundles with 
the market weight. This approach allows assigning the degree of occupational specificity to 
each occupation in our sample. In the final step, we compare the occupational skill bundles of 
any two occupations to calculate the skill distance between any two occupations.  
To better understand our approach, let us walk through an example. Take the occupations 
of banker and electrician as an example. For simplicity, assume that only these two occupations 
exist in the labor market. In addition, we limit our example to a four-dimensional skill vector, 
i.e., the two occupations are characterized by the presence or absence of only four skills.11 
Assume further that a banker has the skills “abstract-logical thinking” and “mathematical 
skills,” and an electrician has the skills “mathematical skills,” “fine motor skills,” and “spatial 
thinking.”  
In the first step, considering these four skills, we describe the skill bundles of the 






� abstract-logical thinking mathematical skills 
fine motor skills 







� abstract-logical thinking mathematical skills 
fine motor skills 
spatial thinking  
                                                 
8 As the SESAM uses the same occupational categories as the BIZ, we can easily match the information from our 
occupation-specific skill bundles. The occupational code available in both data is the Schweizer Berufs-
nomenklatur 2000 (SBN2000), a five-digit code.  
9 In the Appendix in Section A.3.7.1, we provide a list of vocational occupations that are included in our sample.  
10 To account for changes in skill demand over time, we calculate the market bundles separately for each wave.  
11 In the actual data we have 26-dimensional skill vectors. 
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In the second step, we construct the market weight. The market weight in our example is a four-
dimensional skill vector that contains a rank order of our four skills. The rank order is 
determined by the distribution of skills in the labor market. Suppose that the market comprises 
500 bankers and 300 electricians. Looking at the underlying skill bundles, we see that 500 
workers use the skill “abstract-logical thinking,” 800 workers use the skill “mathematical 
skills,” and 300 workers use the skills “fine motor skills” and “spatial thinking.” Thus, in our 
labor market with only bankers and electricians, the market weight λ� is defined as:  
 
 






�  abstract-logical thinking mathematical skills 
fine motor skills 
spatial thinking 
 
This leads to the following ranked order of skills: Mathematical skills are the most general 
skills because they are most widely used. The skill “abstract-logical thinking” is the second 
most general skill, because 500 workers use it. The skills “fine motor skills” and “spatial 
thinking” are the least general skills, because only 300 workers use it.  
In the third step, we derive the specificity measure for the occupation-specific skill bundles 
by dividing the sum of ranks by the sum of skills used in an occupation. The bank clerk uses 
two skills and therefore we assign the value 0.5 to each of his skills. The electrician uses three 
skills and therefore we assign the value 0. 3 to each of his skills. Formally, occupational 
specificity is defined as: 
specificity measure 
occupation j 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠  
Turning to our example, the banker’s specificity is:  
specificity measure 
banker  𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 = 2 + 1 + 0 + 02 = 1.5 
The electrician’s specificity is: 
specificity measure 
electrician 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 = 0 + 1 + 3 + 33 = 2. 3� 
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According to our specificity measure, the electrician is a more specific occupation than the 
banker. Applying this procedure to the whole set of occupations in the labor market, we develop 
a continuous measure of occupational specificity.  
In the final step, we calculate the skill distance between occupations by applying the 
Euclidean distance formula. Turning to our example of bankers and electricians, the Euclidean 






�2 = �0.52 + 0.22 + (−0.3)2 + (−0.3)2 = 0.685. 
In our example, the distance between bankers and electricians is 0.685. Judging whether 
this distance is large or small is of course only possible by comparing this distance to distances 
between other occupations.  
3.4 Empirical Approach 
We proceed in three steps to test our hypotheses. First, to analyze whether occupational 
specificity influences the likelihood of different types of labor market transitions, we estimate 
a multinomial logit model. Second, to explore how occupational specificity affects wages, we 
run two separate regressions. To investigate whether more specific occupations pay a wage 
premium, we use Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation (PPML) with wages in the 
original occupation as dependent variables. Then, to investigate changes in wages we use OLS 
estimation with the difference in log wages as dependent variable. Third, to analyze whether 
the skill distance between occupations is associated with wage changes, again, we use PPML 
and include a measure for skill distance in our regression. 
Before running the regressions, we standardize the variables occupational specificity, labor 
market thickness, and skill distance to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
This procedure simplifies the interpretation of the effects. For the standardized variables, each 
case’s value indicates its difference from the mean of the original variable in number of standard 
deviations. For example, a value of 0.5 indicates that the value for that case is half a standard 
deviation above the mean, while a value of -2 indicates that a case has a value two standard 
deviations lower than the mean.  
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3.4.1 Occupational Specificity and Labor Market Transitions 
We distinguish between four different types of labor market transitions for laid-off individuals: 
finding employment in the original occupation, finding employment in a different occupation, 
remaining unemployed, or quitting the labor force. We estimate the probability of these 
transitions as a function of an individual’s occupational specificity. Our empirical approach 
follows the set-up in Lazear’s skill-weights-approach.  
Lazear’s model is embedded in the traditional job search models (Mortensen 1986; 
Mortensen and Pissarides 1999) in the sense that his model allows for an exogenous probability 
of layoff, and that the length of time a workers spends unemployed and the wage received once 
re-employed are both random variables with distributions that depend on the worker’s 
characteristics and those of the environment. Specifically, traditional models assume that an 
unemployed worker compares the present value of different labor market outcomes and chooses 
the outcome with the highest utility.  
The theoretical framework of McFadden’s discrete choice model can be described as 
follows: The individual i assigns utility  to alternative j and selects the alternative with the 
highest utility (McFadden 1974). The probability of each type of transition  j depends on a 
vector of observed characteristics, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖. Mathematically, a worker’s choice can be expressed as 
follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(x𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡;β) = exp (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
1 + ∑ exp (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟)𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟=2  
 
(3.1) 
              𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋0 + 𝑋𝑋1 ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝑋𝑋2 + 𝑋𝑋3  ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋4  ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑 + 𝛿𝛿. 
In our baseline model, our dependent variables are a set of four dummy variables indicating 
labor market status one year after the layoff: employed in the same occupation as before the 
layoff, employed in a different occupation, unemployed, and out of the labor force. For 
identification purposes we choose the most frequent outcome—“reemployed in the original 
occupation”—as the reference category.  
Throughout this chapter, we use the following concepts and definitions: A layoff in time 𝑡𝑡 
is defined as a situation where the person is employed at a firm in time 𝑡𝑡 − 1 but not employed 
in time 𝑡𝑡, and reports in time 𝑡𝑡 that he has been laid off. Concerning labor market transitions, 
an occupational change occurs if the person is unemployed in time 𝑡𝑡, reemployed in time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 
and holds a different occupation in 𝑡𝑡 + 1 than he did in 𝑡𝑡 − 1, before becoming unemployed. 
In contrast, the person is reemployed in the same occupation if the occupation held in 𝑡𝑡 − 1 
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corresponds to the occupation held in 𝑡𝑡 + 1. A person continues being unemployed f he is 
registered as unemployed in both t and 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Finally, a person has left the labor force, if he is 
unemployed in 𝑡𝑡, and neither employed nor registered as unemployed in 𝑡𝑡 + 1.  
The observed characteristics 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 comprise the following variables. First, 𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is our main 
variable of interest, occupational specificity. Second, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′  comprises a set of control variables, 
used in the traditional job search models (Mortensen 1986; Mortensen and Pissarides 1999). 
The included controls for the individual characteristics are age and age squared (in years), 
tenure and tenure squared (in years), a part-time dummy, and gender and nationality dummies. 
In addition, we include firm size (five categories), and industry (18 categories) as firm 
characteristics. Third, to control for labor market conditions, we include 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, the local 
unemployment rate, and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, the labor market thickness on the occupation level. Finally, 𝜑𝜑 
are time dummies, and 𝛿𝛿 are region dummies.  
In the first specification, we also include the natural logarithm of wages in the original 
occupation and the natural logarithm of unemployment benefits to control for the value of the 
reservation wage and the outside option. Concerning the timing of these variables, as pre-layoff 
wage we include wages in the last job hold before the layoff, while unemployment benefits are 
measured in the year of the layoff.  
However, because wage and unemployment benefits may be endogenous, these coefficients 
should be interpreted with caution (Abowd and Kang 2002). Because wages and benefits are 
an outcome of occupational specificity, including these controls might bias the coefficient on 
occupational specificity.12 Therefore, we use a second specification where we do not control 
for wages and unemployment benefits.  
 
  
                                                 
12 The amount of unemployment benefits is tied to previous earnings. 
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3.4.2 Occupational Specificity and Wages 
To assess the effect of occupational specificity on wages, we estimate two separate wage 
regressions. In the first regression, we use Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
estimation, where the parameters of interest solve the condition: 
�[𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − exp(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝑋𝑋)]𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 0, 
 
(3.2) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋0 + 𝑋𝑋1 ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑋1 ∙ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝑋𝑋2 + 𝑋𝑋3  ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋4  ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑 + 𝛿𝛿, 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 is the monthly wage in the original occupation, 𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 is the specificity in the 
original occupation, and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the vector of controls we have included previously. In addition, 
we control for the local unemployment rate and the labor market thickness. Finally, 𝜑𝜑 are time 
dummies, and 𝛿𝛿 are region dummies.  
Estimating this model with PPML is preferred over OLS estimation for two main reasons. 
First, with heteroskedastic errors, PPML is the least biased estimator out of a various number 
of OLS functional forms such as non-linear least squares or Tobit models. Second, PPML 
allows for predictions on wage levels instead of log wages as in the case for OLS (Santos Silva 
and Tenreyro 2006, 2011). In the second regression, we condition on those workers who are 
reemployed and define 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 as the difference in log wages before and after the layoff.  
3.4.3 Skill Distance and Wages 
To analyze whether the skill distance is associated with changes in wages, we condition on 
reemployed individuals and use PPML to estimate parameters that solve the equation: 
�[𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − exp(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝑋𝑋)]𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 0 
 
 
(3.3) 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋0 + 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝑋𝑋3  + 𝑋𝑋4 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋5𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑 + 𝛿𝛿, 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the monthly wage in the new occupation, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 is the wage in the original 
occupation, and 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the skill distance measure. Again, we include all controls from 
the previous equations.  
  




In this section, we present our estimation results. First, we show the results of the multinomial 
logit estimation where we test whether occupational specificity has an effect on the likelihood 
of different types of labor market transitions. Second, we show the results from the estimations 
where we investigate the relationship between occupational specificity and wages as well as 
skill distance and wages. 
3.5.1 Occupational Specificity and Labor Market Transitions 
Tables 3.4 through 3.6 report the estimation results of the multinomial logit model, where we 
test our first two hypotheses.13 First, we show how occupational specificity affects the log-odds 
ratios of the alternative outcomes compared to the baseline outcome “being reemployed in the 
same occupation.” Second, we calculate the marginal effects to show how occupational 
specificity affects the probability of each possible labor market transition. The parameters of 
the multinomial logit model are not straightforward to interpret. Looking at the log-odds ratios, 
a positive parameter means that the probability of choosing j increases relative to the probability 
of the base outcome. However, the magnitude of the parameter has no direct intuitive meaning.  
In Table 3.4 column (1), the coefficient of interest, “occupational specificity,” is negative 
and statistically significant at the five percent level. This implies that the log-odds ratio of 
finding reemployment in a different occupation compared to reemployment in the original 
occupation is decreasing in occupational specificity. This result confirms our hypothesis. The 
higher the degree of specificity of a worker’s initial occupation, the less likely he will switch to 
a different occupation.  
Column (2) shows the estimates for how occupational specificity affects the probability of 
remaining unemployed one year after the layoff versus having found reemployment in the same 
occupation. Occupational specificity increases the log odds ratio of still being unemployed 
versus having found reemployment in the same occupation. The effect is statistically significant 
at the one percent level. Again, we confirm our hypothesis that the higher the degree of 
specificity of a worker’s original occupation, the more likely he will remain unemployed in the 
period following the layoff.  
                                                 
13 In an alternative specification, reported in the Appendix in Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2, we cluster the standard errors 
at the occupational level. It is reasonable to expect that the error terms for workers in the same occupation are not 
independent. However, clustering does not change the results qualitatively. 
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Column (3) shows that occupational specificity does not affect the log odds ratios of dropping 
out of the labor force versus having found reemployment in the same occupation. The decision 
to leave the labor force appears to be driven by age and tenure effects as well as socio-
demographic variables instead of the specificity of a worker’s occupation.  
Among the control variables, labor market thickness—as expected—decreases the 
likelihood of changing the occupation and decreases the likelihood of remaining unemployed 
versus finding employment in the same occupation. This finding is straightforward: The more 
job offers a laid-off individual has, i.e., the higher the labor market thickness, the more likely 
he will find employment in the occupation he is trained in. The unemployment rate has a 
marginally statistically significant negative effect of leaving the labor force. This might be 
because unemployment is overall rather low in Switzerland.  
Unemployment benefits increase the probability of changing occupation and of remaining 
unemployed and they decrease the probability of leaving the labor force. Wages earned in the 
original occupation decrease the likelihood of choosing any other outcome than being 
reemployed in the same occupation. Given that these variables are proxies for the outside option 
and the reservation wage, the signs of these coefficients are in line with expectations.  
However, as pointed out previously, wages and benefits are to some extent outcomes of 
occupational specificity, which might bias the specificity coefficient. In Table 3.5, we therefore 
repeat the multinomial logit regression without controlling for wages and unemployment 
benefits. We find the coefficients of interest to be unaffected by whether we control for wages 
or benefits or not. They change neither in direction nor in levels of statistical significance.  
In the next step, to interpret the effects of occupational specificity on the probability scale, 
we need to compute marginal effects. The marginal effects inform us about the likelihood of 
the four outcomes independent from the base outcome. Table 3.6 reports marginal effects of a 
one standard deviation increase in occupational specificity on all four outcomes considered in 
our analysis based on the estimates from Table 3.5.  
Our results indicate that for a worker i with mean characteristics ?̅?𝑥𝑖𝑖, an increase in 
occupational specificity by one standard deviation increases the probability of reemployment 
in the original occupation by 0.13 percentage points. Again, this is in line with Lazear’s 
predictions. The more specific the skill bundle, the more likely is reemployment in the original 
occupation. In the same vein, the probability of being reemployed in a different occupation 
decreases by 2.99 percentage points if occupational specificity increases by one standard 
deviation. The more specific the skill bundle, the less likely is an occupational change. In line 
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with expectations, the probability of remaining unemployed increases by 4.01 percentage points 
if occupational specificity increases by one standard deviation. The probability of having left 
the labor force is not influenced by occupational specificity.  
Looking at the average probabilities, i.e., the probability of choosing one of the alternatives j 
for all individuals in the sample, our results suggest that workers in more specific occupation 
are most likely to find reemployment in their original occupation, second most likely to remain 
unemployed for a longer time span, and finally the least likely to switch occupations.  
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Table 3.4: MNL regression: Occupational specificity and employment status,                 




unemployed out of the labor 
force 
Occupational specificity -0.2637** 0.3862*** -0.1172 
 (0.1241) (0.1431) (0.2717) 
Labor market thickness -0.3178** -0.1660 -0.1173 
 (0.1399) (0.1505) (0.2792) 
Unemployment rate -0.1637 0.7923 -1.4574 
 (0.4692) (0.5257) (1.0292) 
Unemployment benefits 0.0778*** 0.3035*** -0.3617*** 
 
(0.0268) (0.0294) (0.0952) 
Wage -0.0358 -0.3825*** -0.6303*** 
 
(0.0389) (0.0351) (0.0568) 
Age -0.0858 -0.0295 -0.2457** 
 
(0.0556) (0.0699) (0.1046) 
Age squared 0.0009 0.0003 0.0038*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
Tenure -0.1770** 0.3493*** -0.8655*** 
 
(0.0837) (0.0710) (0.1506) 
Tenure squared 0.0071* -0.0069* 0.0271*** 
 
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0051) 
Swiss 0.2591 -0.3912* 0.0116 
 
(0.1884) (0.2303) (0.3974) 
Male 0.2181 -0.0992 0.9205** 
 
(0.1852) (0.2109) (0.3806) 
Married -0.1430 0.4273* -2.7106*** 
 (0.1881) (0.2223) (0.4559) 
Full-time -0.0300 -1.8795*** 3.8435*** 
 
(0.1875) (0.2225) (0.5662) 
Firm size  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R squared 0.5185 0.5185 0.5185 
Observations 1,653 1,653 1,653 
  Notes: SESAM data linked with BIZ data, authors’ calculations. 
  Multinomial Logit regression (standard errors in parentheses). 
  The base outcome is being reemployed in the same occupation. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01.   
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out of the labor 
force 
Occupational specificity -0.2570** 0.3547*** -0.2350 
 
(0.1220) (0.1232) (0.1838) 
Labor market thickness -0.3032** -0.1447 -0.0146 
 
(0.1375) (0.1271) (0.1883) 
Unemployment rate -0.1510 0.8669** -0.4672 
 
(0.4615) (0.4338) (0.6188) 
Age -0.0783 -0.0559 -0.3477*** 
 
(0.0548) (0.0593) (0.0741) 
Age squared 0.0008 0.0008 0.0050*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Tenure -0.2040** 0.3352*** -1.4246*** 
 
(0.0821) (0.0652) (0.1690) 
Tenure squared 0.0085** -0.0041 0.0433*** 
 
(0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0052) 
Swiss 0.1661 -0.5244*** -0.0442 
 
(0.1847) (0.1951) (0.2589) 
Male 0.2030 -0.1383 1.2161*** 
 
(0.1823) (0.1809) (0.2620) 
Married -0.1861 0.4171** -2.3926*** 
 (0.1852) (0.1900) (0.2962) 
Full-time -0.0140 -2.0168*** 4.0113*** 
 
(0.1837) (0.1928) (0.4944) 
Firm size  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R squared 0.3928 0.3928 0.3928 
Observations 1,653 1,653 1,653 
  Notes: SESAM data linked with BIZ data, authors’ calculations. 
  Multinomial Logit regression (standard errors in parentheses). 
  The base outcome is being reemployed in the same occupation. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
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out of the labor 
force 
Occupational  0.0013 -0.0299** 0.0401*** -0.0115 
Specificity (0.0161) (0.0119) (0.0114) (0.0098) 
Average probability 0.4721 0.1339 0.2489 0.1451 
  Notes: SESAM data linked with BIZ data, authors’ calculations. 
  Marginal effects of a one standard deviation change in occupational specificity on the 4 outcome probabilities.  
  Standard errors in parentheses. 
  Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
 
 
3.5.2 Occupational Specificity and Wages 
Table 3.7 column (1) reports estimates from a wage regression that uses the Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PPML) method. In line with Lazear’s predictions, we find a positive 
correlation between the degree of specificity and wages. Workers receive a wage premium of 
about 11.1 percent for employment in a one standard deviation more specific occupation. Thus, 
we confirm our hypothesis that higher specificity is associated with higher wages. Among the 
control variables, the coefficients are in line with expectations. Labor market thickness has a 
statistically significant negative effect on wages. If thickness of the market increases, skill 
bundles become more general and the wage premiums decrease. Age and tenure have the 
expected U-shaped and inverse U-shaped effects.  
In the next step, we test the hypothesis of whether workers in more specific occupations 
lose more when they suffer a layoff. Table 3.7 column (2) reports estimates from an OLS 
regression that uses the change in wages before and after the layoff as dependent variable. Here, 
we restrict our sample to those workers who have found reemployment one year after the layoff. 
In line with Lazear’s model, we find a negative correlation between the degree of specificity 
and wage changes. Specifically, workers lose about 13.5 percent of their wages for employment 
in a one standard deviation more specific occupation. We thus confirm our hypotheses. Taken 
together, these results suggest a risk-return trade-off in the sense that investments into more 
specific human capital are associated with higher returns but also with higher risk of 
unemployment and greater wage loss after layoffs.  
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Occupational specificity 0.1106*** -0.1352* 
 (0.0223) (0.0744) 
Labor market thickness -0.0635** 0.0396 
 (0.0264) (0.0769) 
Unemployment rate -0.0490 -0.2867 
 (0.0773) (0.2481) 
Age 0.1123*** 0.0876** 
 (0.0120) (0.0396) 
Age squared -0.0015*** -0.0012** 
 (0.0001) (0.0005) 
Tenure -0.0068 -0.0009 
 (0.0079) (0.0334) 
Tenure squared 0.0006* 0.0007 
 (0.0003) (0.0015) 
Swiss 0.2185*** -0.0749 
 (0.0337) (0.1027) 
Male -0.0582* -0.2092* 
 (0.0330) (0.1182) 
Married 0.5051*** 0.0720 
 (0.0379) (0.1193) 
Full-time 0.2454*** 0.0524 
 (0.0357) (0.1298) 
Firm size Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
Method Poisson OLS 
(Pseudo) R squared 0.2232 0.0826 
Observations 4,511 1,008 
   Notes: SESAM data linked with BIZ data, authors’ calculations. 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
   Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
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3.5.3 Skill Distance and Wages  
We investigate the relationship between wages and skill distance by again using Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation. Table 3.8 shows how pre-layoff wages are 
correlated with post-layoff wages among those who found reemployment in our sample, and 
how the skill distance between pre- and post-layoff occupation drives this relationship.  
We regress post-layoff wages on pre-layoff wages and on skill distance. Specification (1) 
regresses post-layoff wages on pre-layoff wages without accounting for the skill distance. The 
correlation is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient on pre-layoff wages indicates 
how post-layoff wages change in percent if pre-layoff wages increase, ceteris paribus, by 1,000 
Swiss francs. One thousand Swiss francs higher monthly wages before the layoff translate into 
about 0.004 percent higher monthly wages in the new job.  
In specification (2) we include the skill distance between the pre-layoff and the post-layoff 
occupations into our regression. The coefficient shows how post-layoff wages change with skill 
distance. For an increase of a one standard deviation in skill distance, post-layoff wages 
decrease by about 3.18 percent. The results in Table 3.8 thus confirm our hypothesis and show 
that the larger the skill distance, the greater the associated wage losses. Put differently, because 
they can transfer a large part of their skill bundle from the original to the new occupation, 
staying close to the skill bundle of the original occupation benefits workers.  
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Table 3.8: Skill distance and wages  
 
Wage post layoff Wage post layoff  
Pre-layoff wage 0.00004*** 0.00004*** 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) 
Skill distance  -0.0318* 
  (0.0193) 
Labor market thickness 0.0266 0.0217 
 (0.0212) (0.0212) 
Unemployment rate -0.0912 -0.0963 
 
(0.1056) (0.1058) 
Age 0.0335* 0.0332* 
 
(0.0179) (0.0179) 
Age squared -0.0004** -0.0004** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Tenure -0.0600** -0.0591** 
 
(0.0288) (0.0289) 
Tenure squared -0.0005 -0.0004 
 
(0.0018) (0.0018) 
Swiss 0.1474*** 0.1419*** 
 
(0.0455) (0.0455) 
Male 0.0493 0.0490 
 
(0.0454) (0.0453) 
Married 0.2495*** 0.2466*** 
 (0.0498) (0.0497) 
Full-time 0.4494*** 0.4461*** 
 (0.0578) (0.0577) 
Firm size  Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
Method Poisson Poisson 
Pseudo R squared 0.4281 0.4295 
Observations 1,008 1,008 
  Notes: SESAM data linked with BIZ data, authors’ calculations. 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
   Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
 
  




This chapter analyzes returns to educational investments from the individual perspective. In 
particular, we investigate how different types of VET occupations differ in their degree of 
specificity and how these differences affect workers’ mobility and wages. We use Lazear’s 
skill-weights approach (2009) to define the specificity of VET occupations. Lazear assumes 
that all skills are general in nature but that firms use single skills in different combinations and 
with different weights. Drawing on this approach, we characterize VET occupations by skill 
bundles and build occupation-specific skill weights to measure the degree of specificity. We 
then derive empirically testable hypotheses on the effect of occupational specificity on mobility 
and wages of VET graduates.  
Instead of moving voluntarily because of a better work opportunity, workers might be 
forced to move because their firm shuts down or they are laid off. In this chapter, we focus on 
involuntary moves and study the impact of occupational specificity on labor market transitions 
of laid-off workers. In line with Lazear’s predictions, we find that workers in more specific 
occupations are less likely to find reemployment in a different occupation than their original 
occupations. Moreover, the more specific their occupation, the more likely they stay 
unemployed one year after the layoff. 
Relating occupational specificity to wages, Lazear (2009) argues that workers have higher 
wages and suffer larger wage losses in firms that require unusual skill combinations. Translating 
Lazear’s predictions to the occupational level, we derive the following empirically testable 
hypotheses: Workers in more specific occupations have higher wages and suffer larger wage 
losses than workers in more general occupations. In our empirical analysis, we confirm these 
hypotheses. We find that while occupational specificity is associated with higher wages, it is 
also associated with higher wage losses after layoff.  
Finally, we investigate the transferability of skills in more detail. We calculate the skill 
distance between occupations, which indicates how similar the original and the new occupation 
are in terms of their underlying skill bundles. We find that the larger the skill distance between 
two occupations, the higher the wage losses for workers who change between these 
occupations. Taken together, these findings suggest a risk-return trade-off in the sense that 
workers in more specific occupations are compensated for their lower mobility with higher 
wages.  
Our analyses of breaking down occupations into skill bundles and classifying occupations 
in terms of their specificity helps to better understand labor market transitions and wages. We 
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show that it is not the occupation per se but rather the compatibility of the skill bundle of an 
occupation in comparison to the market weight and in comparison to the skill bundle of other 
occupations that matters for labor market success.  
Because occupational skills of workers are important both for individual returns to 
education and the competitiveness of firms, the next chapter continues investigating the relation 
between skill bundles and wages. Due to continuous technological innovation, skill 
requirements not only increase rapidly but also change frequently (Autor and Dorn 2009). As 
structural change challenges traditional occupational demarcations, mobility and flexibility are 
increasingly demanded from both the firm and the individual. The next chapter takes a dynamic 
perspective on occupational skills and investigates how the demand for and supply of single 
skills has changed over a period of three decades and how these changes interact with changes 
in the wage distribution.  
  




Unemployment insurance in Switzerland 
The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) administers the unemployment insurance 
in Switzerland. Contributions to the unemployment insurance are equal to 2.2 percent of the 
monthly gross wages up to 10,500 Swiss francs (126,000 CHF per year). Employers and 
employees pay equal shares of this insurance premium, i.e., each one contributes 1.1 percent. 
Additionally, one percent of monthly gross wages beyond 10,500 Swiss francs has to be paid 
as a “solidarity supplement.” These contributions are mandatory for all employees in 
Switzerland. Self-employed workers can join the unemployment insurance on a voluntary basis. 
To be eligible for unemployment benefits, applicants must fulfill a number of conditions. 
Spells must be longer than two days to be considered as unemployment. Unemployed 
individuals must live in Switzerland and must apply for benefits at the local registration office. 
There they will be assigned a case worker, who can impose benefit sanctions if they fail to 
apply for jobs (Arni, Lalive, and van Ours 2013). The applicants must have contributed during 
at least 12 months over the preceding two years. If they are eligible, unemployed individuals 
receive 70 percent of their insured wages (at a maximum of 70 percent of 10,500 CHF) during 
an unemployment spell of up to two years. Under certain circumstances (obligation to provide 
for children, disability), this rate can increase from 70 to 80 percent. 
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Table A.3.1: MNL regression: Occupational specificity and labor market transitions, 




unemployed out of the labor 
force 
Occupational specificity -0.2729* 0.4087** 0.1316 
 (0.1545) (0.1808) (0.2976) 
Labor market thickness -0.3069 -0.1898 -0.2652 
 (0.2260) (0.1700) (0.2407) 
Unemployment rate -0.1774 1.0249** -1.9660* 
 (0.5335) (0.4102) (1.0068) 
Unemployment benefits 0.0922*** 0.3014*** -0.3236*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0295) (0.0904) 
Wage -0.0185 -0.3710*** -0.6599*** 
 
(0.0323) (0.0371) (0.0700) 
Age -0.1035** -0.0372 -0.3421*** 
 
(0.0501) (0.0963) (0.1072) 
Age squared 0.0010* 0.0003 0.0048*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Tenure -0.1243 0.3425*** -0.7884*** 
 
(0.1009) (0.0907) (0.1744) 
Tenure squared 0.0053 -0.0071 0.0246*** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0059) 
Swiss 0.2912* -0.3956* 0.2251 
 (0.1656) (0.2093) (0.2563) 
Male 0.2103 -0.1301 1.2185*** 
 (0.1638) (0.1969) (0.3235) 
Married -0.1321 0.4870** -2.9247*** 
 (0.1813) (0.2242) (0.4477) 
Full-time -0.1114 -1.9892*** 3.7344*** 
 (0.1964) (0.4132) (0.8436) 
Firm size  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R squared 0.5200 0.5200 0.5200 
Observations 1,518 1,518 1,518 
  Notes: SESAM data linked with BIZ data, authors’ calculations.  
   Multinomial Logit regression (clustered standard errors in parentheses).  
   The base outcome is being reemployed in the same occupation.  
   Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01.   
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Table A.3.2: MNL regression: Occupational specificity and labor market transitions, 




unemployed out of the labor 
force 
Occupational specificity -0.2574* 0.3995*** 0.0355 
 (0.1559) (0.1471) (0.2257) 
Labor market thickness -0.2979 -0.2025 -0.1863 
 (0.2255) (0.1364) (0.1783) 
Unemployment rate -0.1305 1.0932*** -0.5538 
 (0.5306) (0.3525) (0.5653) 
Age -0.0926* -0.0624 -0.4254*** 
 
(0.0486) (0.0740) (0.0840) 
Age squared 0.0010* 0.0009 0.0059*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Tenure -0.1673 0.3112*** -1.2761*** 
 
(0.1108) (0.0973) (0.2228) 
Tenure squared 0.0077 -0.0030 0.0404*** 
 
(0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0066) 
Swiss 0.1860 -0.5498*** 0.0406 
 (0.1624) (0.1873) (0.2390) 
Male 0.1788 -0.2165 1.4617*** 
 (0.1596) (0.1925) (0.2656) 
Married -0.1850 0.4316* -2.4637*** 
 (0.1817) (0.2296) (0.3219) 
Full-time -0.0947 -2.1421*** 3.8655*** 
 (0.1928) (0.3621) (0.7384) 
Firm size  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R squared 0.3940 0.3940 0.3940 
Observations 1,518 1,518 1,518 
 Notes: SESAM data linked with BIZ data, authors’ calculations. 
  Multinomial Logit regression (clustered standard errors in parentheses). 
  The base outcome is being reemployed in the same occupation.  
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Table A.3.3: Vocational occupations in Switzerland  





Poultry specialist Geflügelfachmann 








Food technologist Lebensmitteltechnologe 
Wine technologist Weintechnologe 
Textile designer Textilgestalter Handweben 
Clothes designer Bekleidungsgestalter 
Orthopaedic shoemaker Orthopädie-Schuhmacher 
Saddler Sattler 
Precision optician Feinwerkoptiker 
Ceramic modeller Keramik-Modelleur 
Casting technologist Gusstechnologe 
Galvanizer Galvaniker 
Production mechanic Mechapraktiker 
Engraver Graveur 
Plant manufacturer Anlagen- und Apparatebauer 
Blacksmith Schmied 
Metal worker Metallbauer 
Automotive technician Fahrzeugschlosser 
Metal spinner Metalldrücker 
Metalworker Mechapraktiker 
Mechanical engineer Polymechaniker 
Textile mechanic Textilmechaniker 
Multimedia technician Multimediaelektroniker 
Power line technician Netzelektriker 
Automation engineer Automatiker 
Electronics technician Elektroniker 
Watchmaker (practitioner) Uhrmacher Praktiker 
Surface finisher Oberflächenveredler Uhren 
Panel beater Carrossier Spenglerei 
Motor mechanic Automobil-Mechatroniker 
  Notes: List provided by the Berufsinformationszentrum and matched with SESAM. 
  Authors’ translation.  
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Table A.3.3: Vocational occupations in Switzerland (continued) 
Title of occupation German title of occupation 
Agricultural machinery mechanic Landmaschinenmechaniker 
Painter and varnisher Carrossier Lackiererei 
Sawyer Säger Holzindustrie 
Wood turner Drechsler 
Cabinetmaker Schreiner 
Basket worker Korb- und Flechtwerkgestalter 
Gilder Vergolder 
Paper technologist Papiertechnologe 
Polygraph Polygraf 
Screen printer Siebdrucker 
Print media processor Printmedienverarbeiter 
Laboratory assistant Laborant 
Photo lab technician Fotolaborant 
Plastics technologist Kunststofftechnologe 
Model maker Technischer Modellbauer 
Surveyor Geomatiker 
Electrical designer Elektroplaner 
Textile technologist Textiltechnologe 
Telematics technician Telematiker 
IT technician (system technology) Informatiker (Systemtechnik) 
Draughtsman (architecture) Hochbauzeichner 
Draughtsman (spatial planning) Raumplanungszeichner 
Draughtsman (structures) Bauzeichner 
Metal construction engineer Metallbaukonstrukteur 
Building services planners Haustechnikplaner 
Interior designer Innenausbauzeichner 
Micro designer Mikrozeichner 
Constructing engineer Konstrukteur 
Woodworker Holzhandwerker 
Plant operator Anlagenführer 
IT technician  Informatiker  
Mediamatician Mediamatiker 
IT technician (support) Informatiker (Support) 
Bricklayer Maurer 
Carpenter Zimmermann 
Road builder Strassenbauer 
Paver Pflästerer 
Foundation engineer Grundbauer 
Floor layer Bodenleger 
Roofer Dachdecker 
Plasterer Gipser 
  Notes: List provided by the Berufsinformationszentrum and matched with SESAM. 
  Authors’ translation.  
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Table A.3.3: Vocational occupations in Switzerland (continued) 
Title of occupation German title of occupation 
Painter Maler 
Foundation engineer Grundbauer 
Floor layer Bodenleger 
Roofer Dachdecker 
Foundation engineer Grundbauer 




Installer for heating systems Heizungsinstallateur 
Tinsmith Spengler 
Insulation installer Isolierspengler 




Sunshades fitter Storenmonteur 
Stonemason Steinmetz 
Retail clerk Detailhandelsfachmann 
Bookseller Buchhändler 
Druggist Drogist 
Commercial employee Kaufmann 
Advertising engineer Gestalter Werbetechnik 
Railway operations manager Bahnbetriebsdisponent 
Track worker Gleisbauer 
Train conductor Zugbegleiter 
Cableway technician Seilbahner 
Truck driver Lastwagenführer 
Automotive mechanic Automobil-Fachmann 
Sailor Matrose in der Binnenschifffahrt 
Catering professional Restaurationsfachmann 
Cook Koch 
Hotel specialist Hotelfachmann 
Professional housekeeper Fachmann Hauswirtschaft 
Stone sculptor Steinbildhauer 
Photography expert Fotofachmann 
Graphic designer Grafiker 
Textile designer Textilentwerfer 
Gold smith Goldschmied 
Wood carver Holzbildhauer 
Ceramist Keramiker 
Stained-glass artist Glasmaler 
  Notes: List provided by the Berufsinformationszentrum and matched with SESAM. 
  Authors’ translation.  
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Table A.3.3: Vocational occupations in Switzerland (continued) 
Title of occupation German title of occupation 
Musical instrument maker Musikinstrumentenbauer 
Decoration designer Dekorationsgestalter 
Interior decorator Innendekorateur 
Social care worker Fachmann Betreuung 
Chemical and pharmaceutical technologist Chemie- und Pharmatechnologe 
Physics laboratory assistant Physiklaborant 
Medical practice assistant Medizinischer Praxisassistent 
Pharmaceutical assistant Pharma-Assistent 
Optician Augenoptiker 
Massage therapist Medizinischer Masseur 
Orthopaedic technician Orthopädist 
Dental technician Zahntechniker 
Dental assistant Dentalassistent 
Veterinary nurse Tiermedizinischer Praxisassistent 
Care assistant Pflegeassistent 
Healthcare worker Fachangestellter Gesundheit 
Textiles care worker Textilpfleger 
Building cleaner Gebäudereiniger 
Chimney sweeper Kaminfeger 
Plant maintenance expert Fachmann Betriebsunterhalt 





Archivist Fachmann Information  
Theatre painter Theatermaler 
  Notes: List provided by the Berufsinformationszentrum and matched with SESAM. 








A Declining Middle?                                    
The Relation between Changes in Skills and 
Wages of Middle-Skilled Wages 
Part of this chapter is a revised version of early parts of the working paper “Skill Prices, Skill 





This chapter analyzes educational outcomes in a dynamic setting. In the long run, market 
dynamics might lead firms to demand different types of skills. Workers, in turn, have to respond 
to changed skill demands. We investigate how skill requirements have changed over time and 
how these changes are related to changes in workers’ wages.  
The United States and many European countries are witnessing substantial changes in their 
wage structure, attracting sustained attention of policy makers and the general public 
(Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg 2009; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Card, Heining, and 
Kline 2013). Most research has focused on changing returns to education and experience (Katz 
and Murphy 1992), changes in the workforce composition (Lemieux 2006b), or the decline in 
unionization (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996) as possible explanations for the observed 
changes. Until recently, little attention has been paid to the role of occupational skills.  
With the pioneering work by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), researchers started linking 
changes in the wage structure to the occupational structure of the economy, and particularly to 
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the skill requirements of different occupations. The main idea is that changes in the wage 
structure within- and between occupations are systematically related changes in the types of 
skills1 in these occupations. They hypothesize that technological changes have non-monotonic 
effects on the demand for skill over the wage distribution: They reduce the demand for routine 
tasks performed in middle-wage occupations, increase the demand abstract tasks performed in 
high-wage occupations, and have little direct impact on the demand for non-routine manual 
tasks used in many low-wage occupations.  
This hypothesis has become known as “routinization,” or routine-biased technical change. 
In line with this hypothesis, researchers have consistently shown U-shaped changes in 
employment shares and wages, i.e., increasing employment shares and increasing wages at the 
top and the bottom and decreasing employment shares and decreasing wages in the middle 
(Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006, 2008; Goos and Manning 2007; Goos, Manning, and 
Salomons 2009, 2014; Autor and Dorn 2013).  
To date, however, empirical research has been largely limited to descriptive analyses.2 
Specifically, while previous findings suggest a potentially important role of skills, they do not 
analyze the relationship between changes in skills and changes in wages in a regression 
framework. Moreover, most studies assume a static view to describe skill requirements in 
occupations, thus not allowing for occupations to change their skill composition over time.3 
However, a much more plausible assumption is that the introduction of new technologies will 
not simply wipe out routine-task intensive occupations, but fundamentally change the tasks 
performed in these occupations. New technologies thus require new tasks, which substitute or 
complement the current tasks.  
In this chapter, we address both shortcomings in the previous literature and quantify the 
contribution of changing skills to changes in the wage structure by explicitly accounting for 
within-occupation changes in skill requirements. For the empirical analysis, we use data from 
Germany. Our skills data are the BIBB/IAB and BIBB/BAuA Employment Surveys, 
representative cross-section surveys conducted roughly every seven years since 1979. Each 
survey wave contains questions on the types of skills needed on the job. We describe each 
occupation as a bundle of skills, distinguishing between cognitive, interactive, and manual 
skills. Within occupations, we are able to identify how the share of these skills changes over 
time. We match our skills data to the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB), 
                                                 
1 We provide a detailed discussion on the difference between skills and tasks in the theory section of this chapter. 
2 Notable exceptions are Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, and Leuschner (2009) and Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011b). 
3 A notable exception is Spitz-Oener (2006).  
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a panel on complete job histories and wages. The SIAB is a two percent random sample of all 
social security records in Germany, covering the employment histories of about 1.5 million 
individuals from 1975 through 2008.  
To explicitly quantify the contribution of changing skills to changes in wages over the whole 
wage distribution, we use the recently developed decomposition approach based on recentered 
influence function (RIF) regression by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007). With this method, 
we move beyond merely describing changes in shapes but instead apply a regression framework 
to the question of how technological change impacts wages. Besides allowing for a 
quantification of the effects of skills, this method enables us to take into account that changes 
in skill requirements might affect wages differently at different parts of the wage distribution. 
In addition, this approach allows considering several explanatory factors simultaneously.  
Germany is an important case for analyzing changes in the wage structure, because the 
evidence on wage polarization is far less clear than for other countries. Although earlier studies 
found a polarization of employment and wages attributable to the routinization of work (Spitz-
Oener 2006; Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg 2009), more recent studies started pointing 
out that findings for the United States and the United Kingdom cannot easily be transferred to 
Germany. Specifically, recent contributions hypothesize that the use of new machinery and 
computers complements the work of middle-skilled workers rather than substituting it (Bonin 
et al. 2015; Eichhorst und Buhlmann 2015; Moeller 2015). In the same vein, Eichhorst et 
al. (2015) show that, since the mid-1990s, employment shares of middle-skilled workers 
remained largely stable.  
Because of this particular development, in our core analysis, we restrict our sample to 
middle-skilled workers and investigate changes in wages for this particular group. Moreover, 
both for low-skilled and for high-skilled workers the occupational profiles are much less clear 
cut than for the middle-skilled. While low-skilled workers do typically not receive any training 
beyond compulsory schooling, high-skilled are typically trained in university majors that are 
not easily transferable to one specific occupation.  
Focusing the analysis on middle-skilled workers allows investigating the effects of changes 
within well-defined occupations and thus enables policy conclusions. Because in Germany 
about two thirds of the workforce holds a vocational degree, our analysis is taking into account 
the largest part of the labor market. As a robustness check, we run a separate analysis for the 
full sample and show that our findings remain largely unchanged.  
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In the first step of the analysis, we show that skill requirements varied substantially within- and 
between occupations. In particular, we see an overall increase in the importance of cognitive 
skills, while the importance of manual skills is decreasing. In addition, we show that the wage 
level and the dispersion of wages have changed substantially both for the restricted sample of 
middle-skilled workers and the whole population. In particular, we show that from the late 
1970s through the late 1980s, changes in wages were mostly concentrated at the upper part. 
From the early 1990s through the mid-2000s, wages at the lower parts decreased, while wages 
at the upper part continued increasing. These patterns hold for both the reduced and the full 
sample. The patterns are largely similar to those found in previous studies that have used earlier 
versions of the German administrative records, in particular, Fitzenberger (1999), Gernandt and 
Pfeiffer (2007) and Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg (2009).  
In the second step, we perform RIF regression-based decompositions to investigate whether 
the observed changes in skills and wages are related. The decomposition method accounts for 
composition effects, i.e., changes in worker and job characteristics, and wage structure effects, 
i.e., changes in the returns to these characteristics. Our decomposition results suggest that wage 
structure effects were largely driving the changes in wages, while composition effects only 
played a minor role. Specifically, changes in the returns to skills were most pronounced during 
the 1990s and the mid-2000s. Increases in the returns to cognitive skills were mostly increasing 
top-end inequality, increasing wages of workers at the top of the distribution. Wages of workers 
in the middle of the distribution were increasing as well, due to both increases in cognitive and 
manual skills.  
Changes affect upper- and lower-tail inequality differently because differently skilled 
workers are not uniformly distributed along the wage distribution: Positively affected workers 
are clustered in the upper part, whereas adversely affected workers are clustered in the lower 
part of the wage distribution. Our findings show that we cannot confirm the same U-shaped 
polarization patterns that studies for Anglo-Saxon countries have found. Rather, the lower part 
of the distribution has experienced wage losses, the middle has remained largely stable and has 
either gained or lost depending on the skill profiles, and the upper part has experienced wage 
gains.  
Our analyses show that skill requirements within occupations vary substantially over time. 
It appears that most occupations do not simply become obsolete, but rather adapt to a changing 
technological regime by undergoing substantial changes in their skill requirements. Any 
discussion on how technological change affects the nature of work should thus explicitly 
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account for changing skill requirements within occupations. In addition, quantifying the 
contribution of skills to changes in the wage structure allows a better understanding of why 
some occupations have experienced sharp decreases in wages, while others have experienced 
sharp increases. This chapter therefore adds two new theoretical dimensions to the recent 
discussions on technology-induced changes in the wage structure.  
Finally, our results have crucial implications for the main research question of this doctoral 
thesis, namely, how to secure returns on educational investments in changing market 
environments. First, we provide empirical evidence that returns to skills vary over time and 
depend on market dynamics. Secondly, we are able to quantify exactly how returns to single 
skills vary within different occupations. Thirdly, we show that, unlike in the U.S. and the UK, 
middle-skilled workers in Germany have not experienced sharp declines in their wages. This 
finding could be interpreted as evidence that the dual vocational education and training system 
is enabling workers to well-adapt to technological change. 
4.2 Theoretical Background 
In this section, we first give an overview of the discussion in the literature on the differences 
between tasks and skills and on how to evaluate task and skill measures. Second, we briefly 
review recent literature that has investigated changes in the wage structure. Third, drawing on 
Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011), we introduce a wage setting model where changes in 
occupational wages depend on within-occupation changes in skill requirements and skill prices.  
4.2.1 Defining Skills and Tasks  
For the purpose of our discussion, it is essential to clarify the distinction between tasks and 
skills. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) define tasks as units of work activity that produce output, 
while skills are workers’ endowments for performing various tasks. Workers apply their skills 
to carry out tasks in exchange for wages. This distinction is inconsequential if workers of a 
given skill always perform the same set of tasks. However, it becomes relevant when shifts in 
technology change the assignment of skills to tasks. Therefore, they argue that one needs to 
apply a model that is able to measure the mapping between skills and tasks and observe the 
changes in this mapping over time. 
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) acknowledge that this skill-task mapping presents a substantial 
measurement challenge since consistent information on job tasks is generally not collected by 
representative data sources. Specifically, they point to the following shortcomings of the data 
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most commonly used in the task literature, the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) 
and its predecessor, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).4  
First, the job content measures are often vague, repetitive, and constructed using ambiguous 
scales that are likely to confuse respondents. Second, and in line with what we have pointed out 
previously, the task measures offer a static view of the tasks an occupation comprises. Third, 
the sheer number of distinct occupations and the vast quantity of unique scales leads researchers 
essentially to pick and choose among the vast amount of information. Fourth, because in the 
O*NET it is not the workers themselves who report on the activities performed on the job, but 
rather occupational experts who assign scores to different indicators characterizing occupations, 
this data might underestimate the true changes in job content.  
Most importantly, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) point out that the task definitions in the 
O*NET and DOT are somewhat inconsistent. Following Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), 
researchers have often used three broad task groups: routine cognitive and manual tasks, 
abstract analytical tasks, and non-routine manual tasks. While these task attributes are broadly 
distinct, there are important overlaps among them. For example, many routine cognitive tasks 
(e.g., performing calculations) also require abstract analytical tasks. How these overlaps should 
affect task classification remains an unresolved issue.  
To avoid some of these pitfalls, Autor (2013) recommends collecting job task information 
directly from survey respondents. In this regard, he argues that the German BIBB/IAB and 
BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey and the British Skills Survey might be potential data sets 
that overcome the weaknesses of the U.S. data. However, whether the measures in these data 
are functionally equivalent to the U.S. measures is difficult to assess. Therefore, imposing the 
framework introduced by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) to data other than the O*NET 
might lead to wrong classifications and wrong conclusions.  
In recent contributions, Green (2012) compares the U.S. measures with the British data and 
Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann (2013) do the same with the German data. Both studies show 
that for most of the measures in their respective data sets, there is no direct counterpart in the 
U.S. data. In that case, classification is up to the discretion of the researcher, which increases 
the potential for misclassification and makes reproducibility more difficult. In addition, both 
                                                 
4 The O*NET is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration and 
provides hundreds of standardized descriptors with detailed information on knowledge, skills, abilities, and work 
activities of more than 800 occupations.  
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Green (2012) and Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann (2013) point out that the classification of 
tasks as either routine or non-routine is especially problematic in their data.  
To go into more detail with the German data, Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann (2013) 
review Spitz-Oener’s (2006) task classification and note that some of the tasks might be 
misclassified. Examples are “calculating” which is classified as a routine cognitive task, but 
could as well be a non-routine cognitive task given that the GED Math measure in the Autor, 
Levy, and Murnane (2003) paper includes the items “adds and subtracts 2-digit numbers.” In 
addition, some items seem to include both routine and non-routine tasks. For instance, 
“measuring” includes measuring, testing, and quality control tasks. Whereas “measuring” can 
be considered a routine manual task, “testing” and especially “quality control” might also 
include non-routine manual tasks. Finally, they perform a sensitivity analysis in which they use 
a different operationalization for the task data. Their analysis shows that different classifications 
of tasks into the domains proposed by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) lead to different 
conclusions on task changes in Germany. Therefore, they recommend researchers not to 
distinguish between routine and non-routine tasks.  
Given these challenges, in this chapter, we decide not to follow the classification by Autor, 
Levy, and Murnane (2003) when using the German data. We decide following the suggestions 
by Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann (2013) and instead do not draw a distinction between 
routine and non-routine tasks. Instead, we distinguish between cognitive, interactive, and 
manual tasks only. These three categories allow us to univocally assign all of the items listed 
in the surveys to one of the categories. The classification is straightforward and reduces 
classification ambiguity in the sense that for example calculating is simply classified as 
cognitive skill and there is no need for debating whether is it routine cognitive or non-routine 
cognitive. Our classification thus produces more easily replicable results because it uses only 
one dimension.  
In addition, we assume a one-to-one mapping between skills and tasks. This assumption is 
reasonable for vocational occupations in Germany, where the content of the training curricula 
and the tasks performed on the job closely match and the large majority of workers are working 
in the occupations they were trained in. Unlike in the U.S., the German labor market has an 
institutionalized occupational structure, where occupations are structured according to the 
corresponding tracks of vocational qualifications and bound by vocational qualifications 
(Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1982; Eyraud, Marsden, and Silvestre 1990; Marsden 1999). 
Given that training curricula are constantly updated, our assumption of a one-to-one mapping 
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also holds for technology shifts. In addition, conflicting with the task approach, theories of 
search and matching predict that the matching of workers to occupations is very tight (Albrecht 
and Vroman 2002; Wong 2003). Therefore, in our application, we could use the terms skill and 
task interchangeably as they both measure the same. We decide to use the term skill exclusively 
to avoid any confusion with the task-based approach of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). 
4.2.2 Technological Change and Wages 
In the early 1990s, a series of studies argued that technological change alters the demand for 
skilled work (Bound and Johnson 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992; Levy and Murnane 1992; Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce 1993; Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994; Machin and van Reenen 1998). 
These studies introduced the concept of a skill-biased technological change (SBTC), defined as 
a shift in the production technology that favors skilled over unskilled workers by increasing 
their relative productivity. The working hypothesis was that a burst of new technology caused 
a rise in the demand for highly skilled workers, which in turn led to a rise in earnings inequality. 
However, the actual U.S. wage development is not easily reconciled with the SBTC idea. Since 
the late 1980s, wages in the middle of the distribution stagnated, while wages of the lowest and 
highest percentiles of the wage distribution increased.  
More recently, a new literature has introduced a more “nuanced” view of the SBTC (Autor, 
Levy, and Murnane 2003). Instead of years of education, this new literature uses an alternative 
measure for skills, based on detailed descriptions of job content and skills requirements. Similar 
to Lazear’s skill weights-approach (2009), the nuanced view of the SBTC posits that 
occupations are characterized by a bundle of single tasks. The main idea is that the introduction 
of information technologies has not simply depressed the relative demand for less educated 
workers, but instead changed the demand for certain types of skills required on the job.  
Autor, Katz, and Kearny (2006), Goos and Manning (2007), and Autor and Dorn (2013) 
argue that this nuanced view of technological change can account for the polarization of wages 
that has been observed since the late 1980s. In particular, they argue that the adoption of 
computers substitutes tasks performed in middle-wage jobs, while increasing the demand for 
tasks performed in low-wage and high-wage jobs. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) provide 
evidence that the share of employment in occupations in the middle of the wage distribution 
has declined over time in the United States. Similarly, Goos and Manning (2007) show that the 
composition effect linked to changes in the distribution of occupations accounts for a substantial 
part of the increase in inequality in the United Kingdom. Using a spatial equilibrium approach, 
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Autor and Dorn (2013) show that local labor markets that are more specialized in routine jobs 
experienced more job polarization.  
For the case of Germany, it was long believed that the country was characterized by a stable 
wage distribution (Steiner and Wagner 1998). However, recent work has shown that wage 
inequality started increasing already in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s 
(Gernandt and Pfeifer 2007; Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg 2009; Fuchs-Schuendeln, 
Krueger, and Sommer 2009; Card, Heining, and Kline 2013). Whether the nuanced view of the 
SBTC serves as an explanation for the rise in the German wage dispersion remains a contested 
issue.  
Specifically, in line with the SBTC view, Spitz-Oener (2006) shows that, between 1979 
and 1999, changes in skill requirements have been strongest in occupations in which 
computerization was most pronounced. Similarly, Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg (2009) 
argue that the SBTC is the main driver of wage inequality in the 1980–2000 period in West 
Germany. However, their actual empirical results are more mixed: They show that employment 
shares of occupations at the top of the wage distribution increased, employment shares of 
occupations in the middle of the wage distribution declined, and employment shares of 
occupations at the low end did not change. This pattern does not reflect the Anglo-Saxon 
pattern, where employment shares at the low end increased quite dramatically and have led to 
the well-known polarization.  
Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, and Leuschner (2009) and Antonczyk, deLeire, and 
Fitzenberger (2010) conclude that some of the developments of German employment shares 
might be explained by a decline in routine tasks. However, they point out that great differences 
exist between the developments in the US and Germany and that the SBTC alone cannot fully 
explain the empirical results for Germany. Finally, Boockmann and Steiner (2006) actually find 
a decline in the returns to education. However, they do not use occupational skills as a skill 
measure, but instead use years of schooling.  
In our analysis, we try to resolve these conflicting results by taking into account different 
explanations for why the German wage dispersion has increased. We do not introduce the SBTC 
as an alternative, but rather as a complimentary explanation. Our unique data and the novel 
methodological approach allow us to consider several explanatory factors simultaneously. 
Before explaining our econometric strategy, we will briefly introduce the wage-setting model 
by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2011) to clarify the connection between skills and wages.  
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4.2.3 Wage Setting in Occupations 
Most of the literature on the impact of technological change on wages follows a traditional 
Mincer approach where wages are determined by observed and unobserved skills. This model 
features two distinct skill groups—college and high school workers—performing two distinct 
and imperfectly substitutable tasks or producing two imperfectly substitutable goods. 
Technology is assumed to take a factor-augmenting form, meaning that it complements either 
high- or low-skilled workers and thus induces skill-biased demand shifts. In this way, the 
college/high school wage ratio, for example, reflects the premium that high-skilled workers 
receive relative to low-skilled workers. The premium is determined by the relative supply of 
and relative demand for skills. The relative demand for skills increases over time because 
changes in technology are assumed to be “skill-biased,” in the sense that new technologies have 
greater demands for highly skilled workers. However, since relative supply has also steadily 
increased, this leads to Tinbergen’s (1974) famous race between technology and the supply of 
skills. 
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) refer to this model as the “canonical model.” This model is not 
only tractable and conceptually attractive but has also proved empirically successful in 
explaining the evolution of skill premiums in the U.S. throughout the twentieth century. 
However, the canonical model does not provide satisfactory explanations for a number of 
empirical developments of more recent years. For example, it cannot explain differential 
changes in inequality in different parts of the wage distribution. To overcome these weaknesses 
in light of the observed changes in the U.S. wage structure over the past four decades, Acemoglu 
and Autor (2011) and Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011) propose new wage-setting models.  
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) propose a model that incorporates a clear distinction between 
skills and tasks and allows the assignment of skills to tasks to be determined in equilibrium by 
labor supply, technology, and task demand. Tasks can be performed by workers with different 
types of skills or by machines, so that certain tasks can become mechanized. To understand 
how different technologies affect skill demands, wages, and the assignment of skills to tasks, 
their model allows for comparative advantage among workers in performing different types of 
tasks. Because of the crucial role comparative advantage differences across different types of 
workers play in the model, Acemoglu and Autor refer to their model as a Ricardian model of 
the labor market.  
They assume a pattern of comparative advantage such that tasks are ranked in order of 
complexity. Medium-skilled workers are more productive than low-skilled workers, and less 
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productive than high-skilled workers in more complex tasks.5 Workers with different levels of 
skills are systematically allocated to different occupations on the basis of their comparative 
advantage. The equilibrium allocation is determined by two thresholds, such that low-skilled 
workers perform all tasks below the lower threshold, high-skilled workers perform all tasks 
above the higher threshold, and medium-skilled workers perform all intermediate tasks. 
Critically, the law of one price holds within each skill group in the sense that wages are 
equalized across occupations, conditional on skill.  
However, this assumption of uni-dimensional task allocation and thus a law of one price is 
unlikely to hold in reality. What is observable in the data is that low-, middle-, and high-skilled 
workers also overlap in their tasks and in their task complexity.6 In the empirical application, 
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) therefore drop all task categories that have these overlaps. This 
drop is quite substantial so that they use only seven instead of 16 O*NET scales. They do, 
however, not discuss how to reconcile the empirical findings with their theoretical model and 
whether or not the exclusion of categories limits the generalizability of their results. Their 
empirical application shows that allowing for different skill-weights across occupations is 
indeed crucial for understanding the wage setting in occupations. Assuming a law of one price 
makes sense if each occupation required one skill only. However, because the data shows that 
occupations require skill bundles with differing skill weights, we need to apply a wage-setting 
model that allows wages to vary according to the required skill bundle.  
Lazear (2009) first introduced the idea of skill-weights. Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011) 
use this idea and propose a wage-setting model with much less restrictive assumptions. Relative 
to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), they go one step further by allowing wages to vary across 
occupations conditional on the skills of workers, as in a standard Roy model. They cite a wide 
range of empirical evidence in support of the Roy model. For example, Heckman and 
Scheinkman (1987) show that wages systematically differ across sectors even after controlling 
for observed and unobserved skills. Gibbons et al. (2005) reach a similar conclusion when 
looking at both industry and occupation wage differentials. In addition, a number of other 
reasons might explain why wages fail to equalize across occupations, conditional on skill.  
The most prominent example is the discussion about occupation-specific human capital, 
which initiated the task-based approach. Therefore, we decide to use the more adequate model 
proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011), which allows wages to vary across occupations. 
                                                 
5 However, this assumption does not necessarily hold for labor markets characterized by vocational occupations. 
Therefore, applying this model to the German context might proof to be challenging.  
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Formally, Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011) assume that each worker i is characterized by a k-
dimension set of skills 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = [𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖1,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖2, … , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. The amount of occupation-specific output 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
produced by worker i in occupation j is assumed to depend linearly on skills: 




where the productivity 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 is occupation- and time-specific. In this model, each occupation 
requires different shares of different types of skills. Researchers, for example, require a large 
share of cognitive skills and a rather small share of manual skills. In contrast, machinists require 
the opposite configuration of skills.  
In this framework, factors such as technological change have a different impact on wages 
in different occupations. If the introduction of computer technologies increases the marginal 
product of cognitive skills for researchers, both the level and the dispersion of their wages 
should increase. If computers depress the returns to skills, a symmetric pattern emerges. For 
example, if automated machines decrease the marginal product of manual skills of machinists, 
then the level and the dispersion of wages should decrease. Importantly, if manual skills are not 
a highly valued skill for researchers, then the change in the skill price for manual skills does 
not affect researchers’ wages.  
In contrast to Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011), we assume productivity to vary over time. 
Assuming that wages are set competitively, workers are paid for the output they produce, 
yielding the following wage equation: 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, (4.2) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the wage of worker i in occupation j at time t, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 are the returns to the skills 
component k specific to occupation j at time t, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the output produced in occupation j at time 
t, and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a base payment that a worker receives in occupation j regardless of his skills.  
This simple model predicts that wages might change due to changes in skill prices 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 or 
due to changes in productivity 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡. In principle, we could treat the wage-setting equation like 
a structural model and estimate its parameters. However, we use a simpler and less parametric 
approach by carrying out decompositions at each point of the wage distribution.  
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4.3 Data 
For our empirical analysis, we combine the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies 
(SIAB) with the BIBB/IAB and BIBB/BAuA Employment Surveys. The first data provides the 
wage data, while the second data provides the skill information. In this section, we introduce 
both data sources and show descriptive analyses on how skill requirements and wages changed 
over the last three decades.  
4.3.1 The Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies 
Our main data set is a two percent random sample of administrative social security records in 
Germany from 1975 through 2008, covering the employment histories of more than 1.5 million 
individuals. The SIAB is representative of all individuals covered by social security, which is 
roughly about 80 percent of the German workforce. It includes total earnings, days worked at 
each job in a year, as well as information on education, occupation, industry, and part-time or 
full-time status. Importantly, occupational titles are constant over the observation period so that 
we can analyze changes in wages within occupations over time.  
We use occupational titles at the two-digit level for three main reasons. First, we need to 
obtain a sufficiently large number of observations for each occupation to perform the 
econometric analysis. Second, to maintain comparability of results, we follow previous 
literature in this field, which almost exclusively uses two-digit occupations. Third, and most 
importantly, occupations at higher digit levels do not greatly differ from each other in terms of 
the aggregated skill bundles that we use. For example, the three-digit level distinguishes 
between “nursing aides (671),” “paramedics (672),” and “ambulance drivers (673),” whereas 
at the two-digit level these occupations are summarized under “nursing aides (67).” In terms of 
their skill bundle, it is reasonable to assume that nursing aides, paramedics, and ambulance 
drivers have large overlaps in their shares of cognitive, interactive, and manual skills, whereas 
they differ greatly from their neighboring occupations “nursing and elder care (66)” as well as 
“body and beauty care (68).” 
As in many administrative data sets, our data is right-censored at the highest level of 
earnings. Overall, each year between 9.4 percent and 14.2 percent of the male wage distribution 
is censored. However, once we restrict our sample to workers with a vocational education and 
training (VET) degree, censoring becomes a less severe problem with only about three percent 
of censored wages. To solve the censoring problem, we follow a method proposed by 
Gartner (2005) and use a series of Tobit models—fit by education level, industry, and region—
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to stochastically impute the upper tail of the wage distribution. While we use the imputed wages 
for the descriptive analyses, our decomposition analysis focuses on the uncensored part of the 
wage distribution.  
Although we are specifically interested in the wages of VET workers, of course we have to 
relate wages of this particular population to the overall population. The VET population might 
have been changing over time with different ability types selecting in or out of VET programs. 
If this were the case, our effects might be biased due to a different cohort mix in different years. 
In addition, given that we want to verify whether wages of middle-skilled workers remained 
stable over time, we have to look at wage changes at both the top and the bottom of the skill 
distribution. We conduct separate analyses, where we include all educational degrees in the 
sample. Results for the full sample are reported in the Appendix in Tables A.4.1 through A.4.6. 
We find no large differences between the two samples. In the full sample, the wage dispersion 
is slightly larger. In addition, the effect size of the skill measures is generally smaller. These 
results can be expected given that the full sample also captures the between education dispersion 
and includes education variables as additional explanatory variables.  
At both the beginning and the end of the periods we analyze, we pool several years of data 
together to improve the precision of the estimates. We use 1978/79 as the base year and 1985/86 
as the end year for the first period we analyze; 1985/86 as the base and 1991/92 as the end year 
for the second period, 1991/92 and 1998/99 for the third, and 1998/99 and 2005/06 for the last 
period. These periods are chosen to match the cross-sectional waves of the BIBB/IAB 
Employment Surveys that contain the skills data.  
The econometric analyses focus on men. The labor force participation of women has 
increased considerably over the observed period and this increase is likely to have changed the 
selection of women into work. Because of this selection issues, we cannot perform longitudinal 
analyses on female wages and compare them to male wages. In the descriptive analysis, 
however, we investigate the wage structure for both men and women.  
For our main analysis, we follow Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg (2009) and focus 
on full-time employed7 men between 21 and 65 years of age who are subject to social security 
contributions. Because both the level and the structure of wages differ substantially between 
                                                 
7  Because the SIAB does not include hours of work, limiting our attention to full-time workers reduces the impact 
of the hours dispersion that could confound trends in wage inequality. However, less than seven percent of male 
workers in the SIAB have no full-time job in a year, so the inclusion of wages for part-time men has only a small 
impact on the trends we study. 
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East and West Germany, we use West German data only. Moreover, following Riphahn and 
Schnitzlein (2011), we drop all observations for which daily wages are below 12 euros.  
Table 4.1 presents some basic characteristics of our wage data across the four observation 
periods.8 Reported wages are log gross daily wages weighted by the number of days worked in 
a respective year. Wages are reported in euros and deflated to 1978 wages, the first year of the 
analysis. The table shows that the average wages of full-time men rose by about five percent 
between 1978 and 1986, again rose by about another five percent between 1986 and 1992, 
slowed down by rising one percent over the next eight years and remained relatively stable in 
the 2000s. Average wages of full-time women rose by about four percent between 1978 and 
1986, then increased more sharply and rose by nine percent between 1985 and 1992, rose by 
another five percent between 1992 and 1999, and then stabilized at a level about 25 log points 
below the mean for men. The standard deviation of log wages for both genders rose slightly 
between 1978 and 1992, then surged over the next years, rising by five log points between 1992 
and 1999 and another five log points between 1999 and 2006 for men. For women, the increase 
happened with a time gap. The standard deviations of log wages rose by two log points in the 
1990s and rose by another five log points between 1999 and 2006. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the VET sample  
  Log real wages 
  Observations Mean St. Dev. 
Panel A. Men    
1978-79 240,929 3.740 0.230 
1985-86 241,016 3.783 0.260 
1991-92 268,288 3.833 0.266 
1998-99 249,818 3.849 0.305 
2005-06 224,001 3.839 0.347 
Panel B. Women    
1978-79 103,633 3.416 0.390 
1985-86 120,849 3.459 0.403 
1991-92 155,533 3.544 0.409 
1998-99 145,407 3.598 0.428 
2005-06 126,778 3.580 0.475 
Notes: Sample includes employees in West Germany, aged 20-60, working full-time. 
Wages are based on average daily earnings, in euro, and deflated to 1978 wages. Wages 
that are centered at social security maximum are stochastically allocated based on a Tobit 
model. SIAB data 1978-2006, authors’ calculations.  
                                                 
8 Table A.4.1 in the Appendix presents wage data for the full sample.  
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4.3.2 Wage Patterns 
In the following section, we discuss the wage patterns of the four periods for both male and 
female workers. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the distributional characteristics of changes in the 
wage structure for both male and female workers.9 We plot the fitted values of the difference 
in log wages between two periods over the whole distribution. The vertical line shows the 
median wage change. The descriptive patterns give a first indication for why we need to perform 
distributional analyses to understand the wage dynamics. A simple analysis of the mean or 
median wage would miss the large changes that occurred at the top and the bottom ends of the 
distribution.  
The figures show that from 1978/79 to 1985/86 wages increased overall. However, changes 
in wages were mostly concentrated at the upper part of the distribution, with sharp increases 
beyond the eighth decile. Between 1985/86 and 1991/92, wages continued increasing, but the 
size of the increase was much smaller than in the previous period. Wages were mostly 
increasing in the middle of the distribution, and at the top and the bottom ends the increases 
were much less pronounced.  
The 1990s paint a different picture. While the median wage remained almost unchanged, 
wages below the fourth decile decreased, while wages above the fourth decile increased. At the 
lower part of the distribution, wages fell by about five percent. In contrast, above the 80th 
percentile, wages increased by between five and ten percent. Finally, from 1998/99 to 2005/06, 
wages continued decreasing sharply below the median, while they continued increasing again 
above the median. While wages decreased between five and 10 percent below the third decile, 
they increased by about eight percent above the eighth decile.  
The descriptive patterns largely hold for both male and female workers, although female 
wages changed more sharply. A striking difference between the wage patterns of male and 
female workers is that females did not experience wage losses during the 1990s, while male 
workers did. This pattern might be due to occupational sorting. Because women typically 
refrain from sorting into occupations that require large shares of manual skills, they may have 
been less affected by decreasing returns to manual skills and might have profited more from 
increasing returns to cognitive skills.  
Figures A.4.1 and A.4.2 in the Appendix show the patterns for the full sample, which are 
largely similar to those of the restricted one. However, from the 1990s onwards, wage losses at 
                                                 
9 The wage patterns of the full sample are reported in the Appendix (Figures A.4.1 and A.4.2). 
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the lower end and wage increases at the upper end were more pronounced in the full sample. 
These results indicate that, on average, unskilled workers, who are concentrated at the lower 
part of the wage distribution, suffered higher wage losses than middle-skilled workers. 
Contrarily, high-skilled workers, who are concentrated at the upper part of the distribution, 
gained more than middle-skilled workers.  
These wage patterns for the full sample show polarization tendencies, but they are not the 
same as in Anglo-Saxon countries. While the U.S. and the UK see increasing wages for the top 
and the bottom and decreasing wages for the middle of the distribution, the middle in Germany 
remains largely stable, while workers at the lower part suffer wage decreases and workers at 
the upper part of the distribution experience wage gains.  
 
Figure 4.1: Changes in log wages by percentile, male workers with a VET degree, 1978 to 2006 
 
Notes: Sample includes male employees in West Germany with a VET degree, aged 20-60 and working full-
time. Wages are based on average daily earnings, in euro, and deflated to 1978 wages. Wages that are centered 
at social security maximum are stochastically allocated based on a Tobit model. 
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Figure 4.2: Changes in log wages by percentile, female workers with a VET degree, 1978 to 2006  
 
Notes: Sample includes female employees in West Germany with a VET degree, aged 20-60 and working full-
time. Wages are based on average daily earnings, in euro, and deflated to 1978 wages. Wages that are centered 
at social security maximum are stochastically allocated based on a Tobit model.  
SIAB data 1978-2006, authors’ calculations. 
 
4.3.3 BIBB/IAB and BIBB/BAuA Employment Surveys  
The BIBB/IAB and BIBB/BAuA Employment Surveys on Qualification and Working 
Conditions (hereafter: BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys) are representative surveys among fully 
employed individuals in Germany. From 1979 to 1999, the survey was conducted by the Federal 
Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB), together with the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB), and thereafter in cooperation with the Federal Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA). For our analysis, we use four different waves: 1979, 
1985/86, 1991/92, 1998/99, and 2006, each covering about 30,000 individuals.  
The BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys report on the content of occupations and the education 
backgrounds of employees. They are particularly suitable for analyzing changes in skill 
requirements within occupations since occupations are categorized in all waves according to 
the classification of the German Federal Employment Bureau in 1988.10 This is a major 
improvement over, for example, the American O*NET and its predecessor, the DOT, the data 
                                                 
10 We use the two-digit level of classification, which includes about 50 different vocational occupations and an 
additional 20 occupations in the full sample including occupations of unskilled workers and workers with a tertiary 
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most commonly used for studying skills and occupations, where occupational titles do not 
remain constant over time.  
To ensure compatibility with our SIAB sample, we restrict the BIBB/IAB data in a number 
of ways. For our main analysis, we follow Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg (2009) and 
Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010) and focus on full-time employed men in West Germany 
between 18 and 65 years of age.11 The reasoning behind this sample restriction is the following. 
First, we exclude women, because their labor force participation has increased considerably 
over the observed period and this increase is likely to have changed the selection of women into 
work. Second, we exclude East Germany, because before 1990, neither the SIAB nor the 
BIBB/IAB provide data on East Germany. Moreover, after the re-unification in 1990, both wage 
and employment levels differ substantially between East and West Germany.  
Third, we exclude part-time workers, because they might differ from fulltime workers in 
both required skills and wages. Fourth, we exclude the unemployed, because they have zero 
wages and might remember skill requirements differently from what is actually required. Fifth, 
we exclude the self-employed in the BIBB/IAB data, as these individuals are not included in 
the SIAB data. Moreover, we exclude workers with agricultural occupations or working in the 
agricultural sector, because the observations are not representative for these workers in either 
data set. Finally, we have to restrict the BIBB/IAB sample to employees with German 
nationality, since foreign nationals were not interviewed in the 1979 and 1986 waves of the 
BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys.  
The survey contains a large number of questions on education with a particular focus on 
vocational education and training, making the survey especially suitable for studies of middle-
skilled workers. The respondents are asked to report on a large set of skills that are required for 
                                                 
11  While our sample is representative for the majority of male workers in West Germany, we are not able to judge 
whether our results also apply to certain groups of workers that we exclude from the analysis. If these workers 
were clustered in certain occupations, our results might be biased for those occupations. We analyse the data 
descriptively to check whether this clustering occurs for part-time workers, female workers, and workers resident 
in East Germany. In the 1970s and 1980s, the occurrence of part-time work was very small (below 2% for most 
occupations). In the 1990s and 2000s, the share of part-time workers increased, although not uniformly across 
occupations. In the 1990s, receptionists and janitors were among the occupations with the highest share of part-
time work (10% - 15%), whereas in the 2000s it was cashiers and cleaners (around 20%). Overall, part-time work 
does not appear to be very common (especially given that we exclude female workers), so that we have no reason 
to worry about excluding these workers. Concerning female workers, we find a strong clustering over time for 
some occupations. Throughout the observation period, the following occupations had a share of female workers 
of 95% or higher: receptionists, kindergarten teachers, hair dressers, dieticians and typists. If female and male 
workers were to significantly differ in terms of skills and wages in these occupations, then our findings would 
clearly not be representative. However, we do not claim that our results apply to female workers as well. Finally, 
concerning East Germany, we find a high clustering for track layers, bricklayers, pavers, and roofers (25% - 45%). 
Thus, if we were to include East Germany, we would probably find different results for these occupations.  
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performing their current job. Many of the survey questions remain unchanged between two 
waves, but not all skill items are included in all waves. To compare skills over time, in the 
decomposition analysis, we follow Spitz-Oener (2006) and focus on those questions that remain 
unchanged during the periods we are investigating.  
However, the content and importance of certain skills change over the observation period. 
Take IT and programming skills as an example. Questions on IT skills were included in most 
waves and we classify them as cognitive skills throughout our observation period, given that 
they always involve abstract-logical thinking and technical understanding. But, because it is 
also true that the nature of IT skills changes over this long period, we choose to run pair-wise 
comparisons of two consecutive waves, instead of running panel regressions.  
We quantify changes in IT skills over a period of roughly eight years (e.g. from 1998/99 
until 2005/06), and identify changes in the price and the composition of these skills. We are 
confident that the nature of IT skills remains constant over this relatively short time. Because 
the understanding of what IT skills are should not change over that time, our results should not 
be driven by measurement error. Descriptively, we can show changes in skill requirements over 
the entire observation period. Econometrically, we compare two waves with each other and can 
exactly quantify changes in skill prices and composition.  
We distinguish between three skill categories: cognitive, interactive, and manual skills. As 
pointed out previously, this classification reduces ambiguity and allows a univocal assignment 
of the items listed in the surveys to one of the skill categories. Cognitive skills include reading 
and calculating, interactive skills include negotiating and supervising. Manual skills do not 
mean manual in the traditional sense of e.g., fine motor skills, but more in the sense of doing 
things. In our category, they include for example equipping and using machinery, and repairing 
and renovating.  
Because the unit of analysis is the occupation, we aggregate the individual data into 
occupational cells and use group means for our decomposition analyses. Similarly to Spitz-
Oener (2006) and Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, and Leuschner (2009), we first define skills at the 
individual level and then aggregate them to the occupational level. For individual i at time t, we 
define a skill category s as: 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡   (4.3) 
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where t = 1979, 1985/86, 1991/92, 1998/99, and 2006 and category c = 1 (cognitive skills), 
c = 2 (interactive skills), and c = 3 (manual skills). To generate a skill category at the 
occupational level, we sum the individual skill categories 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 in each occupation and divide 
them by the number of observations in that occupation.  
Table 4.2 shows the three categories. While in the descriptive part, we aggregate all skill 
requirements that fall into one of the three categories, in the econometric analysis we condition 
on those skills that remain unaltered from one wave to the other. This allows us to quantify how 
the returns to those skills has changed over time.  
 






calculating; designing; educating, guiding and 
teaching; evaluating, testing and verifying; 






coordinating and planning; assessing and 
investigating; applying rules; counseling; 






equipping and operating machinery; repairing, 
renovating and reconstructing; manufacturing, 
installing or constructing; nursing; securing 
 
 Notes: BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys, 1979-2006, authors’ translation. 
 
4.3.4 Skill Patterns 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the changes in skills requirements over time for men and women 
respectively. More precisely, they show the share of skills used across all occupations at 
different points in time. The most striking feature of these patterns is that, as expected, skill 
requirements have changed dramatically over time. In the male sample, occupations required 
about 30 percent of cognitive skills, 15 percent of interactive skills, and 55 percent of manual 
skills in 1979, while in 2006 they required 50 percent of cognitive skills, 30 percent of 
interactive skills, and an average of about 20 percent of manual skills. In the female sample, 
occupations required about 40 percent of cognitive skills, 10 percent of interactive skills, and 
about 60 percent of manual skills in 1979. Contrarily, in 2006, occupations required about 55 
percent of cognitive skills, 25 percent of interactive skills, and 20 percent of manual skills. 
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These figures already show that for any analysis relating occupational skills to changes in wages 
it is pivotal to take into account that skill measures are not static, but subject to continuous 
updating and re-allocating.  
In the male sample, cognitive skills have been constantly rising since 1986, with the sharpest 
increases in the 1990s. Interactive skills have remained more or less stable, slightly increasing 
since the 1990s. In contrast, manual skills remained at a constantly high level of about 50 
percent until the beginning of the 1990s and have then decreased sharply, falling to below 30 
percent in 2006. For the female sample, the pattern is somewhat different, which is most likely 
due to the fact that men and women select into different types of occupations. The share of 
cognitive skills has started increasing earlier than in the male sample, already rising since 1979. 
After 1992, however, this share remained constant at about 55 percent. The share of interactive 
skills surged in the early 1980s, decreased again in the late 1980s, and has been rising since 
1992. In 2006, the share of interactive skills makes up about 25 percent of all skill requirements. 
Finally, the share of manual skills decreased very sharply between 1979 and 1986. From then 
on it remained more or less stable at a share of about 20 percent.  
 
Figure 4.3: Changes in skill requirements, male workers with a VET degree, 1979 – 2006 
 
Notes: Sample includes male employees in West Germany with a VET degree, aged 18-65, and working full-
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Figure 4.4: Changes in skill requirements, female workers with a VET degree, 1979 – 2006 
 
Notes: Sample includes female employees in West Germany with a VET degree, aged 18-65, and working 
full-time. BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys, 1979-2006, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
4.4 Econometric Model: RIF Regression-Based Decomposition 
In the empirical analysis, we decompose changes in the wage structure into their contributing 
factors. Understanding the factors accounting for differences in the distribution of individuals’ 
economic outcomes across two periods, or between subgroups of the population is central in 
several fields of economic research, particularly in labor economics. The Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) is the most commonly used decomposition method 
in the labor economics literature (for an overview of the literature see Weichselbaumer and 
Winter-Ebmer (2005) and for a comprehensive overview of the application see Jann (2008)).  
This technique decomposes mean differences in log wages in a counterfactual manner. It 
develops counterfactual wages, that is, estimates of mean wages with changed underlying 
population characteristics. It divides the wage differential between two groups into a part that 
is explained by observable group characteristics (“composition effect”) such as education or 
experience and a residual part (“wage structure effect”) that cannot be accounted for by these 
differences. The residual part measures the returns to observable characteristics.  
Before going more into detail, we should note one important feature of decomposition 
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to a difference in outcomes such as the wage differential between two groups, they cannot 
provide information on the underlying mechanism between factors and outcomes. Just like 
program evaluation methods, decompositions provide valuable information about which factors 
are quantitatively important in a particular relationship, but they cannot provide information on 
the structural parameters of that relationship. They can thus be considered as a first important 
step in investigating a relationship.  
For example, if the decomposition shows that a large part of the gender wage gap can be 
accounted for by differences in the occupational affiliation, then, in the second step, this 
suggests exploring in detail how men and women choose their fields of study and occupations. 
In our application, we perform the decompositions to explore whether skills are important in 
explaining changes in the wage structure. If we find important differences, in the second step, 
our results may suggest exploring in detail how workers choose to acquire certain types of skills 
both during their initial vocational education and further training.  
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is easy to apply and only requires coefficient estimates 
from linear regressions for the outcome of interest and sample means of the independent 
variables used in the regressions. However, it focuses on the difference in the mean of an 
outcome variable and does not allow decompositions along the wage distribution. Until 
recently, no comprehensive approach was available for computing a detailed decomposition of 
the effect of single covariates for a distributional statistic other than the mean. In a recent 
contribution, Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) (hereafter: FFL) have introduced an approach 
that allows taking into account the whole unconditional wage distribution. Their approach is 
very similar in spirit to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in the sense that it allows 
decomposing the distributional statistic of interest into a wage structure and a composition 
effect and further dividing the wage structure and composition effects into the contribution of 
single covariates.  
FFL’s central idea is to use the recentered influence function (RIF) regression for the 
distribution statistic of interest as the left hand side variable in a regression.12 The procedure 
consists of two steps. In the first step, FFL use a reweighting method to divide the distributional 
differences between two groups into a wage structure effect and a composition effect. In the 
second step, they further decompose the wage structure effect and the composition effect into 
the contribution of each explanatory variable using RIF regression. FFL explain in great detail 
                                                 
12  Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2011) use the SIAB data to apply RIF regression-based decompositions when studying 
wage mobility in East and West Germany.  
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how to perform these decompositions. Here, we will present a short summary of their 
methodology.  
In general, any distributional parameter can be expressed as a functional 𝜈𝜈�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖� of the 
cumulative distribution of wages, 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋(𝑌𝑌). To formally discuss the RIF-based decomposition 
method, let us look at the difference in the wage distributions during two periods, 1 and 0. For 
individual i, let 𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖 be the wage that he would receive in period 1 and 𝑌𝑌𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 the wage received in 
period 0. For each i, we can define the observed wage, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖, as 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 ∗  (1 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖), where 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = 1 if the individual is observed in period 1 and 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 =  0 if the individual is observed in 
period 0. The notation 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡|𝑇𝑇=𝑠𝑠 denotes the distribution of wages that would prevail among 
workers observed in period s if they were paid under the wage structure of period t. Therefore, 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋0|𝑇𝑇=0 indicates the actual distribution in period 0, and 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋1|𝑇𝑇=1 denotes the actual distribution in 
period 1. In contrast, 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋0|𝑇𝑇=1 denotes the counterfactual distribution that would have prevailed 
if workers in period 1 had been paid under the wage structure of period 0.  
Consider ∆𝜊𝜊𝜈𝜈, the overall change over time in the distributional statistic 𝜈𝜈. We have: ∆ον=  ν(FY1|T1)−   ν(FY0|T0) 
=  ν(FY1|T1) −   ν(FY0|T1)  +  ν(FY0|T1) −   ν(FY0|T0), (4.4) 
where the first difference is the unexplained part of the decomposition, which Oaxaca-Blinder 
coined as the wage structure effect, ∆𝑆𝑆𝜈𝜈 . The second difference is the explained part of the 
decomposition, which they coined as the composition effect, ∆𝑋𝑋𝜈𝜈 . The wage structure effect 
reflects that part of the wage differential that cannot be explained by differences in the 
distribution of observable characteristics, but is attributable to changes in the returns to these 
characteristics. The composition effect reflects that part of the wage differential that can be 
explained by differences in the distribution of covariates.  
Put differently, while the wage structure effect reflects the difference in the 𝑋𝑋’s, the 
decomposition effect reflects the differences in the distribution of the 𝑋𝑋’s and 𝜀𝜀’s between the 
two groups. In our analysis, the 𝑋𝑋’s comprise the three skill categories: cognitive, interactive, 
and manual skills. In addition, we include a vector of control variables observed in all periods. 
Our controls include age and experience and their squared terms, and industry and region 
dummies. 
Combing back to the equation, 𝜈𝜈(𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋0|𝑇𝑇1) is the counterfactual distributional statistic that 
would have prevailed if workers observed in period 1 had been paid under the wage structure 
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of period 0. As noted previously, to estimate this type of counterfactual distribution, FFL 
suggest using the approach by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), which consists of 
estimating a probit model on the probability of being observed in period 1. In essence, it consists 
of reweighting the period 0 data to have the same distribution of 𝑋𝑋’s as in period 1.13 The 
reweighted data allows performing Oaxaca-Blinder type decompositions and obtaining the 
wage structure and the composition effects for any distributional statistic.  
If we were interested solely in wage structure and composition effects, we could simply 
apply the reweighting method by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and would not need to 
bother with the FFL procedure. However, we are interested in separating the contribution of 
single explanatory variables to see whether one of them is driving the effects. To further 
decompose the wage structure and the composition effect into the contribution of single 
covariates, an additional step is needed. FFL suggest performing RIF regressions on the 
reweighted data.  
The central idea of the RIF is to replace the dependent variable y by the corresponding 
recentered influence function. Essentially, recentering means adding back the distributional 
statistic to the influence function. Let 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹(𝑖𝑖;  𝜈𝜈) denote the influence function corresponding to 
an observed wage y for the distributional statistic of interest 𝜈𝜈. The recentered influence function 
(RIF) is defined as: 
RIF(y; qτ) = qτ +  IF(y; qτ). (4.5) 
We can compute this influence function for a large number of different distributional statistics. 
For our case, we use quantiles. The recentered influence function of the 𝜏𝜏-th quantile is: 
RIF(y; qτ) = qτ +  IF(y; qτ). (4.6) 
The 𝜏𝜏-th quantile RIF regression aggregates to the unconditional quantile of interest and 
captures both the within and between effects of the explanatory variables. The crucial advantage 
of this approach is that it provides a tool to estimate the effects of the covariates on the 
                                                 
13  Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007) show that this reweighting provides a consistent nonparametric estimate of 
the counterfactual distribution. 
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unconditional distribution of wages.14 We then perform the decomposition by running two 
standard Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions on the estimated coefficients of the recentered 
influence functions. The first decomposition compares period 0 with the reweighted period 0 
(that mimics period 1) and allows obtaining the composition effect. The second decomposition 
compares period 1 with the reweighted period 0, allowing us to obtain the pure wage structure 
effects.  
FFL show that we can write the estimate of the composition effect ?̂?𝛥𝑋𝑋,𝑅𝑅𝜈𝜈  as:  
Δ�X,Rν = (X�01 − X�0) γ�0ν +  X�01(γ�01ν − γ�0ν) =  Δ�X,pν + Δ�X,eν  (4.7) 
We thus divide the composition effect, ?̂?𝛥𝑋𝑋,𝑅𝑅𝜈𝜈 , into a pure composition effect, ?̂?𝛥𝑋𝑋,𝑝𝑝𝜈𝜈 , using the wage 
structure of period 0 and into a component measuring the specification error, ?̂?𝛥𝑋𝑋,𝑒𝑒𝜈𝜈 . Similarly, 
we can write the wage structure effect as: 
Δ�X,Sν = X�1(γ�1ν − γ�01ν ) + (X�1 −  X�01)γ�01ν =  Δ�S,pν + Δ�S,eν , (4.8) 
which reduces to the first term, because the reweighting error Δ�S,eν  goes to zero as X�01  → X�1.   
In sum, the formulas for the different components of our decomposition procedure are the 
following: 
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎: ∆�𝑂𝑂𝜈𝜈= 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹(𝑌𝑌1, 𝜈𝜈)�������������� −  𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹(𝑌𝑌0, 𝜈𝜈)�������������� 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡: ∆�𝑋𝑋,𝑝𝑝𝜈𝜈 = (𝑋𝑋01����� −  𝑋𝑋0)�����𝛾𝛾0𝜈𝜈� 
𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡: ∆�𝑆𝑆,𝑝𝑝𝜈𝜈 = 𝑋𝑋1���(𝛾𝛾1𝜈𝜈� −  𝛾𝛾01𝜈𝜈� )̅ 
  
                                                 
14 The difference between conditional and unconditional quantile regression is best explained through an example. 
Assume that 𝑋𝑋 is a dummy variable indicating college versus high-school attendance and the outcome variable is 
earnings. If we estimate a quantile regression for 𝑋𝑋(50) the correct interpretation of ?̂?𝑋(𝜃𝜃) is not the effect of 
college attendance on the 50th percentile wage earner. Rather, it is the effect of college attendance on the 50th 
percentile of the wage distribution. In the case of unconditional quantile regression, ?̂?𝑋(𝜃𝜃) is the effect of college 
attendance on the 50th percentile wage earner.  
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4.5 Results  
We use the decomposition approach of Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) to quantify the 
contribution of single explanatory factors to changes in the wage distribution. These factors 
comprise our three skill measures as well as age and experience and their squared terms, region 
and industry dummies. In line with previous research, we focus our analyses on men.  
As we have pointed out previously, this decomposition method consists of two steps. In the 
first step, we use a reweighting method to recover the counterfactual wage distribution. With 
the reweighted data we can decompose the wage difference into a wage structure and a 
composition effect. FFL call these decomposition results “aggregate decomposition results.” In 
the first subsection we present these aggregate results. In the second step, we perform RIF 
regressions on the reweighted data and then perform Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions on the 
RIF coefficients.  
This second step is a crucial methodological innovation, which allows obtaining the detailed 
decomposition results. Only this additional step allows quantifying the contribution of single 
explanatory variables to changes in the wage structure. Put differently, it allows quantifying 
which type of skills contributes to the observed changes in wages by how much and at which 
parts of the distribution. This exact quantification allows assessing whether changes in skills 
even play an important role, what role they play (increasing or decreasing inequality), and 
whether changes in some skills have larger impacts than changes in other skills.  
4.5.1 Aggregate Decomposition Results 
To simplify the discussion, we focus on standard measures for wage inequality. We report 
changes over time in the 90-10 log wage differential as a measure for overall inequality, and 
changes in the 90-50 and the 50-10 log wage differential as measures of upper-tail and lower-
tail wage inequality. A widening of these gaps implies an increase in wage inequality.  
Table 4.3 reports the aggregate decomposition results for our VET sample. In the first step 
of our discussion, we focus on the analysis of how wage inequality changes over the considered 
period. In the second step, we look into which effects are driving the changes.15 Overall, the 
results are consistent with the descriptive analyses in Section 4.3.2, which indicates that our 
model provides a reasonable fit. From 1978 to 1986, overall wage inequality increases by about 
six log points, whereby almost all of the increase in the wage gap is due to a wage increase in 
                                                 
15 The effect sizes and significance levels are similar to the ones reported in Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011b).  
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the upper tail of the wage distribution. Between 1986 and 1992, overall wage inequality remains 
largely stable. However, bottom-end inequality increases by almost three log points, while top-
end inequality decreases by about two log-points.  
From the beginning of the 1990s until the end of our observation period in 2006, wage 
inequality surges. During the 1990s, overall inequality increases by eight log points, whereby 
top-end inequality increases by about five log points and bottom-end inequality increases by 
about three log points. From 1999 to 2006, overall inequality increases further by another 12 
log points. Top-end inequality increases by about another five log points and bottom-end 
inequality increases by about seven log points.  
These changes translate into the following real wage changes, with real wages being daily 
wages deflated to 1978 wages and expressed in euros. During the observation period, median 
wages increases from 43 euros in 1978 to 47 euros in 2006. At the first decile, wages decrease 
from 32 euros to 30 euros, while at the ninth decile, wages increase from 56 euros to 71 euros. 
As pointed out previously, also the standard deviation of wages increases during the observation 
period. The standard deviation is 23 percent in 1978 and increases to about 35 percent in 2006.  
The question now arises as to which factors contribute to these developments. Table 4.3 
divides the total wage change into the composition effect—due to group differences—and the 
wage structure effect—the residual part that cannot be accounted for by group differences. Both 
effects contribute significantly to the observed changes over all four periods, although the wage 
structure effect is generally much larger in size. Given that our restricted sample of male VET 
workers is largely homogenous, it makes sense that the composition effects do not play a very 
important role.  
Table A.4.2 in the Appendix shows that for the full sample, starting in the 1990s, 
composition effects account for an important part of the increase in wage inequality. This result 
is in line with findings by Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg (2009), who point out that the 
breakdown of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe as well as the reunification of East and 
West Germany led to a large inflow of East Germans and Eastern Europeans into the West 
German labor market. This inflow led to great changes within the workforce composition, 
which is reflected in the composition effects.  
Combing back to the analysis of our restricted sample in Table 4.3, during the first 
observation period, from 1978 to 1986 (Panel A), most of the changes in wage inequality 
happen at the upper part of the distribution. Wage structure effects are driving the increase in 
wage inequality, accounting for slightly more than 100 percent of the increase, whereas 
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decomposition effects move into the opposite direction, i.e., decreasing wage inequality. That 
composition effects and wage structure effects might cancel each other out is a common finding 
in the literature (see Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011) and Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2011)). 
These effects (Panel A, column 2, row 2 and 3) suggest that changes in the distribution of 
the underlying characteristics of the population only play a minor role and are actually 
decreasing inequality at the top, whereas the returns to these underlying characteristics are 
increasing, thereby fueling top-end inequality. This could mean, for example, that the returns 
to certain types of skills or to experience are increasing at the upper part of the distribution over 
the considered period.  
From the mid-1980s to the beginning of the 1990s (Panel B), we observe that overall wage 
inequality hardly changes. The wage gap increases slightly at the lower part of the distribution 
and decreases slightly at the upper part, so that the overall effect is minimal. Increases in the 
50-10 gap are mostly attributable to composition effects. This means that changes in the 
distribution of underlying characteristics increase the 50-10 gap.  
This could mean, for example, that the share of inexperienced workers with low wages 
increases during that period, thereby increasing wage inequality. At the top end, decreases in 
the wage gap are mostly attributable to wage structure effects. This means that the returns to 
the underlying characteristics are decreasing, thereby decreasing the 90-50 gap. However, the 
coefficient of the wage structure effect is rather small (-0.0171) so that overall changes in the 
returns to the underlying characteristics seem negligible in our second observation period.  
Form the beginning of the 1990s until the mid-2000s (Panels C and D), wage inequality 
increases sharply, increasing by eight log points between 1991 and 1999, and by another 11 log 
points between 1999 and 2006. During the 1990s (Panel C), lower-tail inequality increases by 
about three log points, whereby most of this increase is driven by wage structure effects. This 
could mean, for example, that changes in the returns to skill increase during this period, 
widening the gap between workers with different skill bundles in the lower part of the 
distribution.  
Upper tail inequality increases by about five log points, whereby the increase is driven both 
by wage structure effects and composition effects. This could mean, for example, that changes 
in the returns to skill increase at the upper part of the distribution. At the same time, changes in 
the distribution of underlying characteristics also increase the upper-tail wage gap. An 
explanation for this pattern could be that the returns to certain types of skills might have 
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increased disproportionally so that workers with large shares of these skills experience large 
wage gains, increasing the 90-50 gap.   
From 1999 to 2006 (Panel D), lower-tail inequality increases by about seven log points, 
whereby most of this increase is again driven by wage structure effects. Upper tail inequality 
increases again by about five log points, whereby the increase is also mostly driven by wage 
structure effects. These results point towards great changes in the returns to underlying 
characteristics. Again, this could mean that changes in the returns to different types of skills are 
increasing wage inequality.  
However, as pointed out previously, the aggregate decomposition results neither provide 
information about the contribution of single covariates nor about the underlying mechanism. 
They only provide a broad picture of what is going on and point the researcher towards the 
economically significant effects. We need to perform the second step of the RIF-regression 
based decomposition to quantify the contribution of single variables.  
Comparing the aggregate decomposition results for our sample of VET workers to the 
decomposition results for the full sample reported in the Appendix in Table A.4.2 shows that 
changes in the wage structure are very similar. Overall, the increase in wage inequality is 
somewhat larger in the full sample. This result can be expected given that the full sample also 
captures the between-education wage dispersion.  
As pointed out previously, while the relative size and the direction of wage structure effects 
are similar in the two samples, composition effects contribute to a larger extent to increasing 
wage inequality in the full sample. Finally, the full sample shows that the increasing wage 
inequality can be traced back to an increase in wages at the upper part of the distribution and a 
decrease in wages at the bottom part. Thus, in contrast to the United States and the United 
Kingdom, West German wages in the middle of the distribution remain largely stable.  
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Table 4.3: Aggregate decomposition results 
Inequality Measure 90-10 90-50 50-10 
A: 1978/79 to 1985/86 
   
   
Total Change 0.0571*** 0.0503*** 0.0068*** 
 
(0.00016) (0.00014) (0.00031) 
Composition -0.0007*** -0.0184*** 0.0177*** 
 
(0.00009) (0.00031) (0.00040) 
Wage Structure 0.0578*** 0.0687*** -0.0109*** 
 
(0.00012) (0.00038) (0.0005) 
B: 1985/86 to 1991/92 
   
   
Total Change 0.0091*** -0.0173*** 0.0264*** 
 
(0.00025) (0.00015) (0.00040) 
Composition 0.0273*** -0.00001*** 0.0274*** 
 
(0.00035) (0.00009) (0.00044) 
Wage Structure -0.0181*** -0.0171*** -0.0010*** 
 
(0.00033) (0.00024) (0.00057) 
C: 1991/92 to 1998/99 
   
   
Total Change 0.0804*** 0.0524*** 0.0280*** 
 
(0.00040) (0.00020) (0.00060) 
Composition 0.0369*** 0.0299*** 0.0070*** 
 
(0.00065) (0.00049) (0.00114) 
Wage Structure 0.0437*** 0.0228*** 0.0209*** 
 
(0.00071) (0.00056) (0.00127) 
D: 1998/99 to 2005/06 
   
   
Total Change 0.1163*** 0.0482*** 0.0681*** 
 
(0.00055) (0.00026) (0.00081) 
Composition 0.0285*** 0.0113*** 0.0172*** 
  
(0.00042) (0.00001) (0.00043) 
Wage Structure 0.0878*** 0.0369*** 0.0509*** 
 
(0.00051) (0.00034) (0.00085) 
  Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys.  
  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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4.5.2 Detailed Decomposition Results 
Tables 4.4 to 4.7 show the detailed decomposition results for the four periods we are 
investigating. We examine the explanatory power of our skill categories in the context of a 
formal decomposition of changes in the wage distribution. To simplify the discussion, the tables 
report only the single effects of our three skills categories and group the effects of the control 
variables in individual- and firm-specific controls. We recur to the aggregate decomposition 
results as guidance for the economic significance of the effects under investigation. While the 
aggregate decomposition results inform us about the size of the overall wage structure and 
composition effects, the detailed decomposition results inform us about the contribution of 
single explanatory variables in explaining wage structure and composition effects.  
Table 4.4 presents the decomposition results for the period 1978/79 to 1985/86. The table 
shows that our skill categories have non-monotonic effects, a typical feature of the RIF 
regression. Changes in skills increase wage inequality at some parts of the distribution, while 
they decrease inequality at other parts. Panel A shows the detailed composition effects and 
Panel B shows the detailed wage structure effects.  
To understand the single drivers for the changes in wages, the composition and the wage 
structure effects of single explanatory variables have to be analyzed together, i.e., to 
comprehend the effect of changes in, for example, cognitive skills, one needs to look at both at 
how cognitive skills have changed in the underlying distribution of the population (composition 
effects) and how the returns to cognitive skills have changed (wage structure effects).  
Panel A shows that changes in the composition of cognitive and interactive skills are 
associated with an increase in inequality over the entire distribution. An explanation for this 
observation could be that, between 1978 and 1986, the number of individuals with large shares 
of cognitive or interactive skills has increased and that these skills are also more highly 
rewarded. In contrast, changes in the composition of manual skills decrease overall inequality 
and account for almost all of the decrease of the 90-50 gap (Panel A, Column 2).  
This observation goes hand in hand with the fact that changes in the returns to manual skills 
explain a large part of the increase of the 90-50 gap (Panel B, Column 2). The number of 
individuals with large shares of manual skills might have decreased, which narrows the 90-50 
gap. Differences in workers’ skill bundles become less important, because the returns to manual 
skills are still increasing. However, given that the overall composition effects are minimal and 
slightly decreasing inequality (Panel A, column 1, row 6), we infer that these skill effects are 
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counter-balanced by other factors such as changes in the age- or experience composition during 
this period.  
Panel B shows that the returns for all of our three skill categories increase during the 
observation period. The increase is most pronounced at the upper part of the wage distribution, 
where increases in the returns to skills account for almost all of the wage structure effect. 
Table 4.3 (Panel A, Column 2) indicates how relevant wage structure effects are in this period. 
The estimated wage structure effects account for more than 100 percent of the increase in the 
90-50 gap. As pointed out previously, that these effects might exceed 100 percent is common 
in the literature, because composition and wage structure effects might cancel each other out. 
Increases in the returns to all of the three skill categories are thus the main drivers of wage 
inequality at the upper part of the distribution. However, Table 4.3 (Panel A, Column 3) shows 
that at the lower part of the distribution, wage structure effects are actually decreasing wage 
inequality. Here, the increasing returns to skills that we see in Table 4.4 are counter-balanced 
by decreasing returns to other characteristics such as age or experience.  
We can summarize the results for changes in wages between 1978 and 1986 as follows: 
First, the population in 1986 shows greater differences in workers’ skill profiles than the 
population in 1979. Along the whole distribution, changes in the possession of cognitive and 
interactive skills increase wage inequality. Essentially, this means that some workers acquire 
these skills while others do not and this difference fuels inequality. At the same time, changes 
in the acquisition of manual skills increase inequality at the lower part of the distribution, while 
they decrease inequality at the upper part.  
This means that, at the lower part of the distribution, workers’ skill profiles differ along the 
manual dimension and fuel inequality, whereas at the upper part workers become more similar 
in terms of their manual skills, thereby decreasing inequality. In terms of economic significance 
it is most important to stress that increases in the returns to manual and cognitive skills increase 
wage inequality. These results confirm that increases in the returns to skills play an important 
role in increases in upper-tail wage inequality from 1978 to 1986. Our descriptive analyses 
reveal that this increase in upper-tail inequality is mostly driven by an increase in wages at the 
very top of the distribution.  
Finally, a comparison to the full sample (table A.4.3 in the Appendix) shows that size and 
direction of the effects are very similar in both samples. The only exceptions are wage structure 
effects at the bottom-end of the distribution. While wage structure effects are slightly decreasing 
the 50-10 gap in the VET sample (-0.011), they are slightly increasing the 50-10 gap in the full 
CHAPTER 4: CHANGES IN SKILLS AND WAGES OF MIDDLE-SKILLED WORKERS 
 110 
sample (+0.008). Given that the detailed decompositions show that the returns to skills increase 
the 50-10 gap in both samples, changes in the returns to other characteristics must explain this 
difference. As pointed out previously, it is conceivable that increasing returns to skills in the 
VET sample are counter-balanced by decreasing returns to other characteristics such as age or 
experience.  
 
Table 4.4: Detailed decomposition results, 1978/79-1985/86 
Inequality Measure 90-10  90-50  50-10 
A: Detailed Composition Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0140***  0.0060***  0.0080*** 
  (0.00002)  (0.00007)  (0.00005) 
Interactive Skills  0.0125***  0.0056***  0.0069*** 
  (0.00004)  (0.00008)  (0.00004) 
Manual Skills  -0.0111***  -0.0115***  0.0004*** 
  (0.00004)  (0.00022)  (0.00027) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Composition  
Effect 
-0.0007***  -0.0184***  0.0177*** 
(0.00009)  (0.00031)  (0.00040) 
B: Detailed Wage Structure Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0195***  0.0117***  0.0077*** 
  (0.00009)  (0.00011)  (0.00020) 
Interactive Skills  0.0071***  0.0048***  0.0022*** 
  (0.00006)  (0.00010)  (0.00016) 
Manual Skills  0.0331***  0.0211***  0.0120*** 
  (0.00012)  (0.00033)  (0.00045) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Wage  
Structure Effect 
 0.0578***  0.0687***  -0.0109*** 
 (0.00012)  (0.00038)  (0.00050) 
   Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys. 
   Standard errors are in parentheses. 
   Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
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Table 4.5 presents the decomposition results for the period 1985/86 to 1991/92, when upper-
tail inequality slightly decreases and lower-tail inequality slightly increases. Again, Table 4.3 
provides guidance for the importance of the effects. Composition effects are increasing wage 
inequality over the whole distribution and thereby offsetting wage structure effects, which are 
decreasing wage inequality. Overall, the effect sizes of composition and wage structure effects 
are small compared to the effect sizes during other observation periods.  
Panel A in Table 4.5 shows that all three skill measures contribute to a closing of the wage 
gap. This finding means that workers’ skill profiles become more similar over the whole 
distribution. Even if these effects are highly statistically significant, they are very small in size. 
Therefore, composition effects are largely driven by other factors such as for example changes 
in the age and experience composition of the underlying population.  
Panel B in Table 4.5 shows that the effect sizes of changes in the returns to skills are equally 
small. At the bottom end (50-10), decreases in the returns to cognitive skills are decreasing the 
wage gap. Combining this finding with the findings from the previous period, we see how 
returns to different skills change differently in different periods. Specifically, while the demand 
for cognitive skills exceeds the supply in earlier years from 1978 to 1986, in later years, from 
1986 to 1992, supply appears to have caught up and changes in returns to cognitive skills play 
hardly any role anymore.  
A comparison with the full sample (table A.4.4 in the Appendix) shows that size and 
direction of both composition and wage structure effects of our skill measures are very similar 
for both samples. The main differences are the composition effects. While they are minor for 
the VET sample, they increase the 50-10 gap by about three log points and decrease the 90-50 
gap by about three log points in the full sample. Note that, also in the full sample, the effect 
sizes for our skill measures are negligible. Here, between 1986 and 1992, underlying 
characteristics of the population other than skills play a more important role in changing wage 
inequality.  
We conclude that during the first two observation periods, i.e., from 1978 to 1992, at the 
upper part of the distribution, workers appear to have become more similar in terms of their 
underlying characteristics such as age and experience. The same holds true for workers’ skills, 
although the effects are rather small and appear to play only a minor role. At the lower part of 
the distribution, workers appear to have become more dissimilar in terms of their underlying 
characteristics. Here again, however, the effects of changes in the underlying composition of 
skills are not the main driver for the increase in wage inequality.  
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In terms of changes in returns to skills, at first, increases in the returns to cognitive skills are 
increasing wage inequality mostly at the top of the distribution, while increases in the returns 
to manual skills increase wages in the middle of the wage distribution, increasing bottom-end 
inequality. This increasing return to manual skills indicates that these types of skills are 
increasing in importance in some occupations and that the increasing demand could not be 
matched by an adequate supply. However, eventually, the supply of manual skills catches up 
so that over the next period changes in returns to manual and cognitive skills are negligible.  
 
Table 4.5: Detailed decomposition results, 1985/86-1991/92 
Inequality Measure 90-10  90-50  50-10 
A: Detailed Composition Effects     
Cognitive Skills  -0.0047***  -0.0023***  -0.0024*** 
  (0.00003)  (0.00006)  (0.00003) 
Interactive Skills  -0.0168***  -0.0110***  -0.0058*** 
  (0.00015)  (0.00009)  (0.00024) 
Manual Skills  -0.0006  -0.0003***  -0.0002 
  (0.00004)  (0.00002)  (0.00006) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Composition  
Effect 
0.0273***  -0.00001***  0.0274*** 
(0.00035)  (0.00009)  (0.00044) 
B: Detailed Wage Structure Effects     
Cognitive Skills  -0.0029  0.0009**  -0.0039 
  (0.00020)  (0.00018)  (0.00038) 
Interactive Skills  -0.0035***  0.0042***  -0.0077*** 
  (0.00026)  (0.00019)  (0.00045) 
Manual Skills  -0.0028***  -0.0038***  0.0010*** 
  (0.00012)  (0.00011)  (0.00023) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Wage  
Structure Effect 
-0.0181***  -0.0171***  -0.0010*** 
(0.00033)  (0.00024)  (0.00057) 
   Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys.  
   Standard errors are in parentheses.  
   Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01 
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Table 4.6 shows the decomposition results for the period 1991/92 to 1998/99, when both upper-
tail and lower-tail inequality are increasing. Panel A shows that changes in the composition of 
skills are small in size and therefore largely negligible. The only exceptions are changes in the 
composition of interactive skills at the 90-50 gap. Combining this finding with our earlier 
observations reveals the patterns of a hog cycle (Ezekiel 1938; Hanau 1928) in the fluctuations 
of supply of different types of skills. It appears that individuals are adapting their skill bundles 
to changing demands. However, the time lags of this adaptation are too great so that the prices 
of the skills do not change accordingly. 
Because the demand for cognitive and manual skills exceeds the supply in earlier periods, 
returns are high and individuals start investing more in acquiring these types of skills. During 
the 1990s, supply appears to have caught up so that changes in the underlying composition of 
workers’ skills are negligible. Instead, the shortage is concentrated in interactive skills. These 
results might indicate that workers have been too focused on acquiring manual and cognitive 
skills, leading to an undersupply of interactive skills. However, as pointed out previously, the 
decomposition analysis only quantifies effects and does not allow a causal identification of 
mechanisms. 
In Panel B, the wage structure effects show that we do not observe a perfect hog cycle, 
because changes in prices follow a different pattern. The wage structure effects are much more 
interesting in terms of economic significance, because they account for more than 100 percent 
of the increase in wage inequality that is due to changes in wage structure effects. While 
increasing returns to interactive and manual skills contribute rather modestly to an increase in 
the 90-50 gap, increasing returns to cognitive skills explain almost all of the increase. For the 
50-10 gap, both increasing returns to cognitive skills and increasing returns to manual skills 
explain almost all of the increase.  
To summarize, the 1990s are characterized by an increase in both upper-tail and lower-tail 
wage inequality. In terms of the distribution of underlying characteristics, most remarkably, 
changes in the composition of interactive skills are increasing the 90-50 gap. This result might 
be explained through a catching up effect. In terms of changing returns to skills, increases in 
returns to cognitive skills contribute to almost all of the increase of the 90-50 gap as well as to 
the increase of the 50-10 gap. In addition, also increases in the returns to manual skills account 
for a large part of the increases in the 50-10 gap.  
The classification of skills in Table 4.2 gives an overview of the single skills that are 
summarized in our skill categories. Cognitive skills comprise e.g., calculating, writing, 
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designing and planning. All of these activities might be complemented with new technology. 
Therefore, it is plausible that increases in the returns to cognitive skills might be traced back to 
technological changes, which increase the demand for cognitive skills. Manual skills comprise 
e.g., equipping and operating machinery and installing and constructing.  
Although these activities primarily need some kind of technical knowledge, they too, could 
be complemented with new technologies. Therefore, also increases in the returns to manual 
skills might be traced back to technological changes. To equip and operate machinery, workers 
first need to have the basic technical knowledge. New technology might then complement their 
activities. That the increases in returns to cognitive skills are most pronounced at the upper part 
of the distribution might be due to the fact that workers with large shares of these skills select 
into high-wage occupations that require large shares of cognitive skills. Similarly, that the 
increases in returns to manual skills are most pronounced in the middle of the distribution might 
be due to the fact that workers with large shares of these skills select into middle-wage 
occupations that require large shares of manual skills. 
Finally, Table A.4.5 in the Appendix shows the decomposition results for the full sample. 
Again, the results for the full sample are similar to those of the VET sample, both in direction 
and size of the effects. However, as pointed out previously, composition effects in the full 
sample are largely increasing wage inequality, while they play a minor role for the VET sample.  
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Table 4.6: Detailed decomposition results, 1991/92-1998/99 
Inequality Measure 90-10  90-50  50-10 
A: Detailed Composition Effects     
Cognitive Skills  -0.0112***  -0.0051***  -0.0061*** 
  (0.00010)  (0.00010)  (0.00020) 
Interactive Skills  0.0353***  0.0267***  0.0086*** 
  (0.00039)  (0.00034)  (0.00073) 
Manual Skills  0.0020***  0.0104***  -0.0084*** 
  (0.00056)  (0.00046)  (0.00102) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Composition    
Effect 
0.0369***  0.0299***  0.0070*** 
(0.00065)  (0.00049)  (0.00114) 
B: Detailed Wage Structure Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0353***  0.0156***  0.0197*** 
  (0.00057)  (0.00042)  (0.00099) 
Interactive Skills  0.0062***  0.0043***  0.0019*** 
  (0.00018)  (0.00012)  (0.00030) 
Manual Skills  0.0408  0.0054***  0.0354 
  (0.00096)  (0.00074)  (0.00170) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Wage  
Structure Effect 
0.0437***  0.0228***  0.0209*** 
(0.00071)  (0.00056)  (0.00127) 
   Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys. 
   Standard errors are in parentheses. 
   Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
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Table 4.7 presents the decomposition results for our final period, 1998/99 to 2005/06, when 
both lower-tail and upper-tail inequality continue rising. Panel A shows the composition effects. 
Similar to the 1990s, the composition effects of our skill measures are very small. However, 
the total composition effects (Panel A, row 6) show that the underlying characteristics of the 
population, in terms of characteristics such as age and experience, have been diverging. Just 
like in the 1990s, the effect sizes are, however, moderate: Composition effects raise top-end 
wage inequality by about one log point and bottom-end inequality by about two log points. 
Panel B shows the wage structure effects, which are again more interesting in terms of 
economic significance. At the upper part of the distribution, increases in the returns to cognitive 
skills are driving almost all of the wage structure effects, while changes in the returns to other 
types of skills are unimportant. This finding shows how the trend of the 1990s continues through 
the mid-2000s. At the upper part of the distribution, changes in the returns to cognitive skills 
account for almost all of the changes in wage inequality. This finding might indicate that, since 
the beginning of the 1990s, the demand for cognitive skills has been increasing and workers at 
the upper part of the distribution, who mostly use cognitive skills, receive substantial wage 
increases.   
Changes in returns to manual skills show a different pattern. While the returns to manual 
skills decrease at the upper part of the distribution, they largely increase at the lower part of the 
distribution and account for almost all of the increase in lower tail wage inequality. This 
development indicates that manual skills decrease in importance for occupations at the upper 
part of the distribution, while they increase in importance for occupations in the middle. As 
pointed out previously, due to the nature of the decomposition analysis, we can only speculate 
about the factors increasing or decreasing returns to different types of skills, but cannot provide 
a causal interpretation.  
Finally, the results for the full sample (table A.4.6 in the Appendix) show similar patterns 
to those just described for the VET sample: Changes in the composition of skills hardly affect 
changes in the wage structure. With regards to the composition effects, factors other than skills 
are the main drivers of inequality. Changes in the returns to skills, on the other hand, are the 
main drivers for wage inequality over the whole distribution. Increasing returns to cognitive 
skills increase wages at the upper part of the distribution, thereby increasing the 90-50 gap. 
Increasing returns to manual skills increase wages at the middle of the distribution, thereby 
increasing the 50-10 gap.   
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Table 4.7: Detailed decomposition results, 1998/99-2005/06 
Inequality Measure 90-10  90-50  50-10 
A: Detailed Composition Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0016***  0.0025***  -0.0010*** 
  (0.00013)  (0.00009)  (0.00022) 
Interactive Skills  -0.0006***  -0.0003***  -0.0003*** 
  (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00001) 
Manual Skills  -0.0067***  0.0063***  -0.0129*** 
  (0.00018)  (0.00011)  (0.00029) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Composition    
Effect 
0.0285***  0.0113***  0.0172*** 
(0.00042)  (0.00001)  (0.00043) 
B: Detailed Wage Structure Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0341***  0.0358***  -0.0017*** 
  (0.00099)  (0.00065)  (0.00164) 
Interactive Skills  -0.0020***  -0.0060***  0.0040*** 
  (0.00140)  (0.00094)  (0.00234) 
Manual Skills  0.0486**  -0.0070***  0.0556** 
  (0.00075)  (0.00049)  (0.00124) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Wage  
Structure Effect 
0.0878***  0.0369***  0.0509*** 
(0.00051)  (0.00034)  (0.00085) 
   Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys. 
   Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
West Germany has experienced substantial changes in the wage structure over the past three 
decades. During this time, also the skill structure of occupations has drastically changed. In this 
chapter, we relate these changes in skills to the observed changes in the wage structure. We 
combine long-running register data with longitudinal skill information. The skills data allows 
constructing time-variant occupational skill bundles and analyzing skills and wages in a 
dynamic setting. We apply straightforward and uni-dimensional skill measures, distinguishing 
between cognitive, interactive, and manual skills.  
In the empirical analysis, we decompose changes in wages into their contributing factors, 
using the RIF regression-based decomposition introduced by Firpo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux (2009). This decomposition method consists of two steps. In the first step, we use a 
reweighting method to divide the distributional differences between two groups into wage 
structure effects and composition effects. In the second step, we further decompose the wage 
structure effects and the composition effects into the contribution of single explanatory 
variables using RIF regression. These steps allow moving beyond mere descriptive statistics 
and breaking down observed wage changes into changes due to varying worker characteristics 
and changes in the returns to those characteristics. This exact quantification allows assessing 
the role that changes in skills have played in recent changes in the wage structure.  
In our main analysis, we perform the decompositions on a restricted sample of workers with 
a vocational education and training degree. In the Appendix, we report the results for the full 
sample. The most striking finding from the decomposition analyses is that changes in skill 
requirements largely account for changes in wages and that the effects are non-monotonic, 
which emphasizes the necessity for a detailed decomposition at different parts of the 
distribution. Specifically, we find that changes in the composition of skills only play a minor 
role in the VET sample. These results show that the underlying skill bundles of the restricted 
sample of VET workers change in parallel so that they do not provide a large source of wage 
heterogeneity during the observation period. However, the returns to skills are changing rather 
dramatically and contribute to a large part to the observed changes in wages. Changes in returns 
to skills are most pronounced during the 1990s and the mid-2000s. In earlier years, changes in 
returns to other characteristic such as e.g., experience are largely driving wage inequality.  
Between 1991 and 1999, top-wage inequality increases by about five log points and bottom-
end inequality increases by about three log points. Wages increase both at the top and in the 
middle of the distribution, and these increases are largely driven by increases in returns to 
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cognitive skills. Specifically, at the top, increases in the returns to cognitive skills account for 
about 65 percent of the wage structure effect. In addition, in the middle, increases in returns to 
manual skills are increasing the 50-10 gap. Between 1999 and 2006, top-end wage inequality 
increases by another five log points and bottom-end inequality increases by about seven log 
points. Again, increases in the returns to skills are again largely driving these increases in 
inequality. At the upper part of the distribution, increases in the returns to cognitive skills 
account for about 95 percent of the wage structure effect. At the lower part of the distribution, 
increases in the returns to manual skills account for more than 100 percent of the wage structure 
effect.  
From the beginning of the 1990s through the mid-2000s, at the top, changes in skill 
requirements benefit workers with large shares of cognitive skills, whereas workers with large 
shares of interactive or manual skills are excluded from the wage increase. In the middle of the 
distribution, throughout the 1990s, changes in skill requirements benefit workers with a larger 
share of both cognitive and manual skills, whereas workers with large shares of interactive 
skills are excluded from the wage increase. From 1999 to 2006, returns to cognitive skills are 
no longer increasing for workers in the middle. However, workers with large shares of manual 
skills are still largely benefitting from increasing returns to manual skills. The reason why 
changes affect upper- and lower-tail inequality differently is that differently skilled workers are 
not uniformly distributed along the wage distribution.  
We conclude that workers react differently to technological change and that education 
curricula should be revised and updated according to changes in the demand for skills. The 
difference in educational systems in Germany and Anglo-Saxon countries might explain why 
Germany did not experience the same dramatic wage shifts. A VET system that is market-
driven and where firms contribute in designing education curricula seems to be an efficient and 
sustainable educational system. 
  




Table A.4.1: Descriptive statistics of the full sample  
  Log real daily wages 
  Observations Mean St. Dev. 
Panel A. Men    
1978-79 389,409 3.731 0.263 
1985-86 384,267 3.785 0.307 
1991-92 424,320 3.828 0.314 
1998-99 393,043 3.826 0.361 
2005-06 381,962 3.790 0.431 
Panel B. Women    
1978-79 187,016 3.372 0.394 
1985-86 195,681 3.431 0.413 
1991-92 237,496 3.519 0.424 
1998-99 218,414 3.563 0.458 
2005-06 191,090 3.528 0.521 
Notes: SIAB data 1978-2006, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure A.4.1: Changes in log wages by percentile, male workers, 1978 to 2006 
 
Notes: Sample includes male employees in West Germany aged 20-60, working full-
time. Wages are based on average daily earnings, in euro, and deflated to 1978 wages. 
Wages that are centered at social security maximum are stochastically allocated based 
on a Tobit model.  
SIAB data 1978-2006, authors’ calculations.  
 
 
Figure A.4.2: Changes in log wages by percentile, female workers, 1978 to 2006  
 
Notes: Sample includes female employees in West Germany aged 20-60, working full-
time. Wages are based on average daily earnings, in euro, and deflated to 1978 wages. 
Wages that are centered at social security maximum are stochastically allocated based 
on a Tobit model.  
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Table A.4.2: Aggregate decomposition results, full sample 
Inequality Measure 90-10 90-50 50-10 
A: 1978/79 to 1985/86 
   
   
Total Change 0.0768*** 0.0662*** 0.0106*** 
 
(0.00006) (0.00033) (0.00027) 
Composition -0.0137*** -0.0163*** 0.0026*** 
 
(0.00021) (0.00057) (0.00036) 
Wage Structure 0.0905*** 0.0826*** 0.0079*** 
 
(0.00023) (0.00068) (0.00045) 
B: 1985/86 to 1991/92 
   
   
Total Change -0.0007*** -0.0249*** 0.0242*** 
 
(0.00001) (0.00035) (0.00036) 
Composition -0.0040*** -0.0322*** 0.0282*** 
 
(0.00012) (0.00020) (0.00032) 
Wage Structure 0.0033*** 0.0072*** -0.0039*** 
 
(0.00005) (0.00039) (0.00044) 
C: 1991/92 to 1998/99 
   
   
Total Change 0.1166*** 0.0512*** 0.0654*** 
 
(0.00035) (0.00025) (0.0006) 
Composition 0.0623*** 0.0470*** 0.0153*** 
 
(0.00067) (0.00039) (0.0011) 
Wage Structure 0.0550*** 0.0050*** 0.0500*** 
 
(0.00071) (0.00046) (0.0012) 
D: 1998/99 to 2005/06 
   
   
Total Change 0.1959*** 0.0653*** 0.1306*** 
 
(0.00095) (0.00023) (0.00118) 
Composition 0.0464*** 0.0153*** 0.0312*** 
  
(0.00072) (0.00004) (0.00076) 
Wage Structure 0.1487*** 0.0501*** 0.0986*** 
 
(0.00097) (0.00029) (0.00126) 
  Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys. 
  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.4.3: Detailed decomposition results, 1978/79-1985/86, full sample 
Inequality Measure 90-10  90-50  50-10 
A: Detailed Composition Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0195***  0.0109***  0.0086*** 
  (0.00007)  (0.00013)  (0.00005) 
Interactive Skills  0.0223***  0.0139***  0.0084*** 
  (0.00014)  (0.00015)  (0.00002) 
Manual Skills  -0.0122***  -0.0083***  -0.0039*** 
  (0.00015)  (0.00039)  (0.00024) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Composition  
Effect 
-0.0137***  -0.0163***  0.0026*** 
(0.00021)  (0.00057)  (0.00036) 
B: Detailed Wage Structure Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0335***  0.0256***  0.0079*** 
  (0.00004)  (0.00019)  (0.00015) 
Interactive Skills  0.0030***  0.0014***  0.0017*** 
  (0.00004)  (0.00017)  (0.00013) 
Manual Skills  0.0454***  0.0302***  0.0152*** 
  (0.00018)  (0.00058)  (0.00040) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Wage  
Structure Effect 
 0.0905***  0.0826***  0.0079*** 
 (0.00023)  (0.00068)  (0.00045) 
   Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys.  
   Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.4.4: Detailed decomposition results, 1985/86 – 1991/92, full sample 
Inequality Measure 90-10  90-50  50-10 
A: Detailed Composition Effects     
Cognitive Skills  -0.0048  -0.0030  -0.0018*** 
  (0.00006)  (0.00007)  (0.00001) 
Interactive Skills  -0.0384***  -0.0282***  -0.0102*** 
  (0.00011)  (0.00018)  (0.00007) 
Manual Skills  -0.0019***  -0.0011***  -0.0007*** 
  (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00004) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Composition  
Effect 
-0.0040***  -0.0322***  0.0282*** 
(0.00012)  (0.00020)  (0.00032) 
B: Detailed Wage Structure Effects     
Cognitive Skills  -0.0052  -0.0001  -0.0051*** 
  (0.00001)  (0.00030)  (0.00031) 
Interactive Skills  0.0282***  0.0273  0.0009** 
  (0.000004)  (0.00029)  (0.00028) 
Manual Skills  0.0032***  0.0015***  0.0016*** 
  (0.000002)  (0.00020)  (0.00020) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Wage  
Structure Effect 
 0.0033***  0.0072***  -0.0039*** 
 (0.00005)  (0.00039)  (0.00044) 
   Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys. 
   Standard errors are in parentheses. 





CHAPTER 4: CHANGES IN SKILLS AND WAGES OF MIDDLE-SKILLED WORKERS 
 125 
Table A.4.5: Detailed decomposition results, 1991/92 – 1998/99, full sample 
Inequality Measure 90-10  90-50  50-10 
A: Detailed Composition Effects     
Cognitive Skills  -0.0141***  -0.0060***  -0.0082*** 
  (0.00014)  (0.00009)  (0.00023) 
Interactive Skills  0.0422***  0.0389***  0.0033*** 
  (0.00041)  (0.00027)  (0.00068) 
Manual Skills  0.0130***  0.0204***  -0.0074*** 
  (0.00055)  (0.00034)  (0.00089) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Composition  
Effect 
0.0623***  0.0470***  0.0153*** 
(0.00067)  (0.00039)  (0.00106) 
B: Detailed Wage Structure Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0442***  0.0177***  0.0265*** 
  (0.00058)  (0.00043)  (0.00101) 
Interactive Skills  -0.0164***  -0.0096***  -0.0068*** 
  (0.00020)  (0.00016)  (0.00037) 
Manual Skills  0.0399***  0.0044***  0.0355*** 
  (0.00092)  (0.00063)  (0.00155) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Wage  
Structure Effect 
 0.0550***  0.0050***  0.0500*** 
 (0.00071)  (0.00046)  (0.00117) 
    Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys. 
    Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.4.6: Detailed decomposition results, 1998/99 – 2005/06, full sample 
Inequality Measure 90-10  90-50  50-10 
A: Detailed Composition Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0021***  -0.0018***  0.0039*** 
  (0.00037)  (0.00010)  (0.00047) 
Interactive Skills  -0.0011***  -0.0005***  -0.0006*** 
  (0.00007)  (0.00004)  (0.00003) 
Manual Skills  -0.0281***  0.0119***  -0.0400*** 
  (0.00046)  (0.00012)  (0.00059) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Composition  
Effect 
0.0464***  0.0153***  0.0312*** 
(0.00072)  (0.00004)  (0.00076) 
B: Detailed Wage Structure Effects     
Cognitive Skills  0.0313***  0.0066***  0.0247 
  (0.00184)  (0.00052)  (0.00236) 
Interactive Skills  0.0251***  -0.0080***  0.0331*** 
  (0.00255)  (0.00080)  (0.00335) 
Manual Skills  0.1302***  -0.0148***  0.1450*** 
  (0.00146)  (0.00043)  (0.00189) 
Individual Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Wage  
Structure Effect 
 0.1487***  0.0501***  0.0986*** 
 (0.00097)  (0.00029)  (0.00126) 
    Notes: SIAB data linked with BIBB/IAB Employment Surveys. 
    Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.4.7: Vocational occupations in Germany  
Title of Occupation 
Miners, Stone-breaker, Mineral Processing  Beverage Production, Milk Production 
Concrete and Cement Finisher, Bricklayer, Mason 
Potter, Ceramicist, Gaffer Carpenter 
Chemical Processing Road Builder 
Plastics and Polymer Processing Plasterer  
Paper and Pulp Processing Interior Decorator, Interior Designer 
Printer, Typesetter, Typographer Joiner, Cabinet Maker 
Wood, Lumber, and Timber Processing Painter 
Metal and Iron Manufacturer  Product Tester  
Molding, Shaping Crane Driver, Crane Operator, Skinner,  
Metal Presser and Molder Technical Service Personnel 
Metal Polisher, Sander, Buffer Sales Personnel 
Welder, Brazing, Soldering Banker 
Blacksmith, Farrier, Forger, Plumber Traders, Trading Personnel 
Locksmith Truck Driver, Conductor 
Mechanic, Machinist, Repairmen Sailor, Seaman, Navigator, Mariner  
Tool and Dye Maker, Instrument Mechanic  Mail Carrier and Handler, Postal Clerk  
Metal Craftsman Storekeeper, Warehouse Keeper 
Electrician, Electrical Installation Accountant, Bookkeeper 
Assembler Office Clerk 
Weaver, Spinner, Knitter, Wool Trade  Guard, Watchman, Police, Security Personnel  
Tailor, Textile Worker Musician 
Shoemaker Nurse, Dietician, Physical Therapist 
Baker Personal Hygiene Technician 
Butcher Cleaning Service Worker 
 Notes: list provided by the SIAB. 















Summary and Conclusion on  
the Returns to Investment in Vocational 
Education and Training 
This doctoral thesis contributes to the research on human capital investments by empirically 
analyzing how to secure returns on such investments for different actors in the educational 
system. Throughout the chapters, the focus lies on vocational education and training (VET), 
where both firms and individuals are involved in the investment decision. For firms, realizing 
a return on investment crucially depends on whether they are able to retain the workers they 
have trained in order to build up a highly productive workforce. For individuals, realizing a 
return on investment crucially depends on whether they acquire a skill set that is productive in 
many different firms in order to stay flexible and to maximize earnings. Moreover, to secure 
returns in the long run, both actors have to invest in skill sets that allow adapting to changing 
market environments. In a series of empirical investigations, this doctoral thesis yields 
important new insights into successful investment strategies for firms and individuals, both in 
the short and in the long run.  
Returns to education from the firm’s perspective: retaining VET graduates 
In my first contribution, I investigate a strategy, which allows training firms embedded in 
weakly regulated labor markets to retain their training graduates. The new training literature 
explains a firm’s incentive to invest in general training through the existence of imperfect labor 
markets. This literature argues that labor market institutions and regulations allow training firms 
to pay their graduates less than the market wage for skilled workers, thereby recouping their 
initial investment costs. However, this explanation is difficult to reconcile for countries such as 




question therefore arises of why Swiss firms would provide and pay for training if they cannot 
rely on a favorable market environment that secures them a return on their investment. 
The solution I investigate is a firm-based strategy that is independent from external market 
conditions. Combining findings from the new training literature with personnel economic 
theory, I argue that training firms can use performance pay to incentivize their most productive 
graduates to stay. These graduates have two main reasons to stay: First, they expect a higher 
compensation because performance pay rewards their individual productivity. Second, they 
expect to gain from positive externalities from training. Therefore, the most productive 
graduates should reach their highest productivity and thus their highest wage level with the 
current training firm, providing them with a strong incentive to stay.  
The empirical analysis confirms my hypothesis. I find that training firms that use 
performance pay have a significantly higher rate of internal training graduates—defined as the 
proportion of VET graduates staying with the training firm with respect to all VET workers in 
that firm—than training firms that use fixed pay. I show that imperfect labor markets might not 
be a necessary condition for firms to invest in general training. Instead, in weakly regulated 
labor markets, training firms might resort to different strategies to incentivize their graduates 
to stay.  
This chapter thus contributes to the new training literature by providing an additional 
answer to the question of why firms would offer and pay for general training. I argue and 
provide evidence that training firms in weakly regulated labor markets might resort to different 
payment strategies to incentivize their graduates to stay. Therefore, I show that strong labor 
market regulations and institutions are not a conditio sine qua non for an effective Germanic-
style dual VET system. 
Returns to education from the individual’s perspective: mobility and wages 
In my second contribution, I analyze individual investment decisions and focus on the skill set 
that individuals acquire during their vocational education. I investigate the value of different 
types of skill sets and show how these skill sets determine individuals’ labor market transitions. 
To empirically measure the specificity of VET occupations, I apply Lazear’s skill weights 
model (2009). Lazear assumes that single skills are general in nature but firms use them in 
different combinations and with different weights. His approach provides an ideal foundation 
to operationalize the specificity of VET occupations. I characterize these occupations by 




specificity. I then investigate whether, and if so, how the so degree of specificity determines 
worker mobility. I define mobility as the ease with which workers can switch between 
occupations.  
Lazear’s model also allows investigating the relationship between specificity and wages. 
Lazear assumes that the higher the specificity, the higher the wage but the higher also the wage 
loss after layoffs. I analyze if these predictions can be verified empirically. Finally, I construct 
a measure for the skill distance between occupations, drawing on recent literature that 
investigates the source of human capital specificity (Poletaev and Robinson 2008; Gathmann 
and Schoenberg 2010; Robinson 2011). The skill distance indicates how similar two 
occupations are in terms of their underlying skills.  
I find that VET occupations differ greatly in their degree of specificity and that this degree 
of specificity largely determines workers’ mobility and wages. First, I show that workers trained 
in more specific occupations are indeed less mobile than workers trained in more general 
occupations. Second, I find that the degree of specificity has a significantly positive effect on 
wages. Individuals trained in more specific occupations receive a wage premium compared to 
individuals in less specific occupations. Third, I find that the larger the skill distance between 
two occupations, the higher the wage loss for workers who change between these occupations. 
Taken together, these findings suggest a risk-return trade-off for investments in more specific 
skill bundles. While workers trained in more specific occupations are less mobile than workers 
in more general occupations, they are compensated for their lower mobility with higher wages. 
Returns to education and technological change: changing demand for skills 
In the second chapter, I assume that skill bundles are time constant. This assumption implies 
that, for example, a machinist who received his vocational education in the 1990s has the same 
skill set as a machinist who received it in the 2000s. Since my observation period covers six 
years only, this assumption should hold for the analysis. However, if I enlarge the observation 
period, this assumption is unlikely to hold. Of course, occupational skill bundles might adjust 
to changing demands for skills.  
In my third contribution, I relax the assumption of time-constant skill bundles and 
investigate how changes within occupational skill bundles affect workers’ wages. More 
specifically, I investigate how structural change and technological shifts affect the overall 
demand for skills and how this changing demand affects the market value of individuals’ human 




occupational skill bundles, I construct time-variant skill bundles, distinguishing between 
cognitive, interactive, and manual skills. I then investigate how the share of these skills changes 
within occupations and relate these changes to changes in the wage structure.  
I document large changes in skill requirements over the observation period. The way in 
which these changes affect workers’ wages depends on their skill bundles. As a general result, 
increasing returns to cognitive skills have led workers with large shares of cognitive skills to 
experience large wage gains, while decreasing returns to manual skills have led workers with 
large shares of manual skills to experience wage losses. The reason why skill changes affect 
inequality differently at different parts of the distribution is that differently skilled workers are 
not uniformly distributed along the wage distribution. In addition, I show that wages of middle-
skilled workers behaved similarly to the ones of the overall population: Wages fell rather 
sharply at the bottom end; they increased rather sharply at the top end, and increased more 
modestly in the middle.  
My full sample analysis reveals that, overall; wages of middle-skilled workers have 
remained largely stable. I do not find strong evidence that middle-skilled workers have been hit 
particularly hard by technological change, as it has been the case for the US and the UK. In 
Germany, technological change has not made middle-skill occupations obsolete, but rather the 
skill requirements within occupations have fundamentally changed. Because the wages of 
middle-skilled have remained largely stable over the observation period, my analysis suggests 
that middle-skilled workers were able to adapt to these technological changes.  
Implications for the firm and the individual 
Combining the findings of my three contributions reveals several important insights into what 
firms and individuals can do to secure returns on their educational investments. From the firm’s 
point of view, the analyses show that firms’ training participation does not exclusively depend 
on a favorable market environment. Instead, firms might as well use their internal resources to 
incentivize their graduates to stay. An example of such an internal resource is the use of 
performance pay. If firms can minimize the risk of losing newly trained workers, they will also 
be more willing to provide general training instead of firm-specific training. General training 
should in turn incentivize individuals to participate in training, because they acquire skills that 
improve their mobility and earnings.  
In addition, my analyses suggest that firms’ involvement in the design of education curricula 




cope with technological change. Indeed, while most Anglo-Saxon countries underwent 
dramatic changes in wages and labor force participation of their middle-skilled workers, wages 
and employment of middle-skilled workers remained largely stable in countries such as 
Germany, where training firms take a leading part in designing VET curricula. 
From the individual’s point of view, the analyses show that skill specificity hinders workers’ 
mobility in both the short term and the long term. While workers are compensated with a wage 
premium for the lower mobility in the short run, skill specificity is likely to turn into a 
disadvantage in the long run whenever market forces fundamentally change the demand for 
skills. If individuals specialize in a small number of skills only and those skills become obsolete, 
their human capital becomes obsolete as well. Individuals should therefore acquire a broader 
skill set to diversify their risk. Moreover, they are well advised to participate in further training 
to update their skills in accordance with changing skill demands.  
Aligning the interests of firms and individuals   
My analyses provide a more differentiated picture of both the conflicting and the compatible 
interests of firms and individuals. Their interests are conflicting when focusing on the short run. 
While individuals prefer training in more general skills to ensure their labor market flexibility, 
firms are more inclined to invest in more specific training, precisely because of graduates’ 
limited outside options, which minimizes firms’ risk of losing them. To align these conflicting 
interests and to incentivize both actors to participate in training, curricula should be neither 
completely specific nor completely general. While they should be specific to the extent that 
firms profit more from participating in training than from hiring externally trained workers, 
they should also be sufficiently general to ensure graduates’ mobility.  
However, firms’ and individuals’ interests are largely compatible when focusing on the long 
run. To secure returns to education in the long run, individuals need to have a broad knowledge 
and skill base, which allows them to respond to changing skill demands and to acquire new 
skills over their career cycle. Because foreseeing future market dynamics is almost impossible, 
only this broad base endows individuals with the possibility of adapting to change. The most 
rationale strategy appears to be hedging the risk and investing in a more general skill set in 
which the depreciation of one skill can be counteracted by the appreciation of another skill. 
This strategy makes sense both for firms and individuals. Although workers’ flexibility 
increases a firm’s risk of losing them to competitors, it also increases firm performance in the 




each new technology wave. Contrarily, a more generally trained workforce that is keeping up 
with the technological frontier through continuous training, allows firms to react quickly to 
technological change and to exploit it for their benefit. 
Therefore, both firms and individuals are likely to achieve higher benefits from general training 
than from specific training. The crucial point of discussion thus is how to align these long-term 
interests with short-term incentives. One promising solution might be to use performance pay. 
My analyses show that graduates are more inclined to stay with their training firm if their wages 
have a performance pay component, which guarantees them a direct reward for their higher 
productivity. Similarly, incumbent workers will be more inclined to stay and work harder if 
firms use performance pay.  
Ideas for future research  
In a next step, it would be fruitful to replicate my studies with data from different countries. For 
the first project, it would be particularly interesting to use data from countries with a strong 
VET system and a similar labor market regime as Switzerland, such as Denmark, to investigate 
if one can find a similar performance pay effect. In addition, an analysis of what types of firms 
participate in training might produce highly insightful results. Because performance pay firms 
have a higher retention success than firms with fixed salaries, one should find that these 
performance pay firms should also be more likely to invest in training. 
Regarding the second project, one could further investigate whether the VET content is 
more or less specific in Switzerland than it is in other countries and whether, consequently, 
VET workers differ in their mobility across countries.  
Finally, drawing on findings from the third project, one could focus on workers in 
occupations that disappear due to technological change. Following the labor market transitions 
of workers in these occupations would allow a better understanding of how workers in such 
disappearing occupations cope with the fact that most of their skills have become obsolete.  
Policy implications and conclusion 
My findings point to several policy implications. First, as it is already in practice in Switzerland, 
policy makers should actively involve firms in updating education curricula and defining 
further training contents. Whenever firms experience changes in the market environment, they 
should be able to transfer these changes to the educational system to ensure that apprentices 




Second, policy makers should be made more aware that continuous training and lifelong 
learning are crucial for incumbent workers to keep up with technological change. While many 
studies for the United States and the United Kingdom paint a dark picture for middle-skilled 
workers, my analyses for Germany reveal that middle-skilled workers have hardly lost any 
ground. I show that technological change has not made all middle-skill occupations obsolete. 
Rather, technological change has depressed the demand for certain types of skills, while it has 
increased the demand for other types.  
Skill bundles within occupations have adapted to technological change and those workers 
who have adjusted their skill bundles accordingly were able to benefit from these changes. If 
workers remained with their original skill bundles, they would have had to face large 
depreciation rates on their human capital. However, workers who acquired the newly required 
skills, could actively participate in and benefit from technological change. A workforce whose 
skills are up-to-date improves the productivity of firms, enhances the labor market opportunities 
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